• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.24 no.3
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• pp.237-270
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• 2013

Determinism and compatibilism have thought that libertarianism contradicts the scientific view. This paper demonstrates that the hypothesis that free will exists does not cause any problems and contradictions, while maintaining pro-scientific view. Rather, determinism lacks scientific and demonstrative bases. At first, I reject dualistic self by assuming identity theory of the self and physical body & brain. Free will is a functional concept or property that can have multiple realization. Therefore we can recognize whether aliens or robots have free will through observation on their acts. 'Free will' is a functional kinds term like 'digestion'. As we know we have digestive function, we can know that we have free will even before knowing the necessity of its existence by understanding micro structure of human free will. The judgement that an individual has free will function depends on whether it has particular actions. Those actions are controlling and restraining actions in context, predicting future, making elaborate conditional sentences, etc. Real being of free will is the physical occupant of the function that makes those actions. Determinism is based on various kinds of misconceptions and misunderstandings. Determinists often confuse necessity of physical law and determinism. Another decisive misunderstanding is that free will postulates same conditions and different results from the same point of time. However, free will postulates that the two points of time are different. Because determinism is unnecessary redundant hypothesis influenced by religions, according to Ockham's Razor, determinism should be eliminated.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.373-393
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• 2018

Manipulation arguments purport to show that source freedom is incompatible with determinism. According to manipulation arguments, (1) intuitively, an agent manipulated in a certain manner to do A is not free, and (2) there is no significant difference between manipulation and determination. It follows that an agent determined to do A is not free. A compatibilist hard-line reply ('HR') denies (1), whereas a soft-line reply ('SR') denies (2). HR, which is arguably compatibilists' favorite, is assessed from the 'neutral stance.' HR turns out to fall short of adequately rejecting manipulation arguments. Recently Sartorio defends HR by claiming that (1) commits some sort of psychological fallacy. I argue that it does not work. I claim that SR is more promising. I examine the difference between intentional manipulation by design and ordinary determination. I argue that this difference suggests some determination scenario without intentional manipulation to which SR and manipulation arguments make different predictions, and that SR is better supported. Finally, incompatibilist objections are considered and replied.