• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.1-29
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• 2009

Since convertible debt has both characteristics of stocks and bonds, its issuance can be related to both interests of stockholders and bondholders. Nevertheless, the existing studies focused mainly on the wealth effect on stockholders. In this paper we revisit the hypotheses on the issue of convertible debt especially from the viewpoint of a firm's growth, by making an additional investigation into bondholders' wealth effects. We find that stockholders' wealth increases with bondholders' wealth in the firm whose book-to-market ratio is low and thus is considered a growth firm. This finding seems consistent with the hypothesis in which the issue of convertible debt mitigates the agency cost of debt in the high-growth firm.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.267-299
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• 1996

The takeover boom of the 1980s was accompanied by a series of innovations in debt contracts, including the poison put that allows bonds to be redeemed in the event of a corporate control change. The poison put was included in a large majority of convertible debt offerings, shortly after the first issues with such provisions. We attempt to understand the factors that contributed to the widespread adoption of this innovation in convertible bonds and the consequences for shareholder wealth. Our, findings suggest that by reducing the potential for bondholder-shareholder conflicts and by conveying positive information about future takeover prospect'5, poison puts result in significant benefits to issuing firm shareholders, particularly if the firm is under takeover speculation. There are, however, no benefits when a firm has adopted anti-takeover measures prior to the offering. There is weaker evidence that existing bondholders do worse when poison puts are present.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.1-44
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• 2019

The contingent convertible bond (or CoCo) is designed as a bail-in tool, which is written down or converted to equity if the issuing bank is seriously troubled and thus its trigger is activated. The trigger could either be rule-based or discretion-based. I show theoretically that the bail-in is less implementable and that the associated bail-in risk is lower if the trigger is discretion-based, as governments face greater political pressure from the act of letting creditors take losses. The political pressure is greater because governments have the sole authority to activate the trigger and hence can be accused of having 'blood on their hands'. Furthermore, the pressures could be augmented by investors' self-fulfilling expectations with regard to government bailouts. I support this theoretic prediction with empirical evidence showing that the bail-in risk premiums on CoCos with discretion-based triggers are on average 1.13 to 2.91%p lower than CoCos with rule-based triggers.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.175-193
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• 1994

This paper relates the valuation consequences of common-stock, convertible-debt and straight-debt offering announcements to the issuing firms' stock price performance in periods before the announcements. Similar to previous studies on equity offerings, we find that the announcement effects of security offerings, regardless of offering types, are negatively correlated with the short-term pre-offering stock returns. We show that the informational impact of the preceding earnings and dividend(E/D) announcements account for the previous findings of the negative correlation. We further report that security issues following 'good-news' E/D announcements result in larger stock price declines than issues following 'bad-news' E/D announcements. The finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the E/D information affects the investors' assessments of the firm's cash flow expectations and of the probability of external financing.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.163-174
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• 2017

This study analyzed how Korean firms' recapitalization affects their capital structure decision and firm value. Recapitalization was categorized into three groups according to the influence of the debt to equity ratio: debt ratio-increasing-recapitalization(capital reduction with refund, cash dividend), debt ratio-unchanging-recapitalization (capital reduction without refund, retirement of repurchased stocks), and debt ratio-decreasing-recapitalization(exercise the rights for convertible bonds, bond with stock warrants, exchangeable bonds and stock options). This article highlights how the relationship between the firms' recapitalization and the capital structure decision driven by the change in debt to equity ratio through the recapitalization should affect the firm value. The whole recapitalization sample used for this analysis comprised 22,814 enterprises listed on the Korea Exchange that were analyzed over the 16-year period from 2000 to 2015. To summarize the results of this Panel Data Analysis, firstly, when a firm executes debt ratio-increasing-recapitalization and debt ratio-decreasing-recapitalization at the period of t-1, the debt to equity ratio, which is increased or decreased, should affect the firm's debt capacity in the same period, then, at the period of t, the firm establishes a leverage policy to readjust the debt to equity ratio the other way around. These adjustments of debt-paying-ability from the leverage policy, including the capital structure decision, finally affect the firm value. Secondly, when a firm implements the debt ratio-unchanging-recapitalization in the period of t-1, the debt to equity ratio, which is neutral, should not affect the firm's capital structure decision. But, the firm value is positively affected by the influence of that recapitalization. Conclusively, we acknowledge a firm which carries out the recapitalization balances its capital structure to the optimal level of leverage and that the capital structure decision positively affects the corporate value.