• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.2 no.4
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• pp.31-38
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• 2015

During the last two decades the idea that central bank independence and transparency helps to maintain price stability, became popular among economists and central bankers. Many countries' governments give their monetary authorities higher independence and transparency to achieve the price stability goal. However, emerging countries such as Kazakhstan, suffer from high inflation. This inflation occurs largely due to a low level of independence and transparency of central banks. This research project measures the current level of independence and transparency of central bank of Kazakhstan. Indices were used to measure central bank independence and transparency. Central bank independence was measured by two types of indices: based on central bank laws (legal independence) and based on central banks governor's turnover (TOR). Developing countries have a weak legal framework, implying that a legal independence index cannot be appropriate to use as a measures of actual independence. Therefore, by paying attention to the other two indices, we can say that the central bank of Kazakhstan has a low level of independence and transparency. This, in turn, can be one of the causes of high inflation in Kazakhstan.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.833-840
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• 2021

This paper examines the effect of the interest rate set by Bank Indonesia on financial system stability as measured by the credit gap in Indonesia for quarterly data for the period 1976 Q1 to 2019 Q4. We suppose that the relationship between the Central Bank rate and the credit gap is non-linear. Hence, this study applies a smooth transition regression (STR) model to investigate the relationship between these variables. Our results are: first, by performing STR estimation we obtained a threshold level of Central Bank rate of 2.01. Second, a decrease in the Central Bank rate results in a reduction in the credit gap when the Central Bank rate is above or below the threshold level. The effect of the Central Bank rate is five times greater for the high regime than for the low regime. Third, we find evidence that the effect of the exchange rate, economic growth, inflation, and GDP per capita on the credit gap for the high regime is the opposite of the low regime. We suggest that policymakers need to keep the Central Bank interest rate low and stable so that the role of the bank as a financial intermediary remains stable and conducive to strengthening financial stability.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.96-105
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• 1998

Electronic cash affects central bank in many areas, in particular regarding the issuance of money, supervision of cashless payments, supervision of the banking system and monetary policy. The effects of electronic cash on central bank policies, the security and integrity of the payment system, and naturally also on single sector such as company engaged in the transport of money and valuables, depend mainly on the extent to which the new payment methods can replace cash. The possible development of electronic cash merits special attention from central banks for at least three reasons. First, central banks are concerned that the introduction of the new payment instrument should have no adverse effect on public confidence in the payment system and payment media. Second, although the substitution of electronic cash for other forms of money should not theoretically hamper central bank's ability to control the money supply, it might, however, have practial implications, at least in the long run, which need to be carefully examined. Third, because electronic cash may be used for payments of very small value, they have the potential, more than any other cashless instrument, to take over the role of notes and coins in the economy and, therefore, have implications for central bank's activities and revenues.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.21 no.9
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• pp.360-371
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• 2021

The advent of virtual currencies has heightened interest in the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) issued by the central bank. Recently, central banks in some countries have already decided to issue CBDCs or are in the test phase. This study will be an opportunity to compare public and private perceptions of central banks and explore various issues related to the introduction of CBDCs in the future through analysis methods of big data.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.47 no.2
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• pp.103-120
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• 2022

This paper studies the possibility of options as an instrument for central bank to intervene foreign exchange market. As opposed to spot transaction or forward transaction, which impacts spot exchange rate only once, currency options can continuously resist a directional speculative pressure on spot market due to the dynamic delta hedging of OTC currency options market maker. This research also analyzes whether and how central banks can use currency options to lower exchange rate volatility and maintain (implicit) target zones in foreign exchange markets. It argues that short position rather than long position in options will result in market makers dynamically hedging their long option exposure in a stabilizing manner, consistent with the first objective. Selling a "Strangle" allows a central bank to increase the credibility of its commitment to a target zone, and could have a lower expected cost than spot market interventions. However, this strategy also exposes the central bank to an unlimited loss potential. Therefore these kinds of intervention strategies must be used in the short run and temporarily.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.91-100
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• 2020

This study aims to find out the legalization status of a central Shariah regulatory authority for the Islamic banks in Bangladesh. In this regard, the central bank can legalize the existing Centralized Shariah Board for Islamic Banks of Bangladesh (CSBIB) or form a new Centralized Shariah Supervisory Board (CSBB) under the management of the central bank in Bangladesh. Based on the data obtained by the semi-structured interviews, this research finds diversified opinions regarding the legalization of CSBIB or the formation of a new CSBB. Initially, without the law, it would be difficult to form CSSB under the central bank as the Islamic banks and banking environment are still not ready. In addition, it is difficult to legalize the existing CSBIB because the format of its structure is different from the CSSB structure in Malaysia and Bahrain. The existing banking company act authorizes the central bank to provide circulars regarding banking issues and it will be considered as an act. The central bank can legalize the existing CSBIB or form a new CSSB through a circular which will be helpful to monitor the overall Shariah issues. The presence of a CSSB will fulfill the expectations of all Islamic banks, and the concerned stakeholders.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.9
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• pp.317-325
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• 2022

The simple regression model (SRM) is used in this study to look at potential economic growth-influencing factors. The sample's period runs from 2005 to 2019. The data was gathered from various ministries and government agencies such as the Central Bank of Afghanistan's Statistical Bulletin, the World Bank, the United Nations (UN), World Bank open data, NASA, Ministry of Finance (MoF), Ministry of Economy (MoE), and Central Bank of Afghanistan's Statistical Bulletin (CBA), as well as the internet and news. There is an urgent need to ensure that taxes are collected in the most efficient manner possible because one of the enormous management gaps in Afghanistan over the last two decades has been tax evasion. According to the results of this study, tax evasion has a negative and significant impact on Afghanistan's economic growth. We can affirm that the subject of this article is among the most significant topics recently discussed in my country. If the right solutions are implemented, It can significantly contribute to quickening the cycle of the developing Afghan economy and turning it from an unstable to a sustainable one.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.71-94
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• 1990

This paper reviews the rationale of monetary and banking intervention by an outside authority, either the government or the central bank, and seeks to delineate clearly the optimal limits to the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway in Korea as well as on a global scale. Furthermore, this paper seeks to establish an objective and balanced view on the role of the central bank, especially in light of the current discussion on the restructuring of Korea's central bank, which has been severely contaminated by interest-group politics. The discussion begins with the recognition that the modern free banking school and the new monetary economics are becoming formidable challenges to the traditional role of the government or the central bank in the monetary and banking sector. The paper reviews six arguments that have traditionally been presented to support intervention: (1) the possibility of an over-issue of bank notes under free banking instead of central banking; (2) externalities in and the public good nature of the use of money; (3) economies of scale and natural monopoly in producing money; (4) the need for macro stabilization policy due to the instability of the real sector; (5) the external effects of bank failure due to the inherent instability of the existing banking system; and (6) protection for small banknote users and depositors. Based on an analysis of the above arguments, the paper speculates on the optimal role of the government or central bank in the monetary and banking system and the optimal degree of monetary and banking deregulation. By contrast to the arguments for free banking or laissez-faire monetary systems, which become fashionable in recent years, monopoly and intervention by the government or central bank in the outside money system can be both necessary and optimal. In this case, of course, an over-issue of fiat money may be possible due to political considerations, but this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the issue of inside monies based on outside money could indeed be provided for optimally under market competition by private institutions. A competitive system in issuing inside monies would help realize, to the maxim urn extent possible, external economies generated by using a single outside money. According to this reasoning, free banking activities will prevail in the inside money system, while a government monopoly will prevail in the outside money system. This speculation, then, also implies that the monetary and banking deregulation currently underway should and most likely will be limited to the inside money system, which could be liberalized to the fullest degree. It is also implied that it will be impractical to deregulate the outside money system and to allow market competition to provide outside money, in accordance with the arguments of the free banking school and the new monetary economics. Furthermore, the role of the government or central bank in this new environment will not be significantly different from their current roles. As far as the supply of fiat money continues to be monopolized by the government, the control of the supply of base money and such related responsibilities as monetary policy (argument(4)) and the lender of the last resort (argument (5)) will naturally be assigned to the outside money supplier. However, a mechanism for controlling an over-issue of fiat money by a monopolistic supplier will definitely be called for (argument(1)). A monetary policy based on a certain policy rule could be one possibility. More importantly, the deregulation of the inside money system would further increase the systemic risk inherent in the current fractional banking system, while enhancing the efficiency of the system (argument (5)). In this context, the role of the lender of the last resort would again become an instrument of paramount importance in alleviating liquidity crises in the early stages, thereby disallowing the possibility of a widespread bank run. Similarly, prudential banking supervision would also help maintain the safety and soundness of the fully deregulated banking system. These functions would also help protect depositors from losses due to bank failures (argument (6)). Finally, these speculations suggest that government or central bank authorities have probably been too conservative on the issue of the deregulation of the financial system, beyond the caution necessary to preserve system safety. Rather, only the fullest deregulation of the inside money system seems to guarantee the maximum enjoyment of external economies in the single outside money system.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.209-247
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• 2004

Although various publicly reserved funds have recently come to the fore of academic and policy-making attention in Korea, researchers rarely take up the issue of the reserve fund retained from annual profits by the central bank (i.e., the Bank of Korea). Starting with the general public choice premise that bureaucrats seek to maximize their discretionary budget, this paper first provides a theoretical reasoning why central bank's bureaucrats would prefer retaining annual profits to turning them to the Treasury. The major tenet to be emphasized is that retained profits as a reserve fund can give the central bankers discretionary power in their disposition. In particular, we focus on the close relationship between the reserve fund and the discount windows. The latter, as a monetary instrument, has traditionally been demonstrated to cause secrecy, arbitrariness, and other bureaucratic amenities in the previous literature. Subsequently, this paper, based on 61 countries data, empirically verifies that the central bank's reserve fund is at least partially used to additionally increase the discount windows. Since an excessive use of discount windows results in inflationary bias, we conclude the paper with some policy suggestions to have such bureaucratic power of discretion in check. This paper, if in its experimental nature yet, is expected to shed a critical implication for establishing the meaningful independence of the central bank to a host of countries.

• East Asian Economic Review
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.507-529
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• 2018

This paper evaluates the whole impact of quantitative easing on inflation in Korea implemented by the central banks in four major advanced economies, the U.S., Euro Area, U.K. and Japan. According to the analysis employing a VAR-X model with the security holdings of those central banks an exogenous variable, quantitative easing is estimated to exert downward pressures on inflation in Korea. Considering the impulse responses of Korean macroeconomic variables to a quantitative easing shock, the spillover effect is transmitted through exchange rate channel while trade channel turns out to be ineffective. In an additional analysis assessing the impact of each quantitative easing program of the central banks, only those of the Fed and European Central Bank are estimated to be significant. The empirical results prove to be robust even if using long-term interest rates as an alternative indicator of quantitative easing.