• Language and Information
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.13-29
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• 2011

Conditional sentences also can be formed by inversion of subject and auxiliary, but it happens only in a limited environment. This paper addresses grammatical constraints in conditional inversion and how they behave differently from the regular conditional clauses based on corpus investigations. Our corpus search reveals many different types of conditional inversion constructions, indicating the difficulties of deriving inverted conditionals from movement operations. In this paper, we provide a construction-based approach to the inverted conditional construction. The paper shows that the most optimal way of describing the general as well as idiosyncratic properties of the inverted conditional constructions is an account in the spirit of construction grammar in which a grammar is a repertory of constructions forming a network connected by links of inheritance.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.251-272
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• 2012

Recently Professor Lee has suggested the analysis of the indicative conditional based on Sellars-Brandom's inferentialism. In this paper, I raise three questions. First, Professor Lee seems to misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that he considers only the analytically valid arguments as materially valid inferences. Second, Professor Lee seems to misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that whereas Sellars-Brandom talks about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, Professor Lee takes it as the analysis of the indicative conditional only. Third, either Professor Lee's analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or his analysis is too general.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.347-375
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• 2012

In my article published in 2008, I offered an inferentialist account of indicative conditionals. In her recent paper, Professor Seawha Kim raises three objections. First, I misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that I take only concept-constitutive inferences as materially valid inferences. Second, Sellars and Brandom talk about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, but I construe their view as the analysis of the indicative conditionals only. Third, either my analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or my analysis is too general. In this paper I argue that Seawha Kim's objections are all based on insufficient understandings of Sellars's and Brandom's views. First, it is Sellars's view that materially valid inferences are restricted within concept-constitutive inferences. Second, neither Sellars nor Brandom proposes a specific theory about the indicative conditional. Instead, they argue for the expressive role of the conditional. What I accept from their views is this expressive role of the conditional. The detailed proposals about the indicative conditional in my aforementioned article are my own. Third, the differences among conditionals have no direct bearing on Sellars-Brandom inferentialism. In addition, the meaning and role of the conditional expression 'if-then' do not require more than what I have argued for it.

• Language and Information
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.47-65
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• 2011

A Korean adverb '거의(geoui)' modifies predicates to generate complex predicates which have meanings of 'nearly' complete or typical properties of the modified predicates in quantities, degrees, and frequencies. The modified predicates 'complete' or 'typical' properties are referred counterfactually as standards for the generated predicates' meanings of deficiencies. These counterfactual standards can be formalized by a counterfactual conditional operator of the intensional semantics in Cresswell(1990). The deficiencies in the quantities, degrees, or frequencies of the properties can be expressed formally introducing a world-independent measure of comparison. The measure can be manufactured out of relations between intensional things at indices and their equivalence classes. The world-independent measure of comparison has a semantic structure under-specified in quantity, degree, and frequency, and seems very well-suited in describing lexical meaning of '거의(geoui)'. The lexical-semantic analysis of '거의(geoui)' shows explicitly the plausibility of the indispensable existence of the comparing measure which works across real and counterfactual worlds in natural language meaning. On the other hand, we examined Kim, young-hee(1985)'s proposal of a transition of quantificational meaning for Korean degree adverbs, where he tried to explain the quantificational meaning of Korean degree adverbs in general including '거의(geoui)' with several syntactic and semantic constraints of 'contextual deletion'. But it is shown that the quantificational meanings of the degree adverbs which Kim(1985) discussed are also explained better by their under-specified meanings in quantities, frequencies and degrees with the world-independent measure of comparison applied to their paradigmatic lexical constraint rather than Kim(1985)'s transition of meaning.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.109-136
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• 2014

Every (semantic) antirealist accepts one or another form of verification principle. The principle has strong and weak forms, the strong form being highly counterintuitive but the weak one being more plausible. Understandably, antirealists have preferred the weak form of verification principle. Unfortunately, the socalled knowability paradox shows that those two forms are indeed equivalent. To solve this problem, Edgington suggests a yet new form of verification principle. Unfortunately, her new principle has its own difficulty. To overcome this difficulty, Edgington provides a new model of knowledge, according to which every true proposition is somehow associated with a known counterfactual conditional. In this paper, I shall argue that even this new model of knowledge confronts with an insurmountable problem. It is a well-known fact that, in the microscopic levels, some facts manage to occur despite very low physical chances. I will argue that the counterfactuals linked with those facts cannot be known due to the existence of epistemic defeaters. Hence, Edgington's knowledge model does not work in all cases.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.83-133
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• 2015

In this paper, I pose a problem for Hitchcock's arguments for two concepts of effects that are intended to explicate double causal effects, and put forth a theory that is intended not just to meet the problem but also to accommodate Hitchcock's theory and Eells' theory both. First, I introduce an example of dual causal effects, and examine the accounts of Otte(1985) and Eells(1987) on how to explicate the dual effects. I show that their accounts of the dual effects help us understand the problem of dual effects and see how different it is for Cartwright(1979, 1989, 1995), Eells(1991, 1995), and Hitchcock(2001a) to meet the problem. Second, I introduce two concepts of effects on Hitchcock(2001a), that is, net effect and component effect that are allegedly analogous to two effects of structural equation model. Third, I reveal the significance of homogeneous subpopulation and causal interaction regarding the problem of dual effects while examining Cartwright's theory and Elles' theory. Fourth, I critically examine the two concepts of effects on Hitchcock and argue against Hitchcock's criticism of Eells' theory. Fifth, I take a moderator variable of structural equation model and a moderator effect into the probabilistic theory of causality, and formally generalize causal interaction due to the dual effects in terms of disjunctive relation and counterfactual conditionals. I expect my account of disjunctive relation and counterfactual conditionals to contribute not just to several problems the received theories of causal modelling confront but also to the structural equation models many people exploit as a promising statistical methodology.