• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.3-26
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• 2010

The European Union(EU) has recently introduced its Directive 2008/101/EC to include aviation in the EU ETS(emissions trading system). As an amendment to Directive 2003/87/EC that regulates reduction of the green house gas(GHG) emissions in Europe in preparation for the Kyoto Protocol, 1997, it obliges both EU and non-EU airline operators to reduce the emission of the carbon dioxide(CO2) significantly in the year 2012 and thereafter from the level they made in 2004 to 2006. Emission allowances allowed free of charge for each airline operator is 97% in the first year 2012 and 95% from 2013 and thereafter from the average annual emissions during historical years 2004 to 2006. Taking into account the rapid growth of air traffic, i.e. 5% in recent years, airlines operating to EU have to reduce their emissions by about 30% in order to meet the requirements of the EU Directive, if not buy the emissions right in the emissions trading market. However, buying quantity is limited to 15% in the year 2012 subject to possible increase from the year 2013. Apart from the hard burden of the airline operators, in particular of those from non-European countries, which is not concern of this paper, the EU Directive has certain legal problems. First, while the Kyoto Protocol of universal application is binding on the Annex I countries of the Climate Change Convention, i.e. developed countries including all Member States of the European Union to reduce GHG at least by 5% in the implementation period from 2008 to 2012 over the 1990 level, non-Annex I countries which are not bound by the Kyoto Protocol see their airlines subjected to aircraft emissions reductions scheme of EU when operating to EU. This is against the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol dealing with the emissions of GHG including CO2, target of the EU Directive. While the Kyoto Protocol mandates ICAO to set up a worldwide scheme for aircraft emissions to contribute to stabilizing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, the EU ETS was drawn up outside the framework of the international Civil Aviation Organization(ICAO). Second, EU Directive 2008/101 defines 'aviation activities' as covering 'flights which depart from or arrive in the territory of a Member State to which the [EU] Treaty applies'. While the EU airlines are certainly subject to the EU regulations, obliging non-EU airlines to reduce their emissions even if the emissions are produced during the flight over the high seas and the airspace of the third countries is problematic. The point is whether the EU Directive can be legally applied to extra-territorial behavior of non-EU entities. Third, the EU Directive prescribes 2012 as the first year for implementation. However, the year 2012 is the last year of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I countries including members of EU to reduce GHG including the emissions of CO2 coming out from domestic airlines operation. Consequently, EU airlines were already on the reduction scheme of CO2 emissions as long as their domestic operations are concerned from 2008 until the year 2012. But with the implementation of Directive 2008/101 from 2012 for all the airlines, regardless of the status of the country Annex I or not where they are registered, the EU airlines are no longer at the disadvantage compared with the airlines of non-Annex I countries. This unexpected premium for the EU airlines may result in a derogation of the Kyoto Protocol at least for the year 2012. Lastly, as a conclusion, the author shed light briefly on how the Korean aviation authorities are dealing with the EU restrictive measures.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.27 no.4
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• pp.667-694
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• 2018

We analyze the learning-by-doing effects of the allowance pricing system on the Korea's emission trading scheme. The price of allowance (Korean Allowance Unit) is influenced differently by internal market factors and economic conditions variables in the first (January 2015 to June 2016 ) and the second commitment year(January 2016 to June 2017). The prices and transaction volumes of complementary credits (KCU and KOC) as well as economic conditions variables (such as call rate, exchange rate, stock price) are statistically significant only for the second commitment year. Thus, the learning-by-doing effect makes the market participation decision on K-ETS market more efficient in the second commitment year, adopting the previous experience and knowledge in the K-ETS market. The factors estimated significantly in both commitment periods include the institutional binary variable for requiring the submission of the emissions verification reports issued both on February and March.

• Journal of Environmental Science International
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• v.19 no.7
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• pp.901-905
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• 2010

Emissions of leachate, odor, and landfill gas(LFG) from an open-dumping landfill site do harm to public health by contaminating neighboring soil, underground water, and rivers. Particularly, methane($CH_4$) and carbon dioxide($CO_2$), the main components of LFG, are especially noted as the causing material of the global warming that become seriously recognized worldwide issue. As one of alternatives in managing LFG, incineration of inflammable wastes that are generated during excavation process at an open-dumping landfill has been evaluated. Standard on stabilization for evaluation, neither $CH_4$ density nor $CO_2$ density could not Because meet 'less than 5%' criterion and so it is right to install a gas collection system during landfill renewal to prevent diffusion of odor and collect it. Because it shows considerable heating value, incineration of inflammable wastes might be the reasonable solution from the result of our study.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.64 no.5
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• pp.667-679
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• 2015

The bearer of the power sector's ETS compliance cost is power consumer for the following reasons. Firstly, power companies are constrained in establishing appropriate strategies to comply with ETS regulations due to the structural differences between the domestic power market and emission trading system. In other words, because power companies do not have a right to determine price and production of electricity, they have to compete with other companies under disadvantaged conditions in the emission trading market. Secondly, because ETS compliance cost is part of power production costs as it is also clearly written in the national greenhouse gas reduction road-map and the second energy supply plan, the cost should be included in power price following the power market operation rule. Thirdly, the most effective method to reduce carbon emissions in power sector is to reduce power demand, which is efficiently achieved through raising power price to a realistic level. Low power price in Korea is the major cause of rising power demand which is also the major cause of rising GHG emission. Therefore, power sector's ETS compliance cost should be included in power price to encourage power consumers' actions on reducing power consumption. Fourthly, when externality cost occurs in the process of delivering public services, usually beneficiary pay principle is applied to identify the cost bearer. Since electricity is one representative public good, the bearer of power sector's ETS compliance cost is power consumer.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.55-93
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• 2012

In Korea, energy policies are actualized through various energy-related plans. Recently, however, as high-ranking plans, which are very vision-oriented, continually set higher sector-by-sector goals, subordinate action plans, which require consistency, encounter distortions in their establishment process. Also, each subordinate action plan reveals limitations in terms of securing flexibility of the plan in responding to uncertainties of the future. These problems pose potential risks such as causing huge social costs. In this regard, with an aim to provide empirical evidence for discussions on improving the procedure for developing and executing Korea's energy plans, this study mainly analyzes the Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply-one of the most important subordinate action plans-in order to explain the problems of the Basic Plan in a logical manner, and potential problems that could occur in the process of sustaining consistency between the Basic Plan and its higher-ranking plans. Further, this paper estimates the scale of social costs caused by those problems assuming realistic conditions. According to the result, in the case of where maximum electric power is estimated to be 7% (15%) less than the actual amount in the Basic Plan on Electricity Demand and Supply, the annual generation cost will rise by 286 billion won and (1.2 trillion won) in 2020. Such social costs are found to occur even when establishing and executing the Basic plan according to the target goal set by its higher-ranking plan, the National Energy Master Plan. In addition, when another higher-ranking GHG reduction master plan requires the electricity sector to reduce emissions by additional 5% in the GHG emissions from the right mix in electricity generation with 'zero' cost of carbon emission, the annual generation cost will rise by approximately 915 billion won in 2020. On the other hand, the analysis finds that since economic feasibility of electric powers in Korea varies significantly depending on their type, Korea is expected to face very small potential social costs caused by uncertainties over the future price of carbon dioxide in the process of establishing the Basic Plan.