• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.211-241
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• 2012

The Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities officially proposed by the European Union on the occasion of the 55th Session of the United Nations Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space last June 2012 in Vienna, Austria is to fill the lacunae of the relevant norms to be applied to the human activities in the outer space and thus has the merit our attention. The missing elements of the norms span from the prohibition of an arms race, safety and security of the space objects including the measures to reduce the space debris to the exchange of information of space activities among space-faring nations. The EU's initiatives, when implemented, cover or will eventually prepare for the forum to deal with such issues of interests of the international community. The EU's initiatives begun at the end of 2008 included the unofficial contacts with major space powers including in particular the USA of which position is believed to have been reflected in the Draft with the aim to have it adopted in 2013. Although the Code is made up of soft law rather than hard law for the subscribing countries, the USA seems to be afraid of the eventuality whereby its strategic advantages in the outer space will be affected by the prohibiting norms, possibly to be pursued by the Code from its current non-binding character, of placing weapons in the outer space. It is with this trepidation that the USA has been opposing to the adoption of the United Nations Assembly Resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in the outer space (PAROS) and in the same context to the setting-up of a working group on the arms race in the outer space in the frame of the Conference on Disarmament. China and Russia who together put forward a draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) in 2008 would not feel comfortable either because the EU initiatives will steal the lime light. Consequently their reactions are understandably passive towards the Draft Code while the reaction of the USA to the PPWT was a clear cut "No". With the above background, the future of the EU Code is uncertain. Nevertheless, the purpose of the Code to reduce the space debris, to allow exchange of the information on the space activities, and to protect the space objects through safety and security, all to maximize the principle of the peaceful use and exploration of the outer space is the laudable efforts on the part of EU. When the detailed negotiations will be held, some problems including the cost to be incurred by setting up an office for the clerical works could be discussed for both efficient and economic mechanism. For example, the new clerical works envisaged in the Draft Code could be discharged by the current UN OOSA (Office for Outer Space Affairs) with minimal additional resources. The EU's initiatives are another meaningful contribution following one due to it in adopting the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 to the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on the Climate Change) and deserve the praise from the thoughtful international community.

• Radiation Oncology Journal
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.171-180
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• 2001

Purpose : Expression of TIMP, intrinsic inhibitor of MMP, is regulated by signal transduction in response to genotoxins and is likely to be an important step in metastasis, angiogenesis and wound healing after ionizing radiation. Therefore, we studied radiation mediated TIMP expression and its mechanism in head and neck cancer cell lines. Materials and Methods : Human head and neck cancer cell lines established at Asan Medical Center were used and radiosensitivity $(D_0)$, radiation cytotoxicity and metastatic potential were measured by clonogenic assay, n assay and invasion assay, respectively. The conditioned medium was prepared at 24 hours and 48 hours after 2 Gy and 10 Gy irradiation and expression of TIMP protein was measured by Elisa assay with specific antibodies against human TIMP. hTIMP1 promoter region was cloned and TIMP1 luciferase reporter vector was constructed. The reporter vector was transfected to AMC-HN-1 and -HN-9 cells with or without expression vector Ras, then the cells were exposed to radiation or PMA, PKC activator. EMSA was peformed with oligonucleotide (-59/-53 element and SP1) of TIMP1 promoter. Results : $D_0$ of HN-1, -2, -3, -5 and -9 cell lines were 1.55 Gy, 1.8 Gy, 1.5 Gt, 1.55 Gy and 2.45 Gy respectively. n assay confirmed cell viability, over $94\%$ at 24hrs, 48hrs after 2 Gy irradiation and over 73% after 10 Gy irradiation. Elisa assay confirmed that cells secreted TIMP1, 2 proteins continuously. After 2 Gy irradiation, TIMP2 secretion was decreased at 24hrs in HN-1 and HN-9 cell lines but after 10 Gy irradiation, it was increased in all cell lines. At 48hrs after irradiation, it was increased in HN-1 but decreased in HN-9 cells. But the change in TIMP secretion by RT was mild. The transcription of TIMP1 gene in HN-1 was induced by PMA but in HN-9 cell lines, it was suppressed. Wild type Ras induced the TIMP-1 transcription by 20 fold and 4 fold in HN-1 and HN-9 respectively. The binding activity to -59/-53, AP1 motif was increased by RT, but not to SP1 motif in both cell lines. Conclusions : We observed the difference of expression and activity of TIMPs between radiosensitive and radioresistant cell line and the different signal transduction pathway between in these cell lines may contribute the different radiosensitivity. Further research to investigate the radiation response and its signal pathway of TIMPs is needed.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.101-127
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• 2017

Even with the most advanced aviation technology benefits, aircraft accidents are constantly occurring while air passenger transportation volume is expected to double in the next 15 years. Since it is not possible to secure aviation safety only by the post aircraft accident safety action of accident investigations, it has been recognized and consensus has been formed that proactive and predictive prevention measures are necessary. In this sense, the aviation safety management system (SMS) was introduced in 2008 and has been carried out in earnest since 2011. SMS is a proactive and predictive aircraft accident preventive measure, which is a mechanism to eliminate the fundamental risk factors by approaching organizational factors beyond technological factors and human factors related to aviation safety. The methodology is to collect hazards in all the sites required for aircraft operations, to build a database, to analyze the risks, and through managing risks, to keep the risks acceptable or below. Therefore, the improper implementation of SMS indicates that the aircraft accident prevention is insufficient and it is to be directly connected with the aircraft accident. Reports of duty performance related hazards including their own errors are essential and most important in SMS. Under the policy of just culture for voluntary reporting, the guarantee of information providers' anonymity, non-punishment and non-blame should be basically secured, but to this end, under-reporting is stagnant due to lack of trust in their own organizations. It is necessary for the accountable executive(CEO) and senior management to take a leading role to foster the safety culture initiating from just culture with the safety consciousness, balancing between safety and profit for the organization. Though a Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport's order, "Guidance on SMS Implementation" states the training required for the accountable executive(CEO) and senior management, it is not legally binding. Thus it is suggested that the SMS training completion certificates of accountable executive(CEO) and senior management be included in SMS approval application form that is legally required by "Korea Aviation Safety Program" in addition to other required documents such as a copy of SMS manual. Also, SMS related items are missing in the aircraft accident investigation, so that organizational factors in association with safety culture and risk management are not being investigated. This hinders from preventing future accidents, as the root cause cannot be identified. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Manuals issued by ICAO contain the SMS investigation wheres it is not included in the final report form of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. In addition, the US National Transportation Safety Board(NTSB) that has been a substantial example of the aircraft accident investigation for the other accident investigation agencies worldwide does not appear to expand the scope of investigation activities further to SMS. For these reasons, it is believed that investigation agencies conducting their investigations under Annex 13 do not include SMS in the investigation items, and the aircraft accident investigators are hardly exposed to SMS investigation methods or techniques. In this respect, it is necessary to include the SMS investigation in the organization and management information of the final report format of Annex 13. In Korea as well, in the same manner, SMS item should be added to the final report format of the Operating Regulation of the Aircraft and Railway Accident Investigation Board. If such legal and institutional improvement methods are complemented, SMS will serve the purpose of aircraft accident prevention effectively and contribute to the improvement of aviation safety in the future.