• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.15 no.7
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• pp.477-488
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• 2015

This study investigates the association between non-audit services and audit quality, using a sample of firms in which audit services and non-audit services are provided by a same audit firm. This study extends previous studies by separating auditors into Big4 and Non-Big4 audit firms as each group may have different incentives to impair their independence. According to the empirical results, audit quality, proxied by absolute value of discretionary accruals has significant negative association with non-audit service fee for Non-Big4 audit firms, but not for Big4 audit firms, suggesting that Non-Big4 audit firms may impair their independence with increased non-audit service fees. Non-Big4 audit firms are known to be relatively small and local firms that might be highly economically dependent upon a specific client firm whereas Big4 audit firms are not. This results may be of interest to regulators and capital market investors and standard setters who concern a recent trend of increasing non-audit services that are provided by an audit firm which also provides audit service at the same time.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.111-120
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• 2016

PCAOB conducts the direct supervision for the PCAOB registered accounting firm. Therefore, if an accounting firm is registered with the PCAOB, it will thoroughly manage for their quality management systems. The registered auditor can be expected to have better quality of the audit. This study carried out the analysis using the audit fee which proxies for audit quality. The results of analysis are as follows. After controlling for foreign accounting firms affiliated status, company size, risky assets, leverage, ROA, and market-related variables, PCAOB is a significant explanatory variable for the audit fees. The results of this study support the hypothesis that PCAOB-registered auditors will provide a good audit quality.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.3
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• pp.231-247
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• 2016

This study, according to the amendment of the Act on External Audit, on the basis of the number of input auditors, the content of auditing, and audit times as additional informations, calculates the average of the samples listed companies with assets of one hundred billion KRW. However, since the actual number of the subject corporations of which asset is 100 billion KRW is small, it is difficult to extract data with reference to this asset size. Therefore, the samples were extended to 50 corporations of which asset is 10% less than 100 billion KRW and other 50 more corporations of which asset is 10% more than 100 billion KRW. As a result, a total of 100 corporations were included as samples. To calculate the average of the audit times, a t-test was performed between the two groups. The result of the t-test showed that there is not a significant difference between the two groups. According to the analytical results of the t-test, the average of the number of input auditors and the average of audit times were calculated with respect to all the 100 samples. A further analysis showed that the average of audit content in the present study was compared with the estimated values in the study of Mun (2016). Although the results of this study may not be the optimal number, they may be used as a fundamental index which may be compared with the audit times and the audit fees in the current audit market where there is not an available reference. In addition, the amendment of the Act on External Audit may enhance the independence of auditors and the transparency of accounting system when compared with the previous system where only the total audit times were disclosed.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.189-206
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• 2016

It was required to attach the documents on the details of external audit including the number of the participants in external audit, audited parts and audit times under the Article 7-2 on the audit report to the accounting audit report from 2014 in accordance with the amendment to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies. This study aim to calculate the audit fee based on the estimated cost of service calculation of the government contribution agencies by reflecting the implementation of the revised external audit. This study calculated the audit fee for the target company (a listed company assumed to have no internal control risks and relevant audit risks for unqualified opinion in the previous year, 100 billion won of total amount of asset, manufacturing company in the previous year and preliminary client request) by putting together four items of expenditure including employment costs, expenditure, general management expenses and profit in accordance with the calculation system of cost of service under the State Contract Act. Then, it used the data collected from the documents on the details of the revised external audit after requesting estimation on the target company with the estimated cost to Big-4 accounting firms to identify the participants and times of the accounting audit. The employment costs applied 150% of participation rate of the base price of employment costs for the academic research service cost in 2014, the expenditure used the average value of accounting firms of corporate business management analysis of the Bank of Korea (2013), the general management expenses applied 5% of the general management rate of service business under Article 7-1 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Contracts to which the State is a Party and the profit applied 10% of profit rate of service business under Article 7-2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Contracts to which the State is a Party. Based on the calculation of the estimated costs by applying the above, the audit fee was estimated at 50,617,769won. Although the result is not the optimal audit fee, it may be used as a basic scale to compare the audit fees of companies without criteria. Also, such amendment to the Act on External Audit of Stock Companies may improve independence of auditors and transparency of the accounting system rather than previous announcing only the total audit times.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.75-94
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• 2009

The process of obtaining third-party financing contacts was analyzed via a two-stage game model: a "signaling game" for the first stage,and a "principal-agent model" for the second stage. The two-stage game was solved by a process of backward induction. In the second stage game, the optimal effort level of the energy saving company (ESCO), the optimal compensation scheme of the energy user, and the optimal payoffs for both parties were derived for each subgame. The optimal solutions forthe different subgames were then compared with each other. Our main finding was that if there is some restriction on ESCO's revenue (e.g. a progressive sales tax) that causes ESCO's revenue toincrease at a decreasing rate, then the optimal sharing ratio is uniquely determined at a level of strictly less than one under a linear compensation scheme, i.e. a unique balance exists. Subgames have a unique equilibrium arrived at separately for each situation,. Within this equilibrium, energy users accept energy audit proposals from H-type ESCOs with high levels of technology, but reject proposals from L-type ESCOs with low levels of technology. While L-type ESCOs cannot attain profits in the third-party financing market, H-type ESCOS can pocket the price differential between L-type and H-type audit fees. Accordingly, revenues in an H-type ESCO equilibrium increase not only in line with the technology of the ESCO inquestion, but also faster than in an L-type equilibrium due to more advanced technology. At the same time, energy users receive some positive payoff by allowing ESCOs to perform third-party financing tasks within their existing energy system without incurring any extra costs.