• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.649-656
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• 2021

This paper aims to examine the moderating role of bank competition on the effect of liquidity creation on bank capital. We measure bank competition using the Lerner index approach, liquidity creation using the Catfat approach, and bank capital using the capital to total asset ratio approach. This test also considers control variables from bank-specific factors such as Return on Assets, Loan to Deposit Ratio, and Non-Performance Loans as well as macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product, inflation, and Bank Indonesia interest rates. The sampling technique used was purposive sampling. The data sample obtained was 96 banks from a population of 114 banks in Indonesia which consistently operated during the period 2008-2018. Hypothesis testing uses panel data regression analysis techniques through the first model of the Hayes method. The results show that the negative effect of liquidity creation on bank capital depends on competition. We found that bank competition at any level (low, medium, high) negatively moderates (weakens) the effect of liquidity creation on bank capital in all banks. This finding is consistent with the view that banks may strengthen their capital in response to bank competition which may decrease the level of bank liquidity creation.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.317-328
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• 2021

This study examines the impact of bank competition and efficiency in the financial stability of the banking sector in Bangladesh. The study used the Lerner index and the Boone indicator to represent the bank competition, while the non-performing loan (NPL) and Z-score are used to represent financial stability. The secondary data were collected from the annual reports of 28 DSE listed commercial banks of Bangladesh over the period from 2011 to 2018. Using a dynamic panel GMM model, the study found the Lerner index is significantly negatively related with Z-score, which means that higher bank competition results in higher bank stability. It is also seen that higher cost efficiency results in higher bank stability. The Lerner index has negative, but insignificant impact on NPL. Similarly, using the Boone indicator, this study found that lower competition increases NPL. In terms of the Z-score, the Boone indicator found that 1 unit of increment results in decrease of the Z-score by 6.15 units. The study suggests that, as more competition results in more financial soundness, the banking industry competition should be ensured by policymakers or regulators. Banks could enhance financial stability by cost control to achieve cost efficiency as well as by improving loan-to-asset ratio.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.11
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• pp.759-768
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to assess the state of competition in Nepalese banking over the period from 2010 to 2019. This study employs panel data and a non-structural Panzar-Rosse model to measure the degree of competition in the Nepalese banking industry. The first reduced-form equation is applied to gauge competition, and the second model is used to test the long-run equilibrium in the banking market. The finding reveals that the Nepalese banking market is equilibrium in the long-run. It implies that the factor prices do not affect ROA in the long-run. The result of the H-statistic shows that the Nepalese banking system is operating under the state of perfect competition and is shifted from monopolistic competition to perfect competition. The reduced-form model reveals that the interest income is positive and significantly affected by factor prices. Similarly, the macroeconomic variable GDP growth is positively related to interest income. On the contrary, the bank's specific factors risk and the number of bank branches are inversely associated with the regressand. The outcomes of the study may be advantageous to the policymakers, especially to Nepal Rastra Bank to implement monetary policy and M&A policy for the stability and growth of the financial system of Nepal.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.38 no.1
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• pp.53-70
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• 2016

This paper examines market concentration and its effect on competition in the Chinese commercial banking market. This study also investigates how changes in competition have affected the financial stability of Chinese commercial banks. To test the competitive conditions, we obtained the H statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model from a revenue function equation. The degree of financial stability is estimated by the Z-score formula. The Chinese banking industry has become an increasingly less concentrated market with an increased number of banks. Along with a decreased market concentration, competition in the Chinese banking industry has improved moderately. However, its market structure is still far from a competitive market. An individual bank's ability to earn higher markup or charge a higher net interest margin contributes to its financial soundness, although a higher degree of market concentration may have negative effect on the financial stability of the entire banking system.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.6
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• pp.39-44
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• 2016

Purpose - This paper aims to study the competition that occurs in the Islamic Banking industry and to analyze the variables that affect the total revenue of Islamic Banking in Indonesia. Research Design, Data and Methodology - This study observed 10Islamic banks for the period 2010-2013. The annual data are taken from Direktori Perbankan Indonesia, published by Bank Indonesia, and annual report of the observed banks. In analyzing data, Panzar Rosse Approach was applied to analyze the type of Islamic Bank Market and Panel Regression Model for the estimated co-efficients has been used in the Panzar Rosse Approach. Results - Estimation model shows that all the banking cost elements such as the price of capital, unit price of labor, and unit prices of funds have significant positive correlation to Revenue as a dependent variable. The estimated value of H-statistic for the period 2010-2013 is 0.69. It can be interpreted that Islamic banking market in Indonesia shows monopolistic competition. Price of capital and funds has statistically significant effect on Bank's Revenue. Conclusions - The study revealed that the Islamic banking market competition in Indonesia is monopolistic and the major contribution to the H-statistic comes from mainly price of funds.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.130
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• pp.84-98
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• 2007

• Asian Journal of Innovation and Policy
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.1-38
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• 2021

The paper examines the role of the informal sector on innovation activities of urban formal manufacturing enterprises in India. It provides empirical evidence on firm-level linkages between formal and informal sectors by using the World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2013-14 and the Innovation Follow-up survey, 2014. Primarily, the paper aims to examine the effect of informal sector competition on innovation in urban formal manufacturing enterprises in India. Secondly, the paper analyses the mediation effect of informal sector competition on innovations in the urban manufacturing enterprises. It determines the direct and indirect influence of business regulations and constraints on innovation outcomes through the mediation effect of informal sector competition by using the SEM "Structural Equation Modeling" guidelines. The econometric results show that informal sector competition has a negative effect on the introduction of product innovations while industry-level informal sector competition has a positive effect on product innovation through the local knowledge spillovers from the informal to the formal sector. However, the informal sector competition was found to have no significant effect on the probability of introducing process innovations. Further, the results show the inhibitive role of informal sector competition on innovation in urban formal manufacturing enterprises is more severe for firms with heavy regulatory burdens and is relatively weakened in firms with resource constraints. This suggests that the informal sector plays an important role in the NIS (National Innovation System) in India.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.33-55
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• 2011

Market concentration in the Korean banking industry has markedly increased since the financial crisis of 1997-1998 because of M&As, P&As, and consolidation of banks. With this change, there has been a growing concern over market power in the Korean banking sector. We examine the effects of market concentration on bank efficiency and competition for the period of 1992-2006. Three different indicators of bank inefficiency are used in this study, including X-inefficiency that is derived from the directional technology distance function. The level of competition is measured by both the H-statistic of the Panzar-Rosse model and the level of the net interest margin and its standard deviation. Empirical results indicate that market concentration has not improved bank efficiency through scale economies or scope economies. Instead, recent mergers, acquisitions and consolidation of banks resulted in an increase in inefficiency measured by the three different indicators: X-inefficiency, labor inefficiency and asset inefficiency. While an increase in market share of individual banks improved bank efficiency, an increase in the overall market concentration ratio resulted in lower efficiency. Our study also finds that the Korean banking sector has been monopolistically competitive throughout the sample period except for the crisis period according to the H-statistic. Although an increase in market concentration ratio has not changed the overall level of bank competition, it has a positive significant effect on the level of the average interest margin.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.39-50
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• 2021

We investigate competition and its impact on borrowers' indebtedness (BI) in South Asian microfinance. Our empirical investigations are based on a comprehensive panel dataset of 355 MFIs located in seven countries in South Asia. The empirical results revealed that microfinance in South Asia is imperfectly competitive and the existing industry shows a monopolistic competition during the period under consideration. Also, the competition increased after the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007-08 which implies that microfinance uses hostile lending behavior through the adverse selection that is highly risky and it can induce repayment crisis. The empirical findings also show that increased competition has significant negative effects on borrowers' indebtedness, particularly in large-scale and regulated microfinance organizations (MFIs). Instead of using equity financing, debt financing could be a better option. Finally, we find that while competition seems to have some positive effects in economic discourse by channeling technological improvements in products and services, its negative effects in microfinance outweigh the benefits over costs, particularly in poverty-stricken nations. The findings are helpful for the policymakers, microfinance industry, investors, borrowers, and Central Bank of South Asian markets.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.34 no.2
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• pp.1-13
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• 2009

In this paper, we develop theoretical game models to determine the level of government subsidies for banks to provide policy loans to Innovative SMEs(small and medium sized enterprises) through banks, which otherwise would not finance them for the sake of their own profitability. For this, we compare net cash flows of each bank using different strategies against high risk innovative SMEs. A bank can decide whether to provide them loans or not In each period. Following Kim(2003)'s Infinite horizon model on the soft budget constraint, we introduce a situation in which banks compete against each other for higher net long-term payoffs from their loans to innovative SMEs and non-innovative SMEs. From the models, we show that competition among banks in general leads to a tighter decision against innovative SMEs, as a Nash equilibrium. It is not because the government bank is simply loose in providing loans, but because competition among commercial banks for fewer riskier borrowers results in tighter loan decisions against innovative SMEs. Thus, the competitive market for policy loans to innovative SMEs fails to reach the socially optimal level of loans for innovative SMMs. Commercial banks in the competitive market may require additional supports from the government to make up for the differences in their payoffs to support innovative SMEs, possibly much riskier due to moral hazards and poor discounted cash flows. The monopolistic government bank might also request such supports from the government to fund otherwise unqualified SMEs. We calculate an optimal level of governmental support for banks to guarantee funding such high-risk innovative SMEs over periods without deviating from their optimal Nash equilibrium policies.