• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.07a
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• pp.398-400
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• 2002

This paper presents long-term electricity market analysis simulation considering Genco's strategy using P-POOL. In the competitive electricity market, system operation and/or market operation is highly depended on the participants' intention and his planning. We focus on the Genco's strategy, including maintenance scheduling and bidding strategy. And we represent his profit using 3-Bus sample system.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.9 no.1
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• pp.90-97
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• 2014

Nash Cournot Equilibrium (NCE) has been widely used in a competitive electricity market to analyze generation firms' strategic production quantities. Congestion on a transmission network may lead to a mixed strategy NCE. Mixed strategy is complicated to understand, difficult to compute, and hard to implement in practical market. However, Stackelberg model based equilibrium does not have any mixed strategy, even under congestion in a transmission line. A guide to understanding mixed strategy equilibrium is given by analyzing a cycling phenomenon in the players' best choices. This paper connects the concept of leader-follower in Stackelberg model with relations between generation firms on both sides of the congested line. From the viewpoint of social welfare, the surplus analysis is presented for comparison between the NCE and the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE).

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2003.07a
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• pp.655-657
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• 2003

Power system deregulation has become a worldwide trend which introduces competition in electric power system in order to realize efficient electricity production and investment. In this regards, it is very important to develop an electricity market simulator so that it is to analyze competitive market and train market operators and market participants. In this paper, we implement the algorithm of determining market clearing price as the first module of unique market simulator. The adopted and suggested algorithm is verified by modelling a simple market with a commercial market simulator(PLEXOS).

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2000.11a
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• pp.110-112
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• 2000

This paper presents a basic scheme of the congestion management in the Korea electricity market under the deregulated environment. We investigated some cases of the congestion management in the world and the effects of the congestion management in a real data. A basic idea of the congestion management in the Korea is presented based on the analysis of transmission congestion management in the competitive electricity market.

• 한국신재생에너지학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2006.06a
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• pp.343-346
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• 2006

Although renewable energy sources are more environmentally friendly than fossil energy sources, it is far more costly, considering current technological standards. It would not present many competitive advantages in the power market. If the renewable electricity is viable in the market, the government should take 'visible' actions to compensate production costs. Popular policies, such as Feed-In-Tariff and Renewable Portfolio Standards, can help to attract investors into generators of renewable electricity. But presently, they are mainly financed through a undifferentiated increase of electricity bills and occasionally confronted with the opposition of the electricity consumers. And most policies tend to focus on increasing the supply of renewable electricity with little consideration toward elevating the motivation of consumers. This study evaluates the potential of environmentally friendly energy consumption and examines the 'green pricing' program which realize the potential.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.56-66
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric industry. Participants of competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by adequately pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze the price-clearing in the generation bidding competition and the competition is modeled as the noncooperative and complete information. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity and generating entity's strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2007.11b
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• pp.258-260
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• 2007

MAS based market simulator has attracted the attentions of people who are interested in using or developing electricity market simulator. MAS based approach makes it possible to model each market participant's strategic behaviors. Traditional market simulators have used optimization formulation to model market operation, which has been used since vertically integrated system. Optimization mainly uses cost minimization or welfare maximization of entire system. Therefore it is somehow difficult to model the independently strategic behaviors of market participants. MAS is one of AI technology based on distributed intelligence which makes it possible to model independently acting entities in competitive market. This paper proposes the method to model strategic participants in electricity market based on MAS.

• Journal of Energy Engineering
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• v.15 no.4 s.48
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• pp.256-276
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• 2006

Transmission congestion is one of the key factors to local market power in competitive electricity markets. Financial transmission rights provide the financia] protection to their holders by paying back the congestion rent. A variety researches have shown that the existing trading mechanisms on transmission right can exacerbate market power. This paper proposes an alternative methodology in mitigating the local market power using the Contingent Transmission Rights on the locational marginal pricing scheme. The proposed methodology was demonstrated with the Optimal Power Flow.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.11
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• pp.630-635
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. In order to get a profitable bidding function which is usually linear, it is required to modify adequately the intersection and the slope of a linear supply function. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as two level games in this research. One is a subgame where a certain type of parameters is given and the players compete to select values of the underlying parameters. The other is an overall game where the players compete to select a profitable type among the four types of parameters. The NEs in both games are computed by an using analytic method and a payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.