• Korean Association of Arts Management
• /
• no.53
• /
• pp.153-177
• /
• 2020

Arts organizations commonly face a range of operational challenges, from a lack of skilled workers to limited financial resources and thus are dependent on subsidies from the government. Yet, to fully realize their mission arts organizations must both develop strategies to effectively utilize government support and seek a way forward that does not depend on public subsidies. Business diversification, a strategy from corporate management, entails the expansion of products and services, and entry into new industries, enabling companies to disperse risks and increase profits. We propose that business diversification can be effectively applied to arts organization to address the myriad operational difficulties they face. To understand how an arts organization might deploy business diversification we conducted a case study of an organization that is actively pursuing the strategy: Sanwoollim Theater. We interviewed staff members of Sanwoollim including the executive director, as well as selected audiences, to understand how the business diversification model was being applied at Sanwoollim. Our findings indicate that, in a complex arts and cultural space, business diversification is a fresh and flexible new strategy that can enable private cultural arts organizations to thrive sustainably. It is also evident that government support in the initial stages of the process encourages diversification and that successful private arts organizations will leverage government subsidies into a sustainable business plan.

• Management & Information Systems Review
• /
• v.23
• /
• pp.41-74
• /
• 2007

In Korea, corporate merger activities were activated since 1980, and nowadays(particuarly since 1986) the changes in domestic and international economic circumstances have made corporate managers have strong interests in merger. Korea and America have different business environments and it is easily conceivable that there exists many differences in motives, methods, and effects of mergers between the two countries. According to recent studies on takeover bids in America, takeover bids have information effects, tax implications, and co-insurance effects, and the form of payment(cash versus securities), the relative size of target and bidder, the leverage effect, Tobin's q, number of bidders(single versus multiple bidder), the time period (before 1968, 1968-1980, 1981 and later), and the target firm reaction (hostile versus friendly) are important determinants of the magnitude of takeover gains and their distribution between targets and bidders at the announcement of takeover bids. This study examines the theory of takeover bids, the status quo and problems of merger in Korea, and then investigates how the announcement of merger are reflected in common stock returns of bidding firms, finally explores empirically the factors influencing abnormal returns of bidding firms' stock price. The hypotheses of this study are as follows ; Shareholders of bidding firms benefit from mergers. And common stock returns of bidding firms at the announcement of takeover bids, shows significant differences according to the condition of the ratio of target size relative to bidding firm, whether the target being a member of the conglomerate to which bidding firm belongs, whether the target being a listed company, the time period(before 1986, 1986, and later), the number of bidding firm's stock in exchange for a stock of the target, whether the merger being a horizontal and vertical merger or a conglomerate merger, and the ratios of debt to equity capital of target and bidding firm. The data analyzed in this study were drawn from public announcements of proposals to acquire a target firm by means of merger. The sample contains all bidding firms which were listed in the stock market and also engaged in successful mergers in the period 1980 through 1992 for which there are daily stock returns. A merger bid was considered successful if it resulted in a completed merger and the target firm disappeared as a separate entity. The final sample contains 113 acquiring firms. The research hypotheses examined in this study are tested by applying an event-type methodology similar to that described in Dodd and Warner. The ordinary-least-squares coefficients of the market-model regression were estimated over the period t=-135 to t=-16 relative to the date of the proposal's initial announcement, t=0. Daily abnormal common stock returns were calculated for each firm i over the interval t=-15 to t=+15. A daily average abnormal return(AR) for each day t was computed. Average cumulative abnormal returns($CART_{T_1,T_2}$) were also derived by summing the $AR_t's$ over various intervals. The expected values of $AR_t$ and $CART_{T_1,T_2}$ are zero in the absence of abnormal performance. The test statistics of $AR_t$ and $CAR_{T_1,T_2}$ are based on the average standardized abnormal return($ASAR_t$) and the average standardized cumulative abnormal return ($ASCAR_{T_1,T_2}$), respectively. Assuming that the individual abnormal returns are normal and independent across t and across securities, the statistics $Z_t$ and $Z_{T_1,T_2}$ which follow a unit-normal distribution(Dodd and Warner), are used to test the hypotheses that the average standardized abnormal returns and the average cumulative standardized abnormal returns equal zero.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.21 no.2
• /
• pp.99-123
• /
• 2004

We focus in this study on incremental financing decisions and estimate a logit model for the probability a firm will choose a private placement over a public bond issue. We hypothesize that information asymmetry, financial risk, agent cost, and proprietary information may affect a firm's choice between public debt and private placements. We find that as the size of firm increases, the probability of choosing a private placement declines significantly. The age of the firm, however, is not a significant factor affecting the firm's choice between public and privately-placed bond. The coefficients on the firm's leverage and non-investment grade dummy are significantly positive, meaning firms with high financial risk and credit risk select private placements. The findings regarding agency-related variables, PER and Tobin's Q, are somewhat complex. We find significant evidence that firms with high PER prefer private placements to public bonds, suggesting that borrowers with options to engage in asset substitution or underinvestment are more likely to choose private placements. The coefficient of Tobin's Q is negative, but not significant, which weakly support the hold-up hypothesis. When we construct an interaction term on the Tobin's Q with a non-investment rating dummy, however, the Tobin's Q interaction term becomes positive and significant. Thus, high Tobin's Q firms with a speculative rating are significantly more likely to choose a private placement, regardless of the potential hold-up problems. The ratio of R&D to sales, proxy for proprietary information, is positively significant. This result can be interpreted as evidence in favor of a role for proprietary information in the debt sourcing decision process for these firms.

• Korean small business review
• /
• v.31 no.4
• /
• pp.67-93
• /
• 2009

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relations between financial constraints and dividend smoothing of innovative small and medium sized enterprises(SMEs) listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The innovative SMEs is defined as the firms with high level of R&D intensity which is measured by (R&D investment/total sales) ratio, according to Chauvin and Hirschey (1993). The R&D investment plays an important role as the innovative driver that can increase the future growth opportunity and profitability of the firms. Therefore, the R&D investment have large, positive, and consistent influences on the market value of the firm. In this point of view, we expect that the innovative SMEs can adjust dividend payment faster than the noninnovative SMEs, on the ground of their future growth opportunity and profitability. And also, we expect that the financial unconstrained firms can adjust dividend payment faster than the financial constrained firms, on the ground of their financing ability of investment funds through the market accessibility. Aivazian et al.(2006) exert that the financial unconstrained firms with the high accessibility to capital market can adjust dividend payment faster than the financial constrained firms. We collect the sample firms among the total SMEs listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange during the periods from January 1999 to December 2007 from the KIS Value Library database. The total number of firm-year observations of the total sample firms throughout the entire period is 5,544, the number of firm-year observations of the dividend firms is 2,919, and the number of firm-year observations of the non-dividend firms is 2,625. About 53%(or 2,919) of these total 5,544 observations involve firms that make a dividend payment. The dividend firms are divided into two groups according to the R&D intensity, such as the innovative SMEs with larger than median of R&D intensity and the noninnovative SMEs with smaller than median of R&D intensity. The number of firm-year observations of the innovative SMEs is 1,506, and the number of firm-year observations of the noninnovative SMEs is 1,413. Furthermore, the innovative SMEs are divided into two groups according to level of financial constraints, such as the financial unconstrained firms and the financial constrained firms. The number of firm-year observations of the former is 894, and the number of firm-year observations of the latter is 612. Although all available firm-year observations of the dividend firms are collected, deletions are made in the case of financial industries such as banks, securities company, insurance company, and other financial services company, because their capital structure and business style are widely different from the general manufacturing firms. The stock repurchase was involved in dividend payment because Grullon and Michaely (2002) examined the substitution hypothesis between dividends and stock repurchases. However, our data structure is an unbalanced panel data since there is no requirement that the firm-year observations data are all available for each firms during the entire periods from January 1999 to December 2007 from the KIS Value Library database. We firstly estimate the classic Lintner(1956) dividend adjustment model, where the decision to smooth dividend or to adopt a residual dividend policy depends on financial constraints measured by market accessibility. Lintner model indicates that firms maintain stable and long run target payout ratio, and that firms adjust partially the gap between current payout rato and target payout ratio each year. In the Lintner model, dependent variable is the current dividend per share(DPS_t), and independent variables are the past dividend per share(DPS_t-1) and the current earnings per share(EPS_t). We hypothesized that firms adjust partially the gap between the current dividend per share(DPS_t) and the target payout ratio(Ω) each year, when the past dividend per share(DPS_t-1) deviate from the target payout ratio(Ω). We secondly estimate the expansion model that extend the Lintner model by including the determinants suggested by the major theories of dividend, namely, residual dividend theory, dividend signaling theory, agency theory, catering theory, and transactions cost theory. In the expansion model, dependent variable is the current dividend per share(DPS_t), explanatory variables are the past dividend per share(DPS_t-1) and the current earnings per share(EPS_t), and control variables are the current capital expenditure ratio(CEA_t), the current leverage ratio(LEV_t), the current operating return on assets(ROA_t), the current business risk(RISK_t), the current trading volume turnover ratio(TURN_t), and the current dividend premium(DPREM_t). In these control variables, CEA_t, LEV_t, and ROA_t are the determinants suggested by the residual dividend theory and the agency theory, ROA_t and RISK_t are the determinants suggested by the dividend signaling theory, TURN_t is the determinant suggested by the transactions cost theory, and DPREM_t is the determinant suggested by the catering theory. Furthermore, we thirdly estimate the Lintner model and the expansion model by using the panel data of the financial unconstrained firms and the financial constrained firms, that are divided into two groups according to level of financial constraints. We expect that the financial unconstrained firms can adjust dividend payment faster than the financial constrained firms, because the former can finance more easily the investment funds through the market accessibility than the latter. We analyzed descriptive statistics such as mean, standard deviation, and median to delete the outliers from the panel data, conducted one way analysis of variance to check up the industry-specfic effects, and conducted difference test of firms characteristic variables between innovative SMEs and noninnovative SMEs as well as difference test of firms characteristic variables between financial unconstrained firms and financial constrained firms. We also conducted the correlation analysis and the variance inflation factors analysis to detect any multicollinearity among the independent variables. Both of the correlation coefficients and the variance inflation factors are roughly low to the extent that may be ignored the multicollinearity among the independent variables. Furthermore, we estimate both of the Lintner model and the expansion model using the panel regression analysis. We firstly test the time-specific effects and the firm-specific effects may be involved in our panel data through the Lagrange multiplier test that was proposed by Breusch and Pagan(1980), and secondly conduct Hausman test to prove that fixed effect model is fitter with our panel data than the random effect model. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. The determinants suggested by the major theories of dividend, namely, residual dividend theory, dividend signaling theory, agency theory, catering theory, and transactions cost theory explain significantly the dividend policy of the innovative SMEs. Lintner model indicates that firms maintain stable and long run target payout ratio, and that firms adjust partially the gap between the current payout ratio and the target payout ratio each year. In the core variables of Lintner model, the past dividend per share has more effects to dividend smoothing than the current earnings per share. These results suggest that the innovative SMEs maintain stable and long run dividend policy which sustains the past dividend per share level without corporate special reasons. The main results show that dividend adjustment speed of the innovative SMEs is faster than that of the noninnovative SMEs. This means that the innovative SMEs with high level of R&D intensity can adjust dividend payment faster than the noninnovative SMEs, on the ground of their future growth opportunity and profitability. The other main results show that dividend adjustment speed of the financial unconstrained SMEs is faster than that of the financial constrained SMEs. This means that the financial unconstrained firms with high accessibility to capital market can adjust dividend payment faster than the financial constrained firms, on the ground of their financing ability of investment funds through the market accessibility. Futhermore, the other additional results show that dividend adjustment speed of the innovative SMEs classified by the Small and Medium Business Administration is faster than that of the unclassified SMEs. They are linked with various financial policies and services such as credit guaranteed service, policy fund for SMEs, venture investment fund, insurance program, and so on. In conclusion, the past dividend per share and the current earnings per share suggested by the Lintner model explain mainly dividend adjustment speed of the innovative SMEs, and also the financial constraints explain partially. Therefore, if managers can properly understand of the relations between financial constraints and dividend smoothing of innovative SMEs, they can maintain stable and long run dividend policy of the innovative SMEs through dividend smoothing. These are encouraging results for Korea government, that is, the Small and Medium Business Administration as it has implemented many policies to commit to the innovative SMEs. This paper may have a few limitations because it may be only early study about the relations between financial constraints and dividend smoothing of the innovative SMEs. Specifically, this paper may not adequately capture all of the subtle features of the innovative SMEs and the financial unconstrained SMEs. Therefore, we think that it is necessary to expand sample firms and control variables, and use more elaborate analysis methods in the future studies.