• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.14 no.3
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• pp.27-59
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• 2011

This paper concerns several versions of conditionalization. In particular, I will examine the relationship between Jeffrey conditionalization and the second order conditionalization concerning updating higher order credences. In section 2, I suggest explicitly what Jeffrey conditionalization and the second order conditionalization are. I will argue in section 3 that Jeffrey conditionalization conflicts with van Fraassen's Reflection Principle while the second order conditionalization doesn't. And I will also argue in section 4 that under some situations, Jeffrey conditionalization may lead agents to Moorean absurdity while the second conditionalization may not. As a result, I will claim that Jeffrey conditionalization is better than the second order contionalization at updating our higher order credences.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.167-195
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• 2015

This paper aims to respond to Weisberg's claim that the standard Bayesian epistemology cannot model an agent's belief updating that is triggered by some undermining evidence. Our epistemological intuition seems to require that the undermining evidence decreases some particular relevant credences. According to Weisberg, however, such a belief change cannot result from the standard Bayesian belief updating rules-i.e., (Jeffrey) Conditionalization. This is because probabilistic independence between some propositions is preserved under (Jeffrey) Conditionalization on the relevant evidence. Yet I will show in this paper that this conclusion is somewhat hasty. In particular, I will show that there is another version of Conditionalization and that when one updates her credences by means of such a version, the belief updating originated in undermining evidence can be well modeled in the Bayesian framework. Some authors often call the version Higher Order Conditionalization.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.321-352
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• 2018

This paper is intended to examine a relationship between the Principal Principle and Conditionalization. For this purpose, I will first formulate several versions of the Principal Principle and Conditionalization in Section 2. In regard to the relationship between the two norms in question, I will show in Section 3 that the Principal Principle and Conditionalization are complementary in two particular senses. The first complementarity is that we don't have to formulate every version of the Principal Principle if the credences evolves by means of Conditionalization. The second complementarity is that we don't have to require for rational agents to update overall credal state by means of Conditionalization if the agent satisfies the Principal Principle. This result can be regarded as a result that criticizes and supplements some existing works about the relationship between the norms.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.27-50
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• 2017

When we lose our memories or when our self-identity becomes blurred, we may feel as if our mind has split into multiple minds. If someone makes another 'me' by copying my body and mind, how should two conscious 'I's change their credences? In this article, we present a new thought experiment that can be called the 'Two Adams Problem'. This thought experiment represents a piece of philosophical inquiry that speculates on the nature of self-consciousness information that 'I am awake now'. On Sunday evening, as soon as Adam falls asleep, the philosopher Roro makes another Adam by copying Adam's original body and mind. They sleep separately in another room. Within a minute, Roro throws a fair coin. If the coin lands heads up Roro wakes just one of the Adams up on Monday. If the coin lands tails up Roro wakes both Adams up. On Monday, at least one of the Adams will wake up. To what degree ought they believe that the outcome of the coin toss is heads? We will argue that the correct answer to this question is 1/2.