• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.277-293
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• 2015

Mutual Savings Banks generally have weaker governance structure than other financial institutions, so the possibility of earnings management by owner-largest or managements of mutual savings banks is higher than other financial institutions. This study examines the relationship between corporate governance and quality of internal control of financial reporting. If the expropriation of minority shareholder hypothesis holds, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the weaker the internal control system by more likely the opportunistic earnings management by bank managers. On the other hand, under the convergence of interest hypothesis, we predict that the larger block shareholder in mutual savings banks, the stronger the internal control system by reduction in agency costs as owner-manager's holdings increases, and there a negative relationship is expected between internal control weakness and the holdings of the owner-largest shareholder. We find that mutual savings banks with higher owner-largest shareholder equity has significant positive relations with their internal control of financial reporting material weakness. This result suggests that the greater owner-largest shareholder equity, the more likely the opportunistic earnings management, so that decrease quality of internal control. This paper extends the literature on financial institutions corporate governance to verify whether governance system, especially, owner-largest and quality of internal control has significant positive relations.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.5434-5441
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• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.267-299
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• 1996

The takeover boom of the 1980s was accompanied by a series of innovations in debt contracts, including the poison put that allows bonds to be redeemed in the event of a corporate control change. The poison put was included in a large majority of convertible debt offerings, shortly after the first issues with such provisions. We attempt to understand the factors that contributed to the widespread adoption of this innovation in convertible bonds and the consequences for shareholder wealth. Our, findings suggest that by reducing the potential for bondholder-shareholder conflicts and by conveying positive information about future takeover prospect'5, poison puts result in significant benefits to issuing firm shareholders, particularly if the firm is under takeover speculation. There are, however, no benefits when a firm has adopted anti-takeover measures prior to the offering. There is weaker evidence that existing bondholders do worse when poison puts are present.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.85-92
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• 2014

Purpose - This study conducted empirical research on non-financial corporations listed on the stock exchange from 2001 to 2010, focusing on the effects of corporate governance on real earnings management of corporations. In particular, this study examined primarily the impact of the largest shareholder who could use earnings management to pursue his own self-interest, and foreign investors who played a checking role against the largest shareholders. The study also reviewed the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management while also considering corporate growth. Research design, data, and methodology - As for the measurements of real earnings management, abnormal operating cash flow and abnormal production cost were utilized. As for the independent variables, share ratio of the largest shareholder and affiliate person (M) and share ratio of foreign investors (FT) were leveraged. This study excluded those organizations that had changed their fiscal years, those that had not submitted an audit report, corporations under supervision, delisted corporations, corporations that had changed their business type, and so on, from the non-financial corporations out of the publicly traded corporations whose fiscal year ended in December from 2001 to 2010 in addition, KIS values were utilized for the corporate financial data in the study. To verify whether management structure and growth had an impact on real earnings management of a corporation through empirical analysis, a multiple regression analysis model was applied. Result - First, as a result of the analysis, the share ratio (M) of the largest shareholder and affiliate person was found to have a significant positive correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations(ACF) and abnormal production cost (APD). When controlling the growth, the share ratio (M) of the largest shareholder and affiliate person was found to have an insignificant correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations(ACF) but a significant correlation with abnormal production cost (APD). Second, foreign ownership (FT) was found to have a significant positive correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations(ACF) and abnormal production cost (APD) at the confidence level of 1 percent when not including the growth dummy. When controlling the growth, foreign ownership (FT) was found to have a significant negative correlation with abnormal cash flow from operations (ACF) and with abnormal production cost (APD). Conclusion - The results imply that the largest shareholder is closely related to earnings management through real activities regardless of corporate growth. It is also possible to determine from these results that foreign investors are related to earnings management through real activities when not considering corporate growth, but that they would reduce earnings management in the case of considering the growth. Thus, this study verified along with the existing studies that foreign investors were conducting the control function on controlling shareholders.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.183-191
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• 2022

The Korea Stewardship Code 'Principles on the Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors' was introduced in 2016 and the National Pension Service adopted it in 2018. the National Pension Service casted 'dessent' vote on the agenda which is able to reduce the ownership interest of shareholder in general meeting. This paper examines whether 'dissent' voting affected on the ownership interest of shareholder or not. The 'dissent' vote on the agenda are related to revision artical of corperation, appointment or compensation of director and auditor, approval of financial statements ect. The proxies of earnings management is discretionary accruals calculated by modified Jones model. The control variablies are size of assets, liabilities per assets, returns on assets. The results of this study are as followings. First, the 'dissent' voting on the agenda are related to revision artical of corperation, M&A, approval of financial statements ect. are not significant because their sample size is too small, Second, the 'dissent' voting on appointment of director and auditor affected on reduction of discretionary accruals. So the National Pension Service activism shall affect on increasing the ownership interest of shareholder. Third, the 'dissent' voting on compensation of director and auditor is not affected on reduction of discretionary accruals. This results show that 'unconditional dissent voting' on the agenda in general meeting is not to reduce the ownership interest of shareholder.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.119-126
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• 2022

With the rise and rapid development of the "Internet+" economic model, the internet is deeply integrated with the social economy and penetrates every corner of life. Compared with expanding the scale of business operations through internal investment and capital accumulation, e-commerce companies are more inclined to directly gain control of other companies through efficient merger and acquisition (M&A). The purpose of this study is to analyze changes in financial performance before and after M&A of Alibaba, China's largest e-commerce company in the Internet era. To present the impact of M&A events on Alibaba's stock price and shareholder wealth more intuitively, this study selected the market model in the event study method to measure abnormal returns. The results show that an M&A event led to a reduction in Alibaba's shareholder wealth in the short term. This study presents the theoretical basis for the M&A performance of e-commerce companies.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.5558-5563
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• 2011

Using longitudinal data of 108 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2009, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on R&D investment. The study finds that control-ownership disparity is negatively related to R&D intensity. This empirical result suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights incent controlling shareholders' expropriation for their private interests, leading to decreased R&D investment which enhances firm value in the long term.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.4
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• pp.73-89
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• 2009

Circular shareholdings among three companies are formed when company A owns stock in company B, company B owns stock in company C, and company C owns stock in company A. Since circular shareholdings among large family-controlled firms are used to give the controlling shareholder greater control or more opportunities to expropriate minority investors, the government has encouraged large business groups to gradually remove their circular shareholdings. In this paper, we propose a combinatorial optimization model that can answer the question, which equity investments among complicated investment relationships of one large business group should be removed to resolve its circular shareholdings. To the best knowledge of the authors, our research is the first one that has approached the circular shareholding problem in respect of management science. The proposed combinatorial optimization model are formulated into integer programming problem and applied to some Korean major business groups.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.1453-1459
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• 2008

Successful Six Sigma methodology involves continual success of projects, each incrementally moving the organization closer to its strategic goals of shareholder return and customer satisfaction. However, Six Sigma methodology has some disadvantages in long-term technical strategy parts, systematic technology management techniques and concrete idea creativity methodology. To complement these Six Sigma problems, Triz technique is considered. Triz focuses on solving such problems efficiently, effectively, and creatively. The purpose of this paper is to improve the temperature inspection method of a refrigerator through the DAGEV(Define-Analyze- Generate-Evaluate-Verify) cycle of Triz.