• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.2
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• pp.1-21
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• 2004

Clausewitz’s theory of war can be divided between the theory of conduct of war and the theory of preparations for war, and the theory of war that Clausewitz means, is the theory of conduct of war. But before Clausewitz, men regarded a theory of preparations for war as the theory of war. The theory of preparations for war concerns generally about the material side of war, but not its spiritual aspect. The activity of war is basically a human spiritual and psychological action. And because the war is dangerous, the anxiety occurs and diverse human feelings, for example courage, have been required. Also the informations in war is normally very uncertain, so an insight of the commander is in war very needed. The Theory of war has to consider this spiritual aspect. To end the war and to acquire the peace, an excellent talent of commander is necessary. And it is a genius. Men who are difficult to move but have strong feelings, these are the men who are best able to be a genius.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.8
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• pp.271-309
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• 2010

The main theme of this study is about North Korea's contemporary military strategy which remained a blind spot in the 21st century. Indeed, Pyongyang's contemporary military strategy is evolved from the logic of War. On the basis of this logic, this study examined North Korea's contemporary military strategy with three analytical frameworks. The first is the discovery of Clausewitz's dictums and application of the Trinitarian analysis on the Korean cases. During the course of applying Clausewitzian main dictum--War as continuation of politics, the methodological analysis on war played a important role generalizing the pattern and matrix of North Korea's strategic thinking and military strategy. In particular, Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework on war -Government (reason), Army (chance), People (passion)- was a universal framework to scrutinize the North Korean missile and nuclear strategy. The second is about the matrix of North Korea's military strategy, The study suggested the genealogical feature of Pyongyang's military strategy. In principle, the dictum of 'Military-First Politics' 1S the combination of the political philosophy, Chuch'e (self-reliance) of Kim Il Sung and Kin Jong Il reflected in the military readiness. As a result this analysis was able to equate Clausewitz's dictums to explain Pyongyang's idea of the nature of war in that North Korea's military strategy is the central instrument of delivery to achieve political objectives. The third is about the theoretical encounter of 'Clausewitz's Wonderful Trinity' and 'Remarkable Trinity on North Korea's contemporary strategy'. On the basis, three elements are connected to one of three groups in society; the people, the military, and the government. In order to apply the Clausewitz's Trinitarian analysis into Kim Jong Il's 'Military-First' strategy, two case studies (Missile and Nuclear strategy) were examined. The finding of this study is that Clausewitzian dictum in the 19th century is still valid in the 21st century as it provided plausible theoretical framework to explain the North Korean contemporary military strategy with a reminder that the nature and logic of war are fixed in the socially constructed state.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.41-47
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• 2018

Theorists of war have often used Clausewitz's trinity theory as a framework for analyzing war strategies and histories. Heretofore, studies on cyber warfare have focused primarily on laws, policies, structuring organizations, manpower, and training pertaining to preparing the cyberspace for war. Currently, studies highlighting the comparative characteristics of war in cyberspace, how it differs from conventional warfare, and analytical frameworks for understanding war in cyberspace are rare. Using Clausewitz's trinity theory, this paper interprets the essence of war from the perspectives of (1) Intellect, (2) Bravery, and (3) Passion, to propose an analytical model for understanding war in cyberspace, one that factors in the intrinsic qualities and characteristics of cyberspace under spatial and temporal constraints. Furthermore, this paper applies the aforementioned analytical model to the Iraq War and concludes with a theoretical illustration that cyber warfare played a significant role in winning the war.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.1
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• pp.1-34
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• 2003

Clausewitz's On War is a very difficult classic. Because its manuscript was not completed by him, and the Korean translations are hard to understand. Seven Korean translations of the twelve, all of the Korean translations of On War, are the plagiarisms or very alike to the former translations. It remains only five translations, to that is worth reading. Even the five are composed of Korean, difficult to understand. Because they are full of japanese and chinese terms, the sentence structures too long and complex, and many of terms too 'military'. Now is the time to translate the book new, that is understandable with easy and simple terms and short sentences.

• Journal of the military operations research society of Korea
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.1-17
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• 1996

Sun Tzu once clarified that "One who knows the enemy and knows himself will not be endangered in a hundred engagements, " while Clausewitz explained that "A victory will be guaranteed for one who can overcome 'fog and friction' at a battlefield." Now the U.S. is striving hard to develop an American version of RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs)/MTR (Military Technical Revolution) by utilizing its rapidly emerging information technology in the information age. The U.S. firmly believes that its RMA/MTR with less defense expenditure can provide all combat players in the battlespace with "dominant battle awareness, " by which no nation will be able to challenge U.S. military superiority. In this paper, the recent efforts of the U.S. Armed Forces on RMA/MTR will be briefly introduced, some lessons and expertises from the U.S. RMA/MTR are extracted, and, in this regard, several suggestions are provided for the progress of the ROK Armed Forces.gress of the ROK Armed Forces.

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.83-91
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• 2020

The purpose of this article is to analyse the military thought of Ferdinand Foch and to present its contemporary meanings. 1.Foch's life: Since 1871 to end of World War I, he acted as a military philosopher, battle field commander, and Supreme Commender of the Unified Forces so as to be judged as Clausewitz of the 20th century. 2. Historical Background of Foch's Activity Period : The series of the domestic revolutions after Napoleon's downfall were extended to Europe for independence, unification and overseas colonial wars. Thus Foch's growing and acting period was in totally imminent danger at all fields. 3. Foch's Military Thought : Through his three books, he argued cleary the absolute importance of the immaterial power including the technical esteem and the offensive fighting will for the victory. 4. The Contemporary Application of Foch's Thought : Though the operation plan based on Foch's strategic thought was defeated at the early stage of the World War I, its offensive-oriented immaterial spirit power should be remembered. 5. Conclusion : Foch's thought which develops the penetration through the war history and emphasizes the importance of the immaterial power should be highly appraised. Thus it should be also reinterpreted and redeveloped into a modern contemporary meaning.

• Strategy21
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• s.43
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• pp.225-247
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to find out a significant influence of continental strategy theories on the development of maritime strategy theories. For this purpose, I examined similar and different parts of each theories and their implications when applied to different environment. In details, Chapter 2 deals with how continental strategy and maritime strategy theories are similar and different in general. In Chapter 3, I look into how Karl Clausewitz's theory that has been quoted the most by military strategy theorists had influenced over the theory of Julian Corbett, one of the representative English maritime strategy theorists. In Chapter 4, I study how the theory of Alfred Mahan that has also been quoted the most among the theories of maritime strategy had been influenced by Antoine-Henri Jomini's theory. And in Chapter 5, their contemporary implications and conclusions are drawn. According to my findings, unbelievably, the theories of maritime strategy had been influenced by existing continental strategy theories very much. Many similarities are found between them. However, at the same time, a large part of them is found significantly different from original ones especially when used to reflect the maritime distinctiveness. This means that the past maritime strategy theories and stored experience also wield influence, in many ways, yielding out much better ones in terms of applicability to changing environment. Therefore, devising new strategies with creative attitude using knowledges and experiences from both other fields and past ones is the virtue required for maritime strategists.