• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.243-264
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• 2015

Roger White raised an objection, one based on Bayesianism, to the dogmatist view of perceptual justification. In his paper, "Perceptual Dogmatism and Bayesian Favoring", Ilho Park tries to show, contra Roger White, that there is no real conflict between Perceptual dogmatism and Bayesianian theory of confirmation. For this purpose, Park brings in the notions of the degree of confirmation and the favoring relation and argues that Bayesian theory, when properly understood, can yield results that are quite favorable to dogmatism. I don't think, however, that the devices that he employes actually deliver what he promises. The conflict is yet to be resolved. Probably, Bayesian theorists may be better off if they, instead of trying to resolve the conflict, consider the option of simply rejecting dogmatism.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.389-436
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• 2015

Epistemic dogmatism claims that if it seems P to you then you have immediate justification to believe P. The view has been faced with a problem that it is incompatible with Bayesianism, especially raised by Roger White(2006). James Pryor(2013), defending epistemic dogmatism, has given a reply for the problem. In this paper, first, I show some problems on Pryor's reply. Then, I present a new kind of suggestion to deal with the problem, which avoids problems Pryor's reply has. Finally, I suggest a different diagnosis on the problem.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.33-58
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• 2005

The old evidence problem raises a profound problem to Bayesian theory of confirmation that evidence known prior to a hypothesis explaining it cannot give any empirical support to the hypothesis. The old evidence problem has resisted to a lot of trials to solve it. The purpose of the paper is to solve the old evidence problem by showing that the problem originated from a serious misunderstanding about the Bayesian concept of confirmation. First, I shall make a brief analysis of the problem, and examine critically two typical Bayesian strategies to solve it. Second, I shah point out a misunderstanding commonly found among Bayesian discussions about the old evidence problem, the ignorance of the asymmetry of confirmation in the context of explanation and prediction. Lastly, 1 shall suggest two different concepts of confirmations by using the asymmetry and argue that the concept of confirmation presupposed in the old evidence problem is not a genuine Bayesian concept of confirmation.