• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.159-167
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• 2021

The objective of this study is to examine the effect of family ownership and family CEO on the dividend policy of family firms by using the demographic characteristics of the CEO as a moderator. Dividend policy is a decision taken by the firm in determining whether the profits earned by the firm will be distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends or will be reinvested in the company as retained earnings for future internal resources. Using samples from non-financial family firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2013-2017, 93 firms were selected based on adequate data. We also used logit regressions to provide robustness. The results show that family ownership and family CEO have a positive effect on the dividend payout ratio. This finding supports the family income hypothesis. Among CEO demographic characters, CEO age significantly strengthens the positive effect of family CEO on dividend payout ratio. While CEO tenure does not significantly strengthen the positive effect of family CEOs on dividend payout ratios. Meanwhile, leverage, ROA, and firm size significantly affect the dividend payout ratio, but firm age does not significantly affect the dividend payout ratio.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.1101-1111
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• 2021

The current study aims to investigate the influence of different categories of ownership held by different types of board members on bank performance. The study uses a sample of Saudi listed banks for the period from 2011 to 2018. The results of the panel data analysis using firm fixed-effects regression model indicate that bank performance is significantly and positively affected by the chairman ownership and the CEO ownership. However, board independent members' ownership has a negative influence on bank performance. While non-executive board members' ownership and family board members have an insignificant impact on bank performance. Control variables, including board size, non-executive board members, government ownership, leverage, and bank size are significantly associated with bank performance. Overall, the results indicate that Saudi bank performance is higher in smaller banks that have smaller boards with lower non-executive members, lower portion of shares held by independent board members, higher portion of shares held by the chairman, CEO, and government, and higher leverage. The results of this study provide important implications for regulatory authorities and market participants in Saudi Arabia and countries with ownership concentration to understand the actual role of different categories of board ownership on firm performance in addition to optimize board ownership.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.305-313
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• 2019

The study examines whether higher CEO compensation is related to unobserved future firm performance in an emerging market, Pakistan. Further, it extends its scope to analyzing the impact of group affiliation and ownership concentration on the relationship between CEO compensation and future firm performance. The study uses an unbalanced panel data consisting of 1508 firm-year observations from 225 non-financial listed companies in Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) for period 2005 to 2012. The multiple regression models adjusted to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in error terms are used. The study finds that, in general, CEO compensation is positively associated with future operating performance. However, higher CEO compensation leads to lower operating performance in firms that have lower ownership concentration and are affiliated with business groups. When firms are not affiliated with any group and have high ownership concentration, the relationship between excessive CEO compensation and future operating performance becomes insignificant. Given that efficient compensation packages may lead to long term value creation to shareholders and reduce agency problems, this study highlights an important moderating role of ownership concentration and group affiliation of the firms in emerging markets.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.45-60
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• 2020

Purpose - This study examines the impact of company ownership nature and of the dual role of CEO and board chair on R & D investment intensity, as well as the moderating effect of this dual role. Most previous research focused on the impact of the dual role of CEO and board chair on firm performance. Design/methodology/approach - This study uses A-share companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges in China from 2008 to 2017. The univariate and the multivariate regression analysis were hired In order to analyze the data. Findings - The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between state-owned companies and R & D investment intensity. In addition, there is a significant positive relationship between the dual role and R & D investment intensity. The effect of state ownership on R & D investment intensity is more negative when CEO-board chair duality exists. This means that in case of state-owned companies, if CEO serves as the board chair, the propensity to invest in R&D is further reduced. Research implications or Originality - This is a pioneering study that considers the joint effect of state-owned companies and dual role on R & D investment intensity in the Chinese economy.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.175-189
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• 2023

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between CEO name uncommonness and R&D intensity while focusing on CEO ownership and CEO tenure as moderators of the relationship. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected data from various American databases such as national data on given names from Social Security Administration, COMPUSTAT, and Execucomp. The sample of this study includes 2,494 (firm-year) observations from U.S. firms between 2005-2011. This study conducts Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Findings - First, we found CEO name uncommonness was positively related to R&D intensity. In other words, CEOs with unusual names prefer being distinctive by increasing R&D investments. Second, we examine the moderating roles of CEO characteristics (i.e., CEO ownership and tenure). The results show that CEO tenure strengthens the positive relationship between CEO name uncommonness and R&D intensity. Research implications or Originality - First, this study extends the CEO characteristics and R&D literature by investigating how CEO name uncommonness affects R&D intensity. In addition, our study also supports the intitutionalization of CEO power arguments by showing that CEOs with unusual names are more likely to pursue distinctive strategies when they have longer tenure. For practical implications, our results allow the investors to better predict corporate future R&D expenses. It suggests that ceteris paribus, CEOs with unusual names, vis-a-vis CEOs with common names, are more likely to increase R&D expenses.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.157-183
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• 2014

This paper examines how the concentration of ownership in firms influences the R&D investment decision and whether the type of a firm's management (i.e, the owner-manager or professional manger) differentiates the relationship between the ownership concentration and R&D investments by using data of Korean pharmaceutical companies between 2004 and 2008. The results show that the share of the largest shareholder and R&D investment have an inverted U-shaped relationship, and whether a CEO is an owner or a professional manager affects the curvature of the inverted U-shaped relationship. Specifically, when a firm's CEO is a professional manager and the share of his stock is small, increase in the CEO's share increases the R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because the increase in ownership reduces agency cost; However, when the share of his stock is large, the increase in CEO's share decreases R&D investment in the larger amount than when a firm's CEO is an owner. This is because a professional manager gets concerned over excessive risk exposure more than an owner-manager does.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.12
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• pp.293-308
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• 2020

This study aims to investigate the direct relationship between ownership structure, earnings manipulation, and organizational performance, and then examine the mediating effect of earnings manipulation in the relationship between ownership structure and organizational performance. This study collected and analyzed secondary data published in financial reports related to all insurance organizations listed in the Jordanian market during the study period (from 2009 until 2018). A panel data analysis was conducted, giving a total of 200 observations. The findings of this study concluded that ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and organization size affect organizational performance proxied by ROA, ROE, and EPS, more specifically, ownership concentration and organization size have a positive effect, whereas foreign ownership has a negative effect. At the same time, board of director ownership, organizational ownership, and CEO compensation did not affect organizational performance. Next, the board of director ownership, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and CEO compensation affect earnings manipulation separately. In addition, earnings manipulation positively affects organizational performance proxied by ROA, ROE and EPS. This means that the higher the earnings manipulation is, the higher the organizational performance is. Finally, earnings manipulation mediates the relationship between ownership concentration and foreign ownership of ownership structure, and organizational performance.

• Journal of Korea Technology Innovation Society
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• v.8 no.3
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• pp.1199-1224
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• 2005

This study analyzes various factors affecting a firm's investments, focusing on both a firm's ownership structure and CEO's incentives. While previous empirical works focus on various financial data in order to test the Schumpeterian Hypotheses, this paper is using various ownership structure data as well as financial data. Empirical results show that the greater a firm's CEO has the company's own stock, the less he spends in R&D investments. The main empirical results of this study is in line with past empirical studies on various markets outside of Korea.

• Journal of Venture Innovation
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• v.6 no.2
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• pp.21-39
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• 2023

The study investigates the impact of family ownership heterogeneity on the internationalization decisions of family-owned enterprises from ICT sectors in South Korea. The study uses prospect theory to explore the relationship between ownership structure and internationalization. The study finds that as performance improves, the ultimate owner (CEO) is negatively related to internationalization, while other family members are positively related, demonstrating the heterogeneous behavior of family members. The study suggests that the ultimate owner (CEO) tends to avoid risks associated with internationalization, while other family members are willing to take risks. To better understand the various risk behaviors of family firms regarding internationalization, the inherent heterogeneity of family firms, particularly in light of different risk behaviors between the ultimate owner (CEO) and other family members, may explain the inconsistent results in studies on the effect of family ownership on internationalization.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.10 no.2
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• pp.163-174
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• 2023

This study aims to investigate the effect of the composition of the board and ownership structure on a firm's value in Jordanian firms. Specifically, it aims to determine the effect of board size, (CEO) duality, and family, foreign, institutional, and government ownership on a firm's value. An ordinary least square regression (OLS) was employed to examine the study hypotheses in a sample of 35 Jordanian industrial firms (175 firm-year observation) for a period of five years from 2016-2020. As measured by Tobin's Q (Q ratio) and market-to-book (MB ratio) for Jordanian industrial firms listed on Amman Stock Exchange (ASE). The result found that foreign ownership, institutional ownership, and family ownership have a significant and positive effect on firm value. By contrast, government ownership does not have a significant effect on firm value. With respect to board composition (CEO duality and board size), the study results found no evidence to support the effect of board composition on firm value. The study recommended the concerned authorities with several recommendations, most notably: taking the necessary measures to ensure the continuity and growth of family businesses because of their positive impact on the value of the company and economic growth, spreading awareness about how governance protects the interests of investors.