• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.3-21
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• 2020

This study focuses on the binding power of the interim measures of the arbitral tribunal in ICSID arbitration and the effects of non-compliance. Upon consideration of the intentions of those who made these rules, given the interpretation of the provisions of Article 47 of the ICSID Convention and Article 39 of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, it was found reasonable to consider that the interim measures made by the arbitral tribunal in ICSID arbitration were not binding. However, in actual ICSID arbitration, most arbitral tribunals approve the binding power of the interim measures based on the purposes and the characteristics of the interim measures. As such, there is a certain distance between the legislative intention for interim measures in ICSID arbitration and the judicial practice, but considering the demand for maintaining the integrity of the arbitration procedure, it is reasonable to consider that the interim measures are binding. In addition, the fact that the interim measures have binding power can increase the possibility that the party will comply with the interim measures. Thus, the binding power of interim measures not only encourages voluntary compliance to the interim measures of the party, but can also cause negative consequences for the party if it is not met. In other words, the arbitral tribunal will be able to form negative inferences against the party who does not comply with it in a procedural side, and in the practical side, the party who does not comply with the interim measures will be compensated for the additional damages for non-compliance.