• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.42-46
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• 2003

The economic operation of a utility in a deregulated environment brings about optimization problems different from those in vertically integrated one［1］. While each utility operates its own generation capacity to maximize profit, the market operator (or system operator) manages and allocates all the system resources and facilities to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper presents a sequential application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire power transaction process.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.701-703
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• 2004

Although the electricity market structure worldwide may be different in kinds, there generally exists long-term forward market and short-term spot market. Particularly, the bilateral contract in long-term forward market fixes the price between a genco and a customer so that the customer can avoid risks due to price-spike in spot market. The genco also can make an efficient risk-hedge strategy through this bilateral contract. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism for evaluating the optimal bilateral contract price using game theory. This mechanism makes a customer reveal his/her own willingness to purchase electricity so that a fair bilateral contract price can be derived.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• CDE review
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.30-35
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• 1998

Recently, many enterprises wish to preoccupy competitive positions in the market by motivating themselves towards CALS(Commerce At Light Speed) and try hard to achieve system implementation with the use of new concept-based backbone systems such as ERP(Enterprise Resource Planning) or PDM(Product Data Management). However, unfortunately there is an inevitable discrepancy during implementation period between package vendors and customers due to lack of clear methodology and misunderstanding about system. In some cases, consensus on partially verified system design invokes customers'continuous change demands and often it tends to result in unnecessary project delays. PDM application system implementation project of the company L has been studied here to solve these sorts of problems. The major yields of this work are achievement of a willing approval from customers and rapid system design under a time-limited and conceptually defined project scope and finally, through fully verified system design, we were able to reach successful system implementation.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.71-85
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• 2004

Many online content providers who use the Internet to distribute contents, such as news, music, games, books, and other types of information, have been experiencing an extremely competitive business environment. To survive in this environment, they have started charging a fee for the contents that they provide. However, there have been very few success stories in commercializing online contents. One of the biggest hurdles may be customers' psychological resistance against paying a fee for the contents that have been free of charge previously. Without examining customers' perceived prices for online contents, many online content providers have tended to decide their prices by themselves. Online games are not exceptional cases. Although many online game-related research works have focused on psychological and technical aspects, very few works have examined online garners' preference carefully. This study alms at exploring online garners' preference by measuring their WTP (willingness to pay) for online games.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.26 no.3
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• pp.67-78
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• 2009

In this paper, I analyze the mobile broadband services market characterized by vertical and horizontal differentiation. Vertical differentiation as service quality differentiation is based on the transmission speed of mobile internet service and horizontal differentiation as spatial differentiation is based on the service coverage. Theoretical explanations for the competitive price policy have been developed in the game context of WiBro which represent the high quality within the limited service coverage and HSDPA which represent relatively low quality with nation-wide service. When the WiBro has a mobile broadband service quality advantage and the difference in quality is sufficiently low, the price of WiBro with limited service coverage is relatively lower than that of HSDPA. This occurs because the advantage of WiBro's vertical service differentiation is offset by the disadvantage of horizontal differentiation. The difference in the quality of mobile internet service, however, is not too high, the price of WiBro is relatively higher than that of HSDPA. Moreover, when the service quality of WiBro is sufficiently high, the low quality HSDPA service faces no demand.

• Proceedings of the Korean Society of Computer Information Conference
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• 2018.07a
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• pp.321-322
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• 2018

빅데이터 분석은 스포츠에서 다양한 분야에서 사용되고 있다. 야구산업에서도 세이버 메트릭스를 활용하여 전술 훈련, 개인 훈련 등 다양한 방면으로 활용되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 기존의 연구인 빅데이터 분석과 게임이론을 활용한 축구선수 영입 모델을 야구에 적용킨 시뮬레이션을 진행하고 합리적인 의사결정 모델을 제안한다.

• The KSFM Journal of Fluid Machinery
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.43-47
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• 2016

Vertical axis wind turbine, despite of its limit in power efficiency, the simplicity in structure and maintenance is a competitive factor that keeps this type of turbine in the game until nowadays. Continuous solutions have been given to handle its major weakness and the use of omni-directional guide vane is an considerable one. In this paper, a 5kkW scale Savonius-based wind turbine enhanced with such guide vane system was design and studied. Together with reasonable blade design, the wind turbine shows promising performance compared with basic design while maintaining its original advantages.

• IE interfaces
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.54-58
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• 2001

In this study, we suggest a multi-generation Lotka-Volterra model, which is a competition model using game theory and complex system theory. The suggested model shows many improvements to weakness of a well known Bass model to forecast new technology in competitive markets. We show that the Lotka-Volterra model has strong power to forecast mobile communication services when it is used for competition of 1st generation mobile phone service and 2nd generation phone service in Korea. We finally use the model to forecast IMT-2000 service, the 3rd generation mobile communication service.