• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제27권1호
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• pp.19-32
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• 2002

This paper examines the effect of the producer-supplier quality contract parameters and the magnitude of the quality related variables on the quality of the final products. Our analysis focuses on the parties' equilibrium behavior In a quality game environment where the supplier should choose among the two production technologies, one requiring high cost but producing high quality Parts and the other requiring low cost but producing low quality parts and where the producer should decide whether to do the inspection of the parts. The game framework is employed to depict the potential conflicts existing between the Producer and the supplier because the Producer can not observe the supplier's choice and each party wants the other to bear the cost of producing high quality products. In our model, we specifically consider the competitive situation where the producer competes with a firm producing the same product. We employ the market share attraction model to Incorporate the competitive situation and completely characterize the equilibrium by using the Nash equilibrium concept for the game solution. Our results show that the equilibrium depends on the contract terms and the magnitude of the quality related variables. Compared to the non-competitive situation, the probability of producer's Inspection and the probability of supplier's choosing the high quality technology increases in a competitive situation. This is true even when the competitor's quality is lower than the producer's lowest. As a result, the quality of the final product increases In a competitive situation. And as the failure cost borne by the supplier increases, the probability of choosing the high quality technology Increases and the probability of inspection decreases. The net effect of this results in the decrease of the final product quality.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제18권6호
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• pp.131-142
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• 2018

게임 문화가 성장함에 따라 게임중독과 과몰입에 대해 정확하게 이해하기 위한 연구의 필요성이 커지고 있다. 이를 위해서는 먼저 게임의 요소와 메커니즘이 가진 위험성을 이해할 필요가 있다. 본 연구에서는 우선적으로 기존 학자들이 게임 요소와 메커니즘을 어떻게 나누고 있는지 알아본 후, 과몰입을 주의해야 하는 게임 요소들을 선택적으로 도출하였다. 시각, 경쟁, 확률로 분리하여 각 요소를 구성하는 메커니즘을 세부 항목으로 나누어 살펴보았으며, 이 결과 시각적, 경쟁적 요소는 사용하는 메커니즘에 따라 과몰입의 위험성이 달라지며, 확률 요소 중 도박 메커니즘은 중독의 관점에서 바라보아야 한다는 것을 도출해 낼 수 있었다.

• 한국멀티미디어학회논문지
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• 제7권4호
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• pp.532-541
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• 2004

컴퓨터게임은 지식정보사회에서의 멀티미디어 분야의 꽃이라고 여겨지고 있다. 기존의 온라인게임들은 2차원 게임들이 주류를 이루었으나 최근 들어 사용자들에게 많은 현실감을 제공할 수 있는 3차원 형태의 온라인게임들이 관심을 끌고 있다. 국내의 게임 기술은 2차원 온라인게임에 있어서는 경쟁력을 확보하고 있으나 기술적인 문제 때문에 3차원 게임기술 분야에 있어서는 선진국에 비하여 다소 뒤쳐져 있는 것이 사실이다. 본 논문에서는 Dream3D를 이용한 3차원 온라인게임인 아리아온라인의 설계 및 개발에 관하여 기술한다. 개발된 게임은 다수의 사용자가 게임 서버에 연결하여 동시에 게임을 진행 할 수 있도록 하는 온라인 게임으로 개발되었다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제31권3호
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• pp.107-125
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• 2006

We introduce a two-stage game theoretic model to support decision making processes for product Positioning and pricing in competitive environment. In the first stage, firms decide on entry and product position, in the second stage, firms compete with price. 'Alpha rule' is used as a choice model. Demand parameters of the choice model are estimated by conjoint analysis. We investigate conditions for the existence of Nash price equilibria in the pricing game. Nash equilibria in the entry and positioning game are produced using a concept of stable sets. An example of the online game industry in Korea is examined.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제20권5호
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• pp.3-12
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• 2020

5세대 통신기술(5G)의 도입은 4세대 통신기술(4G)에서 발생했던 서비스 트래픽 속도와 용량 문제를 크게 감소시켰다. 이러한 통신환경에서 클라우드 게임의 시장 수요는 높아지고 있으며 향후 모바일 게임을 대체하는 분야로 클라우드 게임이 각광받고 있다. 본 연구에서는 통신기술의 발전에 따른 게임 산업의 변화와 클라우드 게임의 특징 및 시장 현황을 설명한다. 다음으로 클라우드 게임의 경쟁우위 요소로서 독창적인 게임콘텐츠, 안정적인 게임 환경, 높은 플랫폼 접근성을 제시한다. 본 연구는 클라우드 게임에 대한 독자의 이해를 높이며, 클라우드 게임 시장 및 산업을 위한 정책적 지원과 관련된 의사결정을 돕기 위한 자료로 활용될 수 있을 것이다.

• 전기학회논문지
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• 제60권3호
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• pp.509-516
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• 2011

This paper studies a novel method to find the profit-maximizing Nash Equilibriums in allocating generation quantities with consideration of ramp-rates under competitive market environment. Each GenCo in a market participates in a game to maximize its profit through competitions and play a game with bidding strategies. In order to find the Nash equilibriums it is necessary to search the feasible combinations of GenCos' strategies which satisfy every participant's profit and no one wants various constraints. During the procedure to find Nash equilibriums, the payoff matrix can be simplified as eliminating the dominated strategies. in each time interval. Because of the ramp-rate, generator's physically or technically limits to increase or decrease outputs in its range, it can restrict the number of bidding strategies of each generator at the next stage. So in this paper, we found the Nash Equilibriums for multi-stage generation allocation game considering the ramp-rate limits of generators. In the case studies, we analyzed the generation allocation game for a 12-hour multi-stage and compared it with the results of dynamic economic dispatch. Both of the two cases were considered generator's ramp-rate effects.

• 한국게임학회 논문지
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• 제1권1호
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• pp.24-30
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• 2001

본 논문은 게임제작을 위한 온라인게임의 엔진기술 및 설계에 관해 고찰해 보고저 한다. 이 러한 연구는 국제적인 경쟁력을 가지는 국산 게임엔진 개발이라는 과제의 실무기술로 사용될 수 있을 것이다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제40권2호
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• pp.43-61
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• 2015

The valuation of patents is very important, since technology competitiveness is crucial for firms to maintain global competitiveness. But, the patent valuation is difficult and challenging because of the uncertainty affecting their returns. Hence, we propose a patent valuation method by incorporating game theory into the real option model, which can not only potentially recognizes the effect of uncertainty on patent value, but also consider investment decision in a competitive market, as a game between firms. With the model, we can consider dynamic strategy involving an option of patent leveraging strategies enabling the firm to switch among compete, cooperate, or wait modes under different demand or competitive advantage condition.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제28권1호
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• pp.87-98
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• 2002

A competitive coevolutionary algorithm is a probabilistic search method that imitates coevolution process through evolutionary arms race. The algorithm has been used to solve adversarial problems. In the algorithms, the selection of competitors is needed to evaluate the fitness of an individual. The goal of this study is to compare and analyze several competition strategies in terms of solution quality, convergence speed, balance between competitive coevolving species, population diversity, etc. With two types of test-bed problems, game problems and solution-test problems, extensive experiments are carried out. In the game problems, sampling strategies based on fitness have a risk of providing bad solutions due to evolutionary unbalance between species. On the other hand, in the solution-test problems, evolutionary unbalance does not appear in any strategies and the strategies using information about competition results are efficient in solution quality. The experimental results indicate that the tournament competition can progress an evolutionary arms race and then is successful from the viewpoint of evolutionary computation.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2001년도 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.507-508
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• 2001

Power transactions are considered as noncooperative game in that participants compete each other to win the bidding game, and as cooperative game in that they have to cooperate to apply the result of bidding game to the physically interconnected power system. This paper applies both noncooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire process of power transaction.