• Korean Business Review
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• v.2
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• pp.141-169
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• 1989

Most of the theories of collective bargaining outcomes start with a set of economic variables. The economic constraints, pressures, and incentives influence the bargaining power relationship between labor union and employer. In this paper, the critical macro and micro economic variables that need to be considered in analyzing the economic context of collective bargaining power relationship is outlined. The focus is on the role that economic forces play in shaping the results of bargaining, that is the outcome of negotiations. In this study, the elasticity of the demand for labor is introduced as one of the most important economic aspects that influence bargaining power. Unions will be most successful in increasing wages when they enjoy an inelastic demand for labor. If the demand for labor is not naturally inelastic, some institutional arrangement for "taking wages out of competition" must be sought. Inflation, business cycle, and income policy are influential in shaping both parties' goals and expectations as well. In addition to the analysis of the economic variables, the nature of power is diagonized with some introductory notions about its care and feeding before proceeding to the details of the above issues.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.105-121
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• 2019

This study applies diverse game theories to the US-China Trade War. The US-China Trade War can be analyzed as a game situation because the strategic decision-making process to maximize one's profit while considering the reaction of the other party is a game situation. However, related research suffered from some mistakes in applying the US-China Trade War as it is to classic game theory, because while the prisoners dilemma is based on the situation of No Communication, No Trust, No Cooperation, the US-China Trade War has a precondition different from that of prisoners dilemma, since it mutually communicates information and negotiation is repeated several times in a cooperative situation. The result of the trade negotiation will likely end as 'cooperate-cooperate'. Further, considering trade volume, trade interdependence, bargaining power based on economy, and the scale of damage caused by the Trade War, the US-China Trade War is progressing with the bargaining power of the US being higher than that of China. Since the current US-China Trade War is in an asymmetrical situation under the dominant bargaining power of the US, it is likely to reach 'US defect-China cooperative' in the long run.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2016.05a
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• pp.228-229
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• 2016

Bargaining power or negotiation power departing from negotiators' economical beneficial point of view has long been an important research subject in a number of industries, and it has been widely studied by focusing on the various kinds of game theory. Although existing papers are mainly based on the strategies and results of bargaining process, ${\cdots}$(중략)${\cdots}$.

• Journal of the Korean Home Economics Association
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• v.48 no.4
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• pp.83-102
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• 2010

This paper investigates whether intra-household bargaining power affects couples' caregiving decisions during instances of competing parental demands for assistance. The primary focus is on examining how partners' bargaining power influences the relative allocation of time resources between parents and parents-in-law, assuming that children prefer to transfer caregiving resources toward their own parents over their parents-in-law. The findings in this study reject the bargaining theory that couple's parental care behavior results from a bargaining process between the husband and the wife. More specifically, the results did not clearly show that children prefer to transfer caregiving resources toward their own parents over their parents-in-law. Decision-making power, measured by final decision-making authority, also failed to affect the relative care transfers.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.05a
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• pp.208-209
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• 2016

This study explores how bargaining power and partnership effect on the SCM main results namely flexibility, agility, and control of uncertainty. To test the suggested model, this study used a data set generated from online and offline survey. The 140 sets of data collected, which companies use SCM, were tested against the model using SPSS 23 and smartPLS 3.2.3. The results of this study are as follows. First, Bargaining power had an effect on partnership. Second, partnership had an effect on the SCM agility, flexibility, control of uncertainty.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.7
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• pp.311-316
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• 2002

It has been a basic model for the present electric power industry that more than two generators compete, and thereby the market clearing price and the generation schedules are determined through the bid process. In order for this paradigm to be applicable to real electric power systems and markets, it is necessary to reflect many physical and economic constraints related to frequency and transmission in the dispatching schedule. The paper presents an approach to deriving a Nash bargaining solution in a competitive electricity market where multiple generators are playing with the system operator who mitigates the transmission congestion to minimize the total transaction cost. In this study, we take the effect of the line flows and the role of system operator into the Game. Finally, a case study has been demonstrated to verify the proposed cooperative game.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2016.10a
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• pp.189-190
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• 2016

This study explores how bargaining power and influence effect on the information quality and the SCM main performance namely SCM flexibility, SCM agility. Especially it was considered differences in perspective of suppliers and buyers. The 140 data sets collected, which companies use SCM, were tested against the model using SPSS and SmartPLS. The result of this study is when buyers have bargaining power, information quality had most effect on the SCM performances.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.407-414
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• 2011

In an effort to reduce energy consumption, research into adaptive power management in real-time systems has become widespread. In this paper, a novel dynamic voltage scaling scheme is proposed for multiprocessor systems. Based on the concept of the Nash bargaining solution, a processor's clock speed and supply voltage are dynamically adjusted to satisfy these conflicting performance metrics. In addition, the proposed algorithm is implemented to react adaptively to the current system conditions by using an adaptive online approach. Simulation results clearly indicate that the superior performance of the proposed scheme can strike the appropriate performance balance between contradictory requirements.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.137-146
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• 2013

This paper outlines the findings of a model of plea bargaining with multiple defendants, in which a prosecutor makes plea offer sequentially. It is shown that plea discount can be minimized with sequential offers and that not all of defendants shall be induced to plead guilty. By allowing sequential offer, a prosecutor has more power in the plea bargaining, which may increase social welfare by giving appropriate level of punishment to the guilty.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.171-189
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• 2015

On the SCM network, there are two type of company, the one which has the powerful position in the decision process is called the leader, and the other company which reacts to the leader's decision is called the follower. This relationship structure effect on the partnership. Therefore this study suggested a research model which would explain the relationship among the bargaining power, partnership, information quality, SCM features. The 116 sets of data collected, which companies use SCM, were tested against the model using SPSS 23 and smartPLS 3.2.3. The results of this study are as follows. First, Bargaining Power had an effect on Influence, Partnership, Information Quality. Second, Influence didn't have an effect on the Partnership and Information Quality. Third, Partnership had an effect on the Information Quality and SCM Flexibility, Agility, Uncertainty Control. Forth, Information Quality had and an effect on the SCM Flexibility, Agility.