• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.399-424
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• 2014

The main objective of this paper is to examine critically White's claim that there is a conflict between Perceptual Dogmatism and Bayesian Theory of Confirmation. For this purpose, this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, I will introduce White's argument. Section 3 is dedicated to explaining some elements of Bayesian Theory of Confirmation. In particular, I will provide an explanation of confirmation measures and Bayesian Favoring. Using these two conceptual apparatuses, it will be shown that, contrary to what White has thought, there is a way of supporting Perceptual Dogmatism by means of Bayesian Theory of Confirmation - in particular, Bayesian Theory of Favoring.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.155-187
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• 2013

The main objective of this paper is to vindicate the Bayesian belief updating rule, i.e. conditionalization. For this purpose, I introduce first what I call Irrelevance Principle, and show that this principle is equivalent to conditionalization. In turn, the principle is vindicated by means of Bayesian confirmation theory. That is, I suggest some theses that Bayesian confirmation theorists should accept, and prove that if Irrelevance Principle is violated, the theses cannot holds.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.33-58
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• 2005

The old evidence problem raises a profound problem to Bayesian theory of confirmation that evidence known prior to a hypothesis explaining it cannot give any empirical support to the hypothesis. The old evidence problem has resisted to a lot of trials to solve it. The purpose of the paper is to solve the old evidence problem by showing that the problem originated from a serious misunderstanding about the Bayesian concept of confirmation. First, I shall make a brief analysis of the problem, and examine critically two typical Bayesian strategies to solve it. Second, I shah point out a misunderstanding commonly found among Bayesian discussions about the old evidence problem, the ignorance of the asymmetry of confirmation in the context of explanation and prediction. Lastly, 1 shall suggest two different concepts of confirmations by using the asymmetry and argue that the concept of confirmation presupposed in the old evidence problem is not a genuine Bayesian concept of confirmation.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.351-395
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• 2019

Hempel's original intuitions about the raven's paradox are summed up in three ways. The first is known as the paradoxical conclusion: If one observes that an object a - about which nothing is antecedently known - is a non-black non-raven, then this observation confirms that all ravens are black. The second is an intuitive verdict of the misled conclusion of the paradox: If one observes that an object a - which is known to be a non-raven - is non-black (hence, is a non-black non-raven), then this observation does not confirmationally affect that all ravens are black. The third is a comparative claim between the two intuitions: the degree of confirmation appearing in the first intuition is greater than the degree of confirmation in the second intuition. The Standard Bayesian Solution of the paradox is evaluated to fleshed Hempel's intuitions out by establishing the first intuition. However, such an evaluation of this solution should be further analyzed because Hempel's intuition is not the only one. The solution of paradox does not establish the second intuition in a strict sense. However, I think the Bayesian solution will establish the second intuition based on its typical strategy of quantitative vindication. If only quantitative vindication is accepted, this evaluation of the solution remains valid. Nevertheless, the solution fails to establish the third intuition. In this article, I propose a new way to apply the Bayesian method to establish Hempel's intuitions, including the third intuition. If my analysis is correct, the Standard Bayesian Solution of the raven's paradox could indeed flesh Hempel's intuitions out by denying one of the assumptions considered essential.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.243-264
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• 2015

Roger White raised an objection, one based on Bayesianism, to the dogmatist view of perceptual justification. In his paper, "Perceptual Dogmatism and Bayesian Favoring", Ilho Park tries to show, contra Roger White, that there is no real conflict between Perceptual dogmatism and Bayesianian theory of confirmation. For this purpose, Park brings in the notions of the degree of confirmation and the favoring relation and argues that Bayesian theory, when properly understood, can yield results that are quite favorable to dogmatism. I don't think, however, that the devices that he employes actually deliver what he promises. The conflict is yet to be resolved. Probably, Bayesian theorists may be better off if they, instead of trying to resolve the conflict, consider the option of simply rejecting dogmatism.