• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.227-242
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• 2006

This paper analyzes insurance crimes using a game theoretic model. In blackmailing cases involving automobile accidents, insurance criminals deliberately induce innocent drivers(victims) to commit a moving violation such as crossing over the center dividing yellow line, and collide with the victims. After the collision, the criminals and the victims effectively engage in a bargaining game over the amount of the settlement for the damage. Because the penalty for that kind of moving violation is very severe (even criminally prosecuted), the victims do not have much bargaining power. Exploiting the weak bargaining power of the victims, the criminals demand and receive huge compensation (including settlement) from the victims. In the model, it is shown that under the current law agents have perverse incentives leading to insurance crimes. The criminals have incentive to induce car collisions and extract huge settlement from the victims. Based on the analysis, it is suggested that lowering the severity of penalty for certain kind of violation may be needed to prevent insurance crimes, in addition to increasing the crime investigation activities and strengthening punishment for insurance criminals.

• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.202-208
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• 2024

Objective: The purpose of this study is to examine the competitive environment of 7-Eleven using Porter's 5 Force model to analyze the specific competitiveness of 7-Eleven that has maintained continuous growth as a competitive company. Methods: This study is a case study of 7-Eleven. Results: As a result of the analysis, 7-Eleven has reinforced its competitiveness with existing competitors by raising entry barriers by expanding domestic stores and developing overseas convenience store business, focusing on North America, based on economy of scale. In addition, 7-Eleven seeks to differentiate itself from other convenience stores by developing a "private brand" and strengthens its bargaining power with suppliers through the development of new products by gathering information and know-how of experts in product development based on customer needs. The bargaining power with customers has been strengthened by building loyalty and trust in the brand by allowing consumers to purchase the same products at the same price no matter which store they visit. As a threat to potential competitors, 7-Eleven has secured a competition advantage by raising the barrier to entry by concentrating stores in specific areas through a dominant franchise development strategy and increasing awareness of 7-Eleven among consumers. In the case of threats from substitute products, it was confirmed that 7-Eleven has overcome the threat from substitute products by opening 24 hours a day and providing various services such as ATMs and copiers.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.12 no.10
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• pp.299-308
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• 2023

As the spectrum shortage problem has accelerated by the emergence of various services, New Radio-Unlicensed (NR-U) has appeared, allowing users who communicated in licensed bands to communicate in unlicensed bands. However, NR-U network users reduce the performance of Wi-Fi network users who communicate in the same unlicensed band. In this paper, we aim to simultaneously maximize the fairness and throughput of the unlicensed band, where the NR-U network users and the WiFi network users coexist. First, we propose an optimal power allocation scheme based on Monte Carlo Policy Gradient of reinforcement learning to maximize the sum of rates of NR-U networks utilizing rate-splitting multiple access in unlicensed bands. Then, we propose a channel occupancy time division algorithm based on sequential Raiffa bargaining solution of game theory that can simultaneously maximize system throughput and fairness for the coexistence of NR-U and WiFi networks in the same unlicensed band. Simulation results show that the rate splitting multiple access shows better performance than the conventional multiple access technology by comparing the sum-rate when the result value is finally converged under the same transmission power. In addition, we compare the data transfer amount and fairness of NR-U network users, WiFi network users, and total system, and prove that the channel occupancy time division algorithm based on sequential Raiffa bargaining solution of this paper satisfies throughput and fairness at the same time than other algorithms.

• Journal of Technology Innovation
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.91-120
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• 2010

This paper examines the effect of bargaining power over intermediate goods prices on innovation and economic growth using a Schumpeterian growth model. The notion of "intermediate goods prices" broadly indicates the reward to innovators including innovative SMEs as well as intermediate goods producers that are vertically integrated to big businesses. From this viewpoint, this paper sets up a Schumpeterian growth model that incorporates the market power between final goods producers and intermediate goods producers. The results show that the reduction of intermediate goods prices slows down long-run growth rates as it erodes the reward to innovations. Lower intermediate goods prices decrease marginal productivity of capital and real interest rates. However, the harmful effect of lower profits on innovations outweighs the beneficial effect of lower interest rates. Simulations using Korea's data for various cases show that in all cases the policies that raise the share of intermediate goods producers are as powerful as the R&D subsidy policies in raising growth rates. Therefore, fair trade policies that enable intermediate goods producers-especially SMEs to obtain more fruits of innovations will be helpful for long-run economic growth.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.10
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• pp.47-57
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• 2016

Purpose - This study's purpose is to investigate the market structure of the Korean duty free shop industry that has received recent attention from researchers and practitioners. By raising the question of whether or not the Korean duty free shop industry is unequivocally monopolistic, a wider viewpoint is provided. The study seeks to offer insights and managerial implications for marketers and policy makers who are in charge of regulating major Korean duty free shops. Research design, data, and methodology - The authors use secondary data from various sources, including Korea Customs Service and the Moodie Report, to investigate the structure of the duty free shop industry of Korea. Based on several theories, they present various criteria and statistical evidence such as K-firm concentration ratio, HHI, consumer substitutability, excess profit, and marketing costs. Results - In terms of consumer substitutability, it is difficult to confirm whether or not the Korean duty free shop industry is monopolistic. Notwithstanding monopoly characteristics in terms of market share, neither the company Lotte nor Shilla appear to have market dominating power. It is not easy for either of them to control prices or to achieve a much lower operational profit ratio due to a dominant bargaining power. Moreover, the license is not an economic rent. In this situation, it is not easy for these companies to obtain an excessive profit. Conclusions - Considering that most global duty free shops are trying to go upscale to improve bargaining power, it does not seem likely that rigid regulations are needed in the industry. Even though the Korean duty free industry ostensibly has a monopolistic structure, government and policy-makers should look beyond the surface. They should take global and other reasonable criteria into consideration when they establish or change regulation policies. Thorough understanding and appropriate support are needed for the Korean duty free shop industry. Additionally, duty free shops should position themselves as global companies struggling against unlimited international competition, rather than Korean domestic companies. At the same time, they need to give customers appropriate information about the benefits they provide.

• Korean small business review
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• v.41 no.3
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• pp.95-106
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• 2019

The Economic Gab-Jil, where the stronger are forcing the weaker to sacrifice, is not only a serious social problem, but also it exhausts the vitality of the national economy. Especially, the issue of 'cost reduction (CR) of delivery price' in automobile industry, and the issue of 'tolls' and 'retaliating' in the franchise business are becoming more controversial. This paper suggests some measures to rectify the problems by an analysis using a game-theoretic model. One of the ways to change the 'bad equilibrium', where economic Gab-Jil is prevalent, to the 'good equiblium' is to strengthen the bargaining power of the weak by legal and institutional measures. It is also a more market-friendly system that is self-enforcing, where the regulation is automatically enforced by the incentives of the participants, without relying solely on the enforcement power of regulatory or supervisory bodies

• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.115-133
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• 2000

The policy of suppling tax-exempt fishery oil in Korea has a history of almost 40 years, which was initiated by the National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives in 1965. In 1999 the volume of fishery oil supplied to the earning fishermen and fishing entrepreneurs amounted to 8,390 thousand DM, 500 billion won in total. This paper analyzes the oil supplying system to fishermen in Korea and shows that the structural obstacles to the stable provision of fishery oil lies in the ineffective bargaining power (fixing price). Provided that the NFFC as a buyer, which is not equipped with the storage facilities for oil bids for a unit-price contract of fishery oil, there exists a possibility of collusion among 5 local oil refineries corporations to influence the oil price, making it difficult to reach a resonable price of oil. Though the international bids and direct imports following the liberalization of oil imports would help lower the unit price, purchasing and importing the oil out of season at a lower price would not be guaranteed without the oil storage facilities. Furthermore, the current supply system of oil is quite vulnerable to the extraneous factors and, say when the oil price soars unpredictably, it is almost impossible to supply low - priced fishery oil to fishermen. The National Federation of Fisheries Association of Japan(Zengyoren), for instance, possesses 10 oil storage facilities, which had been built across the country during the last 20 years (1964-1984). The storage capacity of these facilities reaches 0.6million DM(by kind, 0.56million DM for A heavy oil, 38thousand D/M kerosene, 5thousand D/M for diesel fuel oil). Allowing no intermediary of production associations(fisheries cooperatives) the NFFA's capacity for keeping oil in reserve rises much higher. As these storage facilities can keep the oil amounting to as much as of 70 days demand in reserve, a stable supply of fishery oil on favorable terms is secured. In contrast with Japan case, unequipped with the storage facilities for fishery oil, Korea does not have much bargaining power for bringing down the price of fishery oil. To make matters worse, the oil storing capacity of the member cooperatives is the volume of only 8 days demand. In case the oil price rises, it is almost impossible to supply the oil to the fishermen at a price lower than the price risen.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.41 no.1
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• pp.113-126
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• 2016

This study investigates the effect of power dynamics on R&D and market performances. Various types of relationships in a supply chain are considered. An R&D company offering new technology for product quality and a manufacturer responsible for both production and sales are utilized as subjects. The company with bargaining power differs with respect to the supply chain situation in practice, and no fixed single relationship and supply chain structure exist. However, only a few studies have considered the various relationships among players in a supply chain and their effects on performance. Therefore, we propose three models with different supply chain structures and power dynamics among players. This study contributes to the academia and supply chain practice by revealing the different characteristics of supply chain models.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.35 no.2B
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• pp.269-278
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• 2010

In the clustering protocol, lifetime of the cluster members radically decrease because frequency interference between clusters make every cluster member consume a lot of energy to maintain or increase its transmission rate. In this paper, we analyze the frequency interference among the clusters with the game theory which deals with resource bargaining problems between players, and present a rational power allocation strategy. Both the cases that each cluster tries to selfishly occupy and cooperatively share the resource are analyzed in terms of non-cooperative and cooperative games. In simulation, we compare the cooperative game with non-cooperative game in terms of the node lifetime.

• Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.63-72
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• 2010

This study aims to make a decision about the rational option for a multipurpose dams development of the Tumen river basin so that the adjoining countries will effectively deal with the chronic problems and fully satisfy the fast growing demand of water and power. It has been thus far investigated that the interests between North Korea and China closely depend on the selected option, and they are not well compatible with each other. These situations are defined in terms of the cooperative two-person nonzero-sum game. The Nash bargaining model is then applied to contemplate the rational option, considering two scenarios of economic growth of the North Korea. After analyzing the model, it was expected that 1) two multipurpose dams must be cooperatively developed, and 2) their benefits should be allocated according to demand of each country. The authors finally suggest that a cooperative organisation be established to effectively manage the dams beyond the border of the countries.