• Journal of the Korean Society of Costume
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• v.63 no.7
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• pp.121-133
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• 2013

The globalization of the world, fueled by the Internet, made possible for individuals to access the cultures around the world, other than their own, easier than ever before. But among those rapidly sought out sub-cultures, the video gaming industry, once a niche market mostly for nerds and geeks, now has become one of the biggest entertainment businesses in the world. In a video game, one of the critical elements that could determine its success or failure is the characters featured in the game. And as the countless number of animated characters from many different video games from the past few years have become incredibly popular among the audiences around the world, the expectations from the fans also grow higher every time a new game comes out. Ultimately this has forced the video game developers to come up with more unique and interesting characters for their video games. And at this point, where a video game character is more than just fictional fantasy but a brand to be recognized, it is worth paying proper attention to the video game characters that represent Korea. Hence in this study, we will take a look at Han Ju-Ri, a Korean character featured in Super Street Fighter IV, a competitive fighting game developed by Capcom, one of the world's most recognized video game companies that started its life as an arcade video game, developer but eventually ventured its business into the online world. The study will propose a complete overhaul of the character by incorporating Korea's own traditional looks.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.07a
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• pp.400-402
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• 2000

This paper presents a game theoretic approach for power transactions analysis in a competitive market. The considered competitive power market is regarded as PooICo model, and the participating players are restricted by only two generating entities for simplicity in this paper. The analysis is performed on the basis of marginal cost based relations of bidding price and bidding generations. That is, we assume that the bidding price of each player is determined by the marginal cost when the bidding generation is pre-determined. This paper models the power transaction as a two player game and analyzes by applying the Nash eauilibrium idea. The generalized game model for power transactions covering constant-sum(especially zero-sum), and nonconstant-sum game is developed in this paper. Also, the analysis for each game model are performed in the case studies. Here, we have defined the payoff of each player as the weighted sum of both player's profits.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.1-5
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• 2009

I study a solution concept which preserves the nice Nash equilibrium properties of two-person zero-sum games, and define a locally competitive equilibrium which is characterized by a saddle point with respect to the coordinates of strategies. I show that a locally competitive equilibrium shares the properties of uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs, interchangeablity of equilibrium strategies and convexity of the equilibrium set.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.23 no.3
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• pp.243-257
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• 2006

ITU-T's NgN(Next generation Network) architecture is expected to offer a new Internet platforms such as QoS(Quality of Service) guaranteed services as it overcame the limitations of the existing best-effort Internet architecture. However, policy development crucial for the NgN framework(e.g., interconnections and billing) is lagging far behind technology development. For example, arguments over network neutrality clearly indicate little understanding of the Internet industry structure where diverse providers including ISP and CP coexist. This study employs a network economics approach to predict how the competitive landscape involving various providers will evolve under the traffic-based billing system under the NgN environment. Applied is the non-cooperative game theory, in particular, Stackelberg's repeated game in order to build and analyze model for competition among those providers. We also studied possible impacts that CPs would have on the competitive landscape if they have an option to replace ISP: i.e., CDN(Content Delivery Network) provider. Lastly, based on the model analysis and experiments, presented are their implications to policy development and tile future prospect.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.11
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• pp.668-674
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• 2003

The electric marketplace is in the midst of major changes designed to promote competition. No longer vertically integrated with guaranteed customers and suppliers, electric generators and distributors will have to compete to sell and buy electricity. Unit commitment (UC) in such a competitive environment is not the same as the traditional one anymore. The objective of UC is not to minimize production cost as before but to find the solution that produces a maximum profit for a generation firm. This paper presents a hi-level formulation that decomposes the UC game into a generation-decision game (first level game) and a state(on/off)-decision game (second level game). Derivation that the first-level game has a pure Cournot Nash equilibrium(NE) helps to solve the second-level game. In case of having a mixed NE in the second-level game, this paper chooses a pure strategy having maximum probability in the mixed strategy in order to obviate the probabilistic on/off state which may be infeasible. Simulation results shows that proposed method gives the adequate UC solutions corresponding to a NE.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.49-60
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• 2000

The proliferation of electronic commerce(EC) has led manufactureres to consider Internet based marketing as a salient candidate for strategic diversification of marketing channel. In this case, each manufacturer can build its own Web store or rent an existing special EC store. Such decision making of ‘build’ or ‘rent’ can be analyzed by a game model which derives the Nash solutions for price and profit considering degree of competition with other competitive manufacturers. In this paper, to overcome the drawbacks of the traditional linear demand function, we first propose a new linear demand function which incorporates not only the price difference between competitive products but the awareness of Web stores perceived by the consumers, then design the game models to analyze the characteristics of three typical types of marketing channel in duopoly market. Based on the Nash solutions of the game models, we analyzed the effect of the degree of competition and Web awareness in selecting the optimal marketing channel.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.11a
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• pp.3-5
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• 2000

It has been the paradigm of game theory that more than two utilities compete and determine the price and amount of dispatch. In order for this theory to be available on real power system, it is necessary to consider the transmission costs as well as the generation costs. In addition Independent System Operator(ISO) should be able to mitigate the congestion, recover the transmission costs and provide information for long-term capacity investment by devising reasonable pricing schemes for the transmission services. Generators also have to take the transmission costs into account when building the bidding strategies. This paper proposes an approach to analyzing the profit maximizing game considering the transmission cost in a competitive electricity market.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2009.07a
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• pp.569_570
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• 2009

This paper presents a methodology to find the profit maximized Nash Equilibriums of each generator(or GenCo), which considers the Ramp-rate of each generator under a competitive market environment. The ramp-rate of a generator is one of the physical or technical constraints of a generator and means the ability to increase or decrease the output instantaneously. In this paper, we found several Nash Equilibriums of the generation allocation problem through Dynamic Programming in a competitive market. Individual generators participate in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies of its generation quantities in a spot market.