• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.104-107
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• 2007

In this paper, we propose the coordination scheme in a single-manufacturer-multiple-retailer supply chain system. Traditionally, the bargaining power of the single manufacturer is superior to those of retailers. The business environment supported by the e-business scheme may give rise to new business behavior. The multitude of retailer requests the manufacturer to relax the his unilateral lot-sizing policy while they are willing to compensate more than the manufacturer's expected loss caused by abandon his superior bargaining power. The side payment aggregated by the multiple retailers is transferred to the manufacturer according to the degree of the manufacturer's relaxation from the current unilateral lot-sizing policy.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.39-59
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• 2009

Game theory is adapted to a variety of domains such as economics, biology, engineering, political science, computer science, and philosophy in order to analyze economic behaviors. This research is an application of game theory to wireless communication. In particular, in terms of bargaining game we dealt with a multimedia resource allocation problem in wireless communication, which is rapidly spreading such as Wibro, WCDML, IPTV, etc. The algorithm is assumed to allocate multimedia resources to users who can choose and access differentiated media services. For this purpose, 3 utility function of users is devised to reflect quality of service (QoS) and price. We illustrated experimental results with synthesis data which were made to mimic real multimedia data, and analyzed differentiated service providing and the effect of the utility function.

• Proceedings of the Korean Operations and Management Science Society Conference
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• 2008.10a
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• pp.164-178
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• 2008

Game theory is adapted to a variety of domains such as economics, biology, engineering, political science, computer science, and philosophy in order to analyze economic behaviors. This research is an application of game theory to wireless communication. In particular, in terms of bargaining game we dealt with a multimedia resource allocation algorithm in wireless communication, which is rapidly spreading such as Wibro, WCDML, IPTV, etc. The algorithm is assumed to allocate multimedia resources to users who can choose and access differentiated media services. For this purpose, a utility function of users is devised to reflect quality of service (QoS) and price. We illustrated experimental results with synthesis data which were made to mimic real multimedia data, and analyzed differentiated service providing and the effect of the utility function.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.15-21
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• 2015

Purpose - This study examines a bundling effect on production and distribution in a patent-protected industry. Despite the heavy use of bundling strategies in the information and technology industry, literature has paid scant attention to bundling of intellectual property rights. This study examines a theoretical exploration of the bundling effect on licensing behavior. Research design, data, and methodology - To address this behavior, we build a simplified model consisting of three stages: 1) bundling decision, 2) licensing agreement, and 3) competition. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is applied to the model. Results - A single-patent holder with superior technology grants its own license to the multiple-patent firm, thereby leaving the market. Anticipating the single right holder's licensing strategy, the multiple-patent firm offers a bundle, making the single-right holder's bargaining position weaker. Conclusions - Bundling is an effective business strategy, resulting in multiple products for a firm as it faces other firms with single-product lines in each market. Taking advantage of the multi-patent or multi-product lines, the firm utilizes the bundling strategy obtaining better technology from the standalone single-patent firms.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.4293-4304
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• 2014

In order to ensure the wireless connectivity and seamless service to mobile users, the next generation network system will be an integration of multiple wireless access networks. In a heterogeneous wireless access system, bandwidth allocation becomes crucial for load balancing to avoid network congestion and improve system utilization efficiency. In this article, we propose a new dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme for hierarchical wireless network systems. First, we derive a multi-objective decision criterion for each access point. Second, a bargaining strategy selection algorithm is developed for the dynamic bandwidth re-allocation. Based on the intervenient Stackelberg game model, the proposed scheme effectively formulates the competitive interaction situation between several access points. The system performance of proposed scheme is evaluated by using extensive simulations. With a simulation study, it is confirmed that the proposed scheme can achieve better performance than other existing schemes under widely diverse network environments.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.4 no.6
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• pp.1006-1022
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• 2010

In this paper, a cross-layer resource allocation mechanism is proposed for wireless multimedia service. In particular, a game theory based on quality of service (QoS) for multimedia users is introduced to deal with the fairness of network resource allocation in wireless networks. Moreover, the channel states of wireless users are additionally regarded under the cross-layer design in WiMAX environment. In details, the bargaining solution is adopted to discover the efficient and fair resource allocation strategy for multimedia service in considering QoS in the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) and the channel states in the carrier-to-interface ratio (CINR). The proposed mechanism is illustrated and evaluated by simulation results of transmitting video sequences in WiMAX environment.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.1-20
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• 2009

Negotiation is a process of reaching an agreement on the terms of a transaction. such as price, quantity, for two or more parties. Negotiation tries to maximize the benefits for all parties concerned. instead of using human-based negotiation. the e-commerce environment provides such an environment as adopting automated negotiation. Thus. choosing agent technology is appropriate for an automatic electronic negotiation platform. since autonomous software agents strive for the best deal on behalf of the human participants. Negotiation agents need a clear-cut definition of negotiation models or strategies. In reality, most bargaining systems embody nearly one negotiation model. In this article. we present a mobile agent negotiation system with reusable negotiation strategies that allows agents to dynamically embody a user's favorite negotiation strategy which can be preinstalled as a component in the system. We develop a prototype system, which is fully implemented in compliance with FIPA specifications, and then. describe the benefits of using the system.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.484-492
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• 2016

Smart grid (SG) technology is now elevating the conventional power grid system to one that functions more cooperatively, responsively, and economically. When applied in an SG the demand side management (DSM) technique can improve its reliability by dynamically changing electricity consumption or rescheduling it. In this paper, we propose a new SG scheduling scheme that uses the DSM technique. To achieve effective SG management, we adopt a mixed pricing strategy based on the Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game and a repeated game model. The proposed game-based pricing strategy provides energy routing for effective energy sharing and allows consumers to make informed decisions regarding their power consumption. Our approach can encourage consumers to schedule their power consumption profiles independently while minimizing their payment and the peak-to-average ratio (PAR). Through a simulation study, it is demonstrated that the proposed scheme can obtain a better performance than other existing schemes in terms of power consumption, price, average payment, etc.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.57-81
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• 2010

Recently, labor unions' active participation in social issues is drawing people's attention as their concerns are expanding from the conventional wage raise and employment to others such as the environment and poverty eradication. This derives from the notion that a trade union with bargaining power is also an economic agent responsible and able to take a positive role in social issues. This paper explains through a micro economic analysis model that labor union movements can also contribute to social issues such as the global environment. Based on the international oligopoly trade theory, the study analyzes the principal-agent model whereby firms and labor unions pursue their strategic choices based on their interest and influence the implementation of regulatory policies on pollution emission. The analysis confirmed that labor unions' bargaining power and international cooperation are influential in alleviating global pollution emission and in improving social welfare. This conclusion could be presented as a basis for arguing for and requesting the participation and cooperation of labor unions to solve environmental problems discussed at WILL 2006.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.23 no.1
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• pp.103-135
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• 2000

After scrutinizing the actual conditions of labor participation in management decision makings through analysing the collective agreements and the regulations of labor-management committee at the affiliated companies of Korea's top-five Chaebols, we could get some conclusions as follows. First, because the labor participation in management decision makings is in very inactive situations at the long-term management strategy level and the workplace practice level of industrial relations, both parties of the industrial relations in those companies surveyed show the serious lack of abilities to tackle the new and rapidly changing business environments as nowadays actively and cooperatively. Second, we could find the fact that in the surveyed companies the device of collective bargaining was used more commonly at the collective bargaining level of industrial relations and the device of labor-management committee was often used relatively at the long-term management strategy level and the workplace practice level. Third, we could conclude that the separating type of the labor-management committee which was able to keep a safe distance from the more antagonistic device, the collective bargaining, was much more efficient device of the labor participation in management decision makings.