• 한국콘텐츠학회논문지
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• 제15권11호
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• pp.397-409
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• 2015

글로벌 금융위기 이후 은행에 대한 감독강화 및 국제회계기준(IFRS) 도입은 우리나라의 부실채권(NPL) 시장을 급격히 팽창시키는 계기가 되었다. 은행의 BIS 비율이 하락할 경우 신인도가 낮아져 고객이 이탈하고, 은행퇴출 위험까지 직면하게 되므로 은행들의 자산건전성 향상 노력은 앞으로도 지속될 것으로 예상되며, 이에 따라 부동산 경매시장에서는 NPL 매각수단으로서의 일반담보 부동산의 경매에 대한 투자자들의 관심이 크게 증가하고 있다. 그러나 NPL채권 거래시장과 NPL을 회수하기 위한 일반담보부 부동산 경매시장의 양적 팽창에도 불구하고 이들 시장이 공정하고 건전한 투자시장으로서 제대로 기능을 발휘하기 위해서는 다음과 같은 몇 가지 문제점에 대한 개선이 이루어져야 한다. 첫째, 일반투자자들도 NPL 시장에 자유롭게 참여할 수 있도록 NPL 유통시장의 진입장벽이 제거되어야 하며, 부동산 경매시장으로 이어지는 담보처분 방식의 NPL정리가 확대되어야 한다. 둘째, 투명한 NPL 거래로 담보부동산 경매의 공정성을 확보해야 한다. 셋째, 담보부동산 경매에서 NPL 매수인의 상계권 남용을 제한해야 한다. 이처럼 NPL 유통시장의 공개경쟁과 투명성을 확보하고, NPL 담보부동산 경매에 의한 부실채권 정리확대 및 공정한 입찰기회 제공 등 제도개선이 이루어지는 경우 경매참여자보호는 물론 부동산 경매시장의 활성화 및 이를 통한 은행의 자산건전성 향상에도 기여할 수 있을 것으로 기대된다.

• 제어로봇시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 제어로봇시스템학회 2001년도 ICCAS
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• pp.149.3-149
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• 2001

Task allocation is a key problem in multiagent systems. The importance of automated negotiation protocols for solving the task allocation problem is increasing as a consequence of increased multi-agent applications. In this paper, we introduce the multiagent Traveling Salesman Problem(TSP) as an example of task reallocation problem, and suggest Vickery auction as an inter-agent coordination mechanism for solving this problem. In order to apply this market-based coordination mechanism into multiagent TSPs, we define the profit of each agent, the ultimate goal of negotiation, cities to be traded out through auctions, the bidding strategy, and the order of auctions. The primary advantage of such approach is that it can find an optimal task allocation ...

• 한국지능정보시스템학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국지능정보시스템학회 2001년도 The Pacific Aisan Confrence On Intelligent Systems 2001
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• pp.73-77
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• 2001

In this paper, we propose a virtual action system based on information agents, We call the system the MultiHammer, MultiHammer can be used for studying and analyzing online actions. MuiltiHammer provides functions of implement-ing a meta online action site and an experiment environ-ment. We have been using MultiHammer as an experiment as an experiment environment for BiddinBot. BiddingBot aims at assisting users to bid simultaneously in multiple online auctions. In order to bid simultaneously in multiple online auctions. In order to analyze the behavior of BiddngBot, we need to pur-chase a lot of items. It is hard for us to prepare a lot of fund to show usability and advantage of BiddingBot. MultiHam-mer enables us to effectively analyze the behavior of BiddingBot. MultiHammer consists of three types of agents for information collecting data storing and auctioning. Agents for information wrappers. To make agent work as wrarp-pers, we heed to realize software modules for each online action site. Implementing these modules reguires a lot of time and patience. To address this problem, we designed a support mechanism for developing the modules. Agents for data storing record the data gathered by agents for informa-tion collecting. Agents for auctioning provide online services using data recorded by agents for data storing. By recording the activities in auction sites. MultiHammer can recreate any situation and trace auction for experimentation, Users can participate in virtual using the same information in real online auctions. Users also participate in real auc-tions via wrapper agents for information collecting

• 한국전자거래학회지
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.135-158
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• 2000

In recent years, many retail businesses jumped on the Internet auction bandwagon and paid substantially high fees to learn and develop proper business strategies for this new environment. Unlike what most businesses in the real world presume, this research shows that discriminatory-price ascending-bid auctions in a digital economy might be not very beneficial for the sellers on the Internet, if sellers sell the identical digital products through both a typical posted-price market and an auction. Using an extensive technology infrastructure along with suitable incentives and rules for market agents, we found that a discriminatory-price ascending-bid auction, which is the most popular auction mechanism on the Internet, serves consumers better than it does the sellers or producers in the digital economy. That is, the average prices for digital goods in these auctions are substantially lower than the prices in a posted-price market. This shows that it is not so wise for sellers to jump on the bandwagon of Internet auctions, if there is a market place with posted-price mechanisms which sells comparable items, or if a seller does not have special advantages or strategies in this new market institution. Electronic market mechanisms provide powerful means of understanding and measuring consumer characteristics including willingness-to-pay and other demographics for sellers or producers. Many concern that sellers may extract the entire surplus from the market by using customization on the Internet, thus consumers will be worse off in this digital economy. We found that these sellers who can customize their products and prices fail to capture the whole consumers surplus and cannot exercise a monopoly. One major explanation for this phenomenon is that the competition among the sellers prohibits them from charging prices according to customers demand for each product, where switching from one seller to another is not so difficult for the customers, and reselling products among the buyers are prohibited.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:시스템및이론
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• 제30권9호
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• pp.477-486
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• 2003

조합 경매에서는 구매자들이 원하는 상품들을 조합해서 입찰할 수 있다. 그러나 판매자의 이익을 최대로 하는 구매자들, 즉 조합 경매의 승자를 결정하는 문제는 NP-complete이다. 적절한 시간 내에 승자를 찾기 위해서 분기 한정법(branch-and-bound)을 사용할 때, 구매자들의 비드(bid)들 중에서 어떤 비드를 선택해서 분기할 것인가를 결정해야 한다. 이 때, 비드를 선택하는 휴리스틱이 분기 한정법의 성능을 결정하는 중요한 역할을 한다. 본 논문에서는 조합경매의 승자를 결정하기 위해서 분기 한정법과 Linear Programming(LP)를 사용하는 알고리즘을 설계하고, 분기할 비드를 선택하기 위하여 분기할 비드와 충돌하는 비드들을 동시에 고려하는 비드 선택 휴리스틱을 제안한다. 그리고 최대 한계치를 재 사용하는 경우를 찾아내서 알고리즘의 수행시간을 줄였다. 알고리즘의 수행 성능을 평가하기 위해서 다섯 가지의 데이타 분포에 대한 실험 결과를 이전 논문들과 비교했다. 제시한 휴리스틱을 사용한 알고리즘은 두 가지 데이타 분포에서는 더 빠른 성능을 보였고 나머지 세 분포에서는 비슷한 성능을 보였다.

• 한국정보과학회논문지:소프트웨어및응용
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• 제32권11호
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• pp.1099-1110
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• 2005

전자상거래상에서 경매가 활발해짐에 따라 경매용 에이전트와 경매 에이전트의 비딩 스트레티지 개발에 관한 연구가 중요한 관심의 초점이 되고 있다. 특히, 우세한 스트레티지가 알려져 있지 않는 복잡한 경매 환경에서의 에이전트 스트레티지 개발은 실용적인 의미를 가지고 있다 이 논문은 최적의 스트레티지가 존재하지 않는 연속이중경매(Continuous Double Auction, CDA) 환경에서 사용할 수 있는 "적응성 스트레티지"를 소개한다. 적응성 스트레티지는 현재 알려져 있는 P-스트레티지에 실시간 적응력을 부가하는 것을 주 아이디어로 한다. 적응성 스트레티지는 여러 종류의 알려진 스트레티지들 중 이제까지 좋은 성능을 보여준 스트레티지를 계속 사용하려는 탐색(exploitation)과 바뀌어졌을지도 모르는 새로운 환경에 적합한 스트레티지를 찾아내려는 이용(exploration)간의 균형을 꾀하며, 이를 각 스트레티지의 기대이득과 실행횟수사이의 상반관계를 고려하는 휴리스틱 탐색 함수를 이용하여 결정한다. 실험분석의 결과, 적응성 스트레티지는 (1) P-스트레티지가 잘 작동하지 않는 환경에선 P-스트레티지보다 높은 이득을, (2) P-스트레티지가 다른 종류의 단순한 스트레티지를 앞서는 환경에서는 P-스트레티지와 비슷한 이득을 보인다.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제32권1호
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• pp.27-51
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• 2007

We analyze the effects of the sellers' strateiges on the final bid prices in internet auctions. We focus on the following three strategies of the seller adoption of the buy-price, setting the starting bid price, and adoption of 'the effective fixed price' which means that the starting bid price is set near the buy-price. In addition, the number of units sold single-unit or multi-unit, and item characteristics, such as whether the food is a search product (functional product) or an experience product (non-functional product), are also considered. We use real data on bids for 4 items from an online auction site. We find that in an auction for experience products when sold as single units, adopting the buy-price strategy raises the final bid price. We also find that in multi-unit auctions, starting the auction at 'the effective fixed price' raises the final bid price.

• 한국전자거래학회지
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• 제6권2호
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• pp.87-99
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• 2001

Along with the rapid emergence of the Internet and e-commerce, online auctions are hitting the spotlights. The inconveniences found in off-line auctions, such as time and place restriction and limited number of items, are solved in the online auction. However, not so many auction sites have integrated auction information systems, which monitor the present status of auctions, resulting in greater inconvenience for the online auction users. Moreover, there is no auction site that suggests the appropriate starting or closing price that is useful for users when they make, their bids, What the online auction users need is an auction system that can solve such problems. This study is purported for solving the problems by designing and implementing a real time auction system that applies the comparison search functions and the agent functions. In other words, an integrated database system using a bidder-oriented agent for providing information is built so that the users can search and compare the information on the item they are interested in and make a faster and more accurate purchase. Also the appropriate starting and closing prices are offered to the sellers and bidders through the integrated system for a closer and more accurate comparison and analysis of the prices. For future work, the product recommendation service, which accurately reflects the bidding patterns, and the methods for studying the multi bidding pattern will be applied to the suggested system to realize a real time auction information system that supports CRM(Customer Relationship Management) .

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제10권12호
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• 정보처리학회논문지B
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• 제8B권6호
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• pp.601-608
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• 2001

The automated assignment of multiple tasks to executing agents is a key problem in the area of multi-agent systems. In many domains, significant savings can be achieved by reallocating tasks among agents with different costs for handling tasks. The automation of task reallocation among self-interested agents requires that the individual agents use a common negotiation protocol that prescribes how they have to interact in order to come to an agreement on "who does what". In this paper, we introduce the multi-agent Traveling Salesman Problem(TSP) as an example of task reallocation problem, and suggest the Vickery auction as an interagent negotiation protocol for solving this problem. In general, auction-based protocols show several advantageous features: they are easily implementable, they enforce an efficient assignment process, and they guarantce an agreement even in scenarios in which the agents possess only very little domain-specific Knowledge. Furthermore Vickrey auctions have the additional advantage that each interested agent bids only once and that the dominant strategy is to bid one′s true valuation. In order to apply this market-based protocol into task reallocation among self-interested agents, we define the profit of each agent, the goal of negotiation, tasks to be traded out through auctions, the bidding strategy, and the sequence of auctions. Through several experiments with sample multi-agent TSPs, we show that the task allocation can improve monotonically at each step and then finally an optimal task allocation can be found with this protocol.