• International Area Studies Review
• /
• v.21 no.4
• /
• pp.141-158
• /
• 2017

The purpose of this study is to firstly estimate the inflation rate of North Korea using relative purchasing power parity. Most of the existing studies use North Korean rice prices as proxy to explain changes in North Korean prices. In this study, North Korea's price was estimated by applying purchasing power parity, which was used to estimate the price of socialist countries in the past, to North Korea. Second, it analyzes the impact of North Korea's price inflation after the institutional change of currency reform. We looked at the movements of North Korean prices after the institutional change of currency reform and compared it with the post-monetary reform of other socialist countries. We examine the impact of currency reform on North Korea, focusing on the price. As a result, after the currency reform in 2009, North Korea experienced hyperinflation. The North Korean inflation rate in the model was 3,010.0% in 2010, 195.0% in 2011, 68.0% in 2012 and 48.3% in 2013. After the currency reform of North Korea, the inflation rate is much higher than the socialist countries such as China and Vietnam who had experienced currency reform before. North Korea's monetary reforms are considered to have failed because of the side effects of hyperinflation.

• East Asian Economic Review
• /
• v.21 no.1
• /
• pp.81-100
• /
• 2017

This study measures the degree of dollarization in North Korea using results from a survey of 231 North Korean refugees. Specifically, we compare foreign currency use of households as both store-of-value substitutes (i.e., asset substitution) and transaction substitutes (i.e., currency substitution) before and after the confiscatory currency reform of 2009. The degree of dollarization has advanced since the currency reform in terms of both asset and currency substitutions. Survey results also indicate that the Chinese yuan is frequently used in the Sino-North Korean border area, whereas the US dollar is predominantly used in non-border areas. Furthermore, foreign currency increasingly serves as a medium of exchange not only for large transactions but also for smaller transactions, such as food purchases.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.32 no.4
• /
• pp.153-195
• /
• 2010

The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The International financial institutions (IFIs) that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body. There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. The share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell and the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the international monetary system (IMS), and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. The main focus of this paper will be the IMS reform and the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings. The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows. First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market. Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS, from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform. The key in the former is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. That leads us to the second option - building a stronger globalfinancial safety net. Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones. Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. The transition would require close collaboration among the major players. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. The challenge is how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8.

• East Asian Economic Review
• /
• v.26 no.4
• /
• pp.279-304
• /
• 2022

This paper quantitatively analyzes the current status of North Korean consumer payment instruments through a questionnaire survey of 292 North Korean defectors. In the 2010s, it was found that the payment experience ratio of domestic currency cash and grain decreased, while the payment experience ratio of foreign currency cash increased. The use of foreign currency reached a stage where it was spread not only as a store of value but also as a medium of exchange. However, the most frequently used payment instrument by North Korean consumers was still domestic currency cash. By region, in inland urban areas both domestic currency cash and U.S. dollars are used and in the North Korea-China border region both domestic currency cash and Chinese yuan are used, while in inland rural areas dollarization does not occur because both domestic currency cash and grain are used. Meanwhile, despite the stable price trend during 2013-2019, the dollarization hysteresis effect is appearing, and both the purchasing power risk theory and the network externality theory are considered to have explanatory power for the cause. The results of this paper suggest that as dollarization is intensifying, it is expected that more costs such as shortages of commodities will be incurred than in the past if North Korea's de-dollarization policy is reimplemented. Also, in the case of domestic currency cards, which the North Korean authorities introduced in 2015 as part of a means of financial reform, this paper suggests that it may continue to be difficult for domestic currency cards to normalize official finance under the dollarization hysteresis.

• East Asian Economic Review
• /
• v.16 no.1
• /
• pp.3-23
• /
• 2012

The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of international monetary and financial system reform. The current system is deemed to be no longer adequate to meet the needs of a complex, integrated world economy. With regards to the reform of the international monetary system, there have been various proposals both in demand and supply sides. These include proposals to build a stronger global financial safety net, to diversify the supply of international reserve currency and so on. These proposals face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. Given this situation, a practical transition would be to strengthen policy coordination among the major economies and to reform the International Monetary Fund. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20. Increased status and representation of Asian countries in the G20 give both privileges and responsibilities to Asians. To meet these responsibilities, Asians should put forth greater efforts to develop their intellectual leadership in global economic issues through creating new forum and institutions.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
• /
• v.15 no.1
• /
• pp.75-92
• /
• 1999

In this study, the present state of fiscal crisis for local governments after IMF is analyzed, firstly. its implications Characteristics of structural reform of finance after IMF bailout in Korea are examined, secondly. Since Korea was shocked by the currency crisis at the end of 1997, its local governments have also faced fiscal difficulties. The Depression of national and local economies led to decreases in tax revenues of local governments. And these shrunken revenues led to their expenditure cuts. Many investment plans were curtailed, and ordinary expenditures were also reduced sharply. The negative influences of the currency crisis on local government's finances can be examined in terms of fiscal revenue, fiscal spending, and debt burden. As a result many local governments are now experiencing fiscal stress, and some of them are even faced with fiscal crisis although the possibility of extreme measures, such as moratoriums or bankruptcies, is very slim. This is due in part to the weight of debt in local governments' budgets having remained small since the debt of local governments has been controlled by the central government. Another reason is that, central government, which functions as a lender of last resort for the local governments, will pay the debt for them. Also, without a legal system which stipulates the adjudication of bankruptcy for municipalities in Korea, local Korean governments have no legal right to declare bankruptcy. Although not a single municipality has fallen into insolvency, yet, this trend will continue to deepen as the recession continues and may lead to a situation where manu local governments fall into virtual bankruptcy in the near future, and its effects on society, as a whole, will be serious. Therefore, measures to prevent and overcome such an extreme situation are necessary, but both short-and long-term policies should be to cope with the current fiscal crisis and to prevent the deepening of the current situation.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
• /
• v.38 no.5
• /
• pp.754-768
• /
• 2003

The purpose of this study is to analyze how financial and commercial space in Jeonju had changed after Japanese rule. The biggest local bank was located near the Chungangdong post office in Taisyoudoori and the other bank facilities were located near the Jeonrabuk-do provincial office and Nammun market. Periodic markets and permanent stores were major commercial activities in Jeonju. Many stores and commercial companies established by many Chosun merchants near Nammun markets. Chosun commercial companies were superior to Japanese commercial companies in both number and capital scale. Japanese commercial companies were concentrated on Taisyoudoori(Jungang Road). Commercial activities in Jeonju were segregated by ethnic group. Financial and commercial activities were concentrated on Taisyoudoori and Ekimaedoori(Nammun Road).

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Crop Science Conference
• /
• 1998.10a
• /
• pp.336-352
• /
• 1998

The horticultural seed industry has made great progress in the last fifty years of its history after the independence of this country. The industry has accomplished self-sufficiency in major vegetable seeds and has even gained international competitive edge in certain crop seeds, particularly in hybrid cultivar development. However, the industry is facing a crisis at present coming from excessive competition among the domestic seed companies as well as the foreign currency crisis of the country. Several major seed companies have already been acquired by multinational corporations. Many people in the country as well as agriculturists are concerned about this situation. Although it is true that the industry is undergoing hard times, this crisis can be turned into a chance for making new progress depending on the joint efforts of the groups responsible, i.e., private companies, public institutions, and policy makers. Therefore, we have to turn this crisis into an opportunity for self-reform and progress. We should not be discouraged or give up. We Propose some ideas for the Progress of the seed industry. Public institutions and policy makers should do such things in cooperation as 1) training human resources for future breeders, 2) securing a wide range of genetic resources and improvement of the management system, 3) basic science research including biotechnology, 4) releasing breeding stocks from germplasm enhancement through use of exotic accessions, 5) support for breeding region- or use-specific cultivars, and 6) collection of foreign agricultural information for breeding cultivars for overseas markets. Eventually the responsible group for the final development of commercial cultivars, production, sales and management is private companies. Therefore, private companies also should have to do their best to develop competitive cultivars with a missionary spirit and endeavor for both domestic and overseas markets in cooperation with public institutions. Management based on competition, professionalism and rationalism is also urged. We are going to conclude with optimism that we can make a new vault of progress once the private and public sectors closely cooperate for the development of Korean horticultural seed industry by overcoming this crisis.

• International Area Studies Review
• /
• v.22 no.2
• /
• pp.163-186
• /
• 2018

The purpose of this study is to analyze the institutional conditions and problems for the transition to the North Korean economic system. As a research method, we first analyzed the legislative processes of 4th stage market reform policies (liberalization, privatization, privatization, and corporation) by major economic transition countries. And we found out the difference with North Korea. Based on this, it analyzed the process of institutionalization of North Korea's 4th stage economic reform policies (7.1 measures, comprehensive market policies, Currency reform, 6.28 policy). According to research, There are three important conditions that can not compare the changes of the North Korean market economy with those of the transition economies. First, the internal and external conditions and environment for the transition of the economic system and the role of the state and civil society are very different. Second, the means and objectives of the policy decision process and the implementation process are different. Third, it differs absolutely in terms of the nature and effectiveness of the nation's political and economic policies. Fourth, the priority, contents, and legislation process of economic policies for economic reform differ considerably from those of North Korea. Especially, when discussing the possibility of transition to the 'Chinese model', it is accompanied a considerable risk. It is because the purpose of market entry of control power in North Korea and their survival network are quite unique. In addition, China's domestic market size, population size, and type of control are quite different from North Korea. A necessary and sufficient condition for the transition of the North Korean economic system is the relaxation of physical control mechanisms and institutions in the market area. Next, it is necessary to make a legitimate institutionalization as well as an entire survey on the illegal ownership market. Based on this, it is necessary to gradually change the dependence of the domestic market on China to South Korea. In other words, this is a paradigm shift in the semi-controlled power exclusion, post-automation and domestic market.

• Economic Analysis
• /
• v.27 no.4
• /
• pp.70-119
• /
• 2021

This paper analyzes the changes in financial reform during the Kim Jong-un era based on North Korean literature. We find that North Korea has systematically and functionally separated the central bank from commercial banks since the Kim Jong-un era began. In addition, enterprises have been allowed to withdraw cash from bank accounts and make inter-enterprise cash payments. In other words, nowadays non-cash currencies with passive money can partially serve as active money with purchasing power. With the systematic and functional separation of the central bank and the commercial bank, the issuance of the central bank changed to a money supply method through the commercial bank, and changes in the currency distribution structure have allowed commercial bank's credit creation function to be implemented. This means that the banking system and the monetary·payment system of the socialist planned economy are changing in the way of the market economy. Reforms in the financial sector are believed to have been necessary to support changes in the economic system and to restore the function of the public financial sector. These changes have progressed in terms of the level of reform, but they are still considered similar to the period of the former Soviet Union's Perestroika or to the early period of China's reform and opening. Although North Korea's financial reform is superior in terms of enacting the banking law, it is insufficient in terms of realizing the functions of commercial banks. In addition, it is assessed that institutional constraints such as maintaining a planned economy, and the lack of confidence in public finances limit the effectiveness and development of the financial system. It should be noted that these results are based on literature published in North Korea. In other words, there is a limit in the fact that such recent changes have been carried out on a trial basis in some areas, or have been carried out in a full-scale manner with a blueprint, since Kim Jong-un's inauguration.