• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.55 no.3
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• pp.1125-1139
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• 2023

The system-integrated modular advanced reactor 100 (SMART100), an integral-type pressurized water small modular reactor, is based on a novel design concept for containment cooling and radioactive material reduction; it is known as the containment pressure and radioactivity suppression system (CPRSS). There is a passive cooling system using a condensation with non-condensable gas in the SMART CPRSS. When a design basis accident such as a small break loss of coolant accident (SBLOCA) occurs, the pressurized low containment area (LCA) of the SMART CPRSS leads to steam condensation in an incontainment refuelling water storage tank (IRWST). Additionally, the steam and non-condensable gas mixture passes through the CPRSS heat exchanger (CHX) submerged in the emergency cooldown tank (ECT) that can partially remove the residual heat. When the steam and non-condensable gas mixture passes through the CHX, the non-condensable gas can interrupt the condensation heat transfer in the CHX and it degrades CHX performance. In this study, condensation heat transfer experiments of steam and non-condensable gas mixture in the natural circulation loop were conducted. The pressure, temperature, and effects of the non-condensable gas were investigated according to the constant inlet steam flow rate with non-condensable gas injections in the loop.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.30 no.5
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• pp.123-130
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• 2015

Wolsong Unit 2,3&4 has been performing a containment integrity test during power operation. This test could impact to the safe operation during test. If an accident occurs during pressure dropping phase, reactor trip can be delayed because of the increased pressure difference which causes a time delay to reach the trip set-point. On the contrary, if an accident occurs during pressure increasing phase, reactor trip could be accelerated because the pressure difference to the trip set-point decrease. Point Lepreau nuclear power plant, which installed GCLMS (Gross Containment Leakage Monitoring System) in 1990, has discontinued the test since 1992 due to these adverse effects. Therefore, we evaluated the risk to obviate the GCLMS test based on PWR's ILRT (Integrated Leak Rate Test) extension methodologies. The results demonstrate that risk increase rate is not high in case of performing only ILRT test at every 5 years instead of doing GCLMS test at every 1.5 years. In addition, the result shows that GCLMS test can be removed on a risk-informed perspective since risk increasement is in acceptable area of regulatory acceptance criteria.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Safety
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.126-135
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• 2000

Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is an engineering analysis method to identify possible contributors to the risk from a nuclear power plant and now it has become a standard tool in safety evaluation of nuclear power plants. PSA consists of three phases named as Level 1, 2 and 3. Level 2 PSA, mainly focused in this paper, uses a step-wise approach. At first, plant damage states (PDSs) are defined from the Level 1 PSA results and they are quantified. Containment event tree (CET) is then constructed considering the physico-chemical phenomena in the containment. The quantification of CET can be assisted by a decomposition event tree (DET). Finally, source terms are quantitatively characterized by the containment failure mode. As the main benefit of PSA is to provide insights into plant design, performance and environmental impacts, including the identification of the dominant risk contributors and the comparison of options for reducing risk, this technique is expected to be applied to the industrial safety area.

• Journal of Ship and Ocean Technology
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.35-44
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• 2008

As arctic energy resource is attracting public attention, arctic shipping market will also be growing in large as expected to increase in LNG trade from Arctic area to the western countries by shipping. During the voyages through such routes, collision with icebergs may be possible. In the present report, ice collision analyses are carried out from a practical point of view to verify the safety of hull structural strength of LNG carriers equipped with GTT $MKIII^{TM}$ membrane type cargo containment system. From the results of collision analyses and the operation-friendly design concept of no-repairing of cargo containment system, a safe operating envelope against ice collision is proposed for LNG carriers of membrane type cargo containment system. Based on the currently proposed safety criteria, it is concluded that LNG carriers with membrane tank type can operate safely with regard to the integrity of CCS in regions where collision between LNG carrier and iceberg is expected.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.311-322
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• 2012

Since the crisis at the Fukushima plants, severe accident progression during a station blackout accident in nuclear power plants is recognized as a very important area for accident management and emergency planning. The purpose of this study is to investigate the comparative characteristics of anticipated severe accident progression among the three typical types of nuclear reactors. A station blackout scenario, where all off-site power is lost and the diesel generators fail, is simulated as an initiating event of a severe accident sequence. In this study a comparative analysis was performed for typical pressurized water reactor (PWR), boiling water reactor (BWR), and pressurized heavy water reactor (PHWR). The study includes the summarization of design differences that would impact severe accident progressions, thermal hydraulic/severe accident phenomenological analysis during a station blackout initiated-severe accident; and an investigation of the core damage process, both within the reactor vessel before it fails and in the containment afterwards, and the resultant impact on the containment.

• Proceedings of the Korea Society for Energy Engineering kosee Conference
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• 1998.10a
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• pp.3-8
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• 1998

The present work proposes the potential fuzzy framework, based on fuzzy set theory, for supporting decision-making problems, especially, selection problems of a best design in the area of nuclear energy system. The framework proposed is composed of the hierarchical structure module, the assignment module, the fuzzification module, and the defuzzification module. In the structure module, the relationship among decision objectives, decision criteria, decision sub-criteria, and decision alternatives is hierarchically structured. In the assignment module, linguistic or rank scoring approach can be used to assign subjective and/or vague values to the decision analyst's judgment on decision variables. In the fuzzification module, fuzzy numbers are assigned to these values of decision variables. Using fuzzy arithmetic operations, for each alternative, fuzzy preference index as a fuzzy synthesis measure is obtained. In the defuzzification module, using one of methods ranking fuzzy numbers, these indices are defuzzified to overall utility values as a cardinality measure determining final scores. According these values, alternatives of interest are ranked and an optimal alternative is chosen. To illustrate the applicability of the framework proposed to selection problem, as a case example, the best option choice of four design options under five decision criteria for primary containment wall thickening around large penetrations in an advanced nuclear energy system is studied.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.31 no.4A
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• pp.311-321
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• 2011

To analysis the effect of reinforcement ratio and impact velocity on local damage, a series of impact analyses are performed to predict local effects. According to these results, the reinforcement ratio has no effect on the penetration depth and perforation thickness, but notable change to the scabbing area were observed. The higher the missile velocity becomes, the greater the degree of local damage to the reinforced concrete slabs is. Analysis results will be useful in the impact-resistance design of containment buildings and structures.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.56 no.3
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• pp.949-958
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• 2024

In contrast to all-time flooded small modular reactor (SMR) systems, an in-kind flooding safety system (FSS) has been proposed as a passive safety system applicable to small modular reactors (SMRs) that adopt a metal containment vessel (MCV). Under transient conditions, the FSS can provide emergency cooling to dry reactor cavities and sustain long-term coolability using re-acquired evaporated steam in the reactor building on demand. When designing an FSS, the effect of the flooding flow area is vital as it affects the overall accident sequence and safety. Therefore, in this study, a MELCOR model of a reference SMR is developed and numerical analysis is performed under postulated accident scenarios. Without flooding, the MCV pressure of the reactor module exceeds the design pressure before core damage. To prevent core damage, an emergency flooding strategy is devised using various flow path parameters and requirements to ensure an adequate emergency coolant supply before the core damage is investigated. The results indicate that a flow area exceeding 0.02 m2 is required in the FSS to prevent MCV overpressure and core damage. This study is the first to report a strategic analysis for appropriately sizing an FSS flooding valve applicable to innovative SMRs.

• Nuclear Engineering and Technology
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• v.49 no.3
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• pp.632-637
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• 2017

Even though the potential for an accident in nuclear power plants is very low, multiple emergency plans are necessary because the impact of such an accident to the public is enormous. One of these emergency plans involves a robotic system for investigating accidents under conditions of high radiation and contaminated air. To develop a robot suitable for operation in a nuclear power plant, we focused on eliminating the three major obstacles that challenge robots in such conditions: the disconnection of radio communication, falling on uneven floors, and loss of localization. To solve the radio problem, a Wi-Fi extender was used in radio shadow areas. To reinforce the walking, we developed two- and four-leg convertible walking, a floor adaptive foot, a roly-poly defensive falling design, and automatic standing recovery after falling methods were developed. To allow the robot to determine its location in the containment building, a bar code landmark reading method was chosen. When a severe accident occurs, this robot will be useful for accident condition monitoring. We also anticipate the robot can serve as a workman aid in a high radiation area during normal operations.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 1993.06a
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• pp.1051-1054
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• 1993

The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.