• The Journal of Fisheries Business Administration
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.89-102
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• 1994

This paper is to survey the major results of the game-theoretic models and recent research directions of the literature on auctions and competitive biddings. This paper classifies the auctions and competitive biddings into the following four major types:(i) English auction, (ii) Dutch auction, (iii) the first-price sealed-bid auction, (iv) the second-price sealed-bid auction. In order to survey the major ideas related to auctions and competitive biddings, we use two representative theoretical models developed under the game-theoretic framework : (i) the independent private value model are summarized as follows ; (1) The Dutch auction and the first-price auction are strategically equivalent, and so are the English auction and the second-price auction. (2) At the symmetric equilibria, the expected selling price is the same for all four types of auction. Meanwhile, the major results of the general model are as follows ; (1) When bidders are uncertain about their value extimate, the English and second-price auctions are not equivalent, but the dutch and the first-price auctions are still strategically equivalent. (2) The English auction generates the higher expected prices than the second-price auction. Also, when bidders are risk-neutral, the second-price auction generated higher average prices than the Dutch and the first-price auctions.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.41-53
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• 2016

According to the price-decline effect, the art auction prices are known to decrease with the order of auction sale. Our empirical study investigates the presence for the price-decline effect using the data for Korean antique art hosted by the Seoul Auction in September, 2015. We apply the Hedonic price model to the data and examine the relation between the sale order and auction price. Our empirical evidences show that the well-known price decline effect is not present for the case of Korean antique auction in 2015. We confirm our results by estimating the ordered probit model. From the view of the price-decline effect, our results suggest that the Korean antique auction data exhibits different characteristics from most of the foreign art auction data.

• Asia pacific journal of information systems
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.33-49
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• 2010

We empirically examine the impact of online auction knowledge and category-specific knowledge on the final price of online auctions. Specifically, we question how the relationship between buying and selling experiences affects the final prices of online auctions. Related to the trust between buyers and sellers, we examine the multiple interactions between a buyer-seller pairand aim to identify how these repeated transactions influence the final price. To contrast these effects with other product related factors, we focus on so called 'common value' auctions of vintage stamps on eBay, in which the ex-post value of the product is the same among participating agents’ perceived value. Online auction of stamps provides a representative setting to examine the relationship between market experience and the auction participation behavior in the common value auction, as it provides the book value of stamp as well as price variation across individual buyers with different expertise levels. Our analysis of over 3000 stamps auctions on eBay indicates a significantly high frequency of buyer-seller (pair) interactions, thus suggesting a 'relationship view' of auctions. The work validates five hypotheses derived from the existing theory in economics, marketing, and information systems. Through the common-value auction data, we find that seller's online auction experience and category-specific experience favor sellers by increasing the final price. However, buyer's online auction experience does not affect the final price, but buyer's category-specific experience favors buyers by decreasing the final price. We find that the trust between two trading parties increases the final price.

• Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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• v.12 no.5
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• pp.159-170
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• 2011

In procurement auctions, auction frequency and transaction volume per auction have been analyzed as important factors in determining auction performance. However, there is no empirical study on the effect of auction frequency and transaction volume in procurement auction. Current studies mainly focus on bidder behavior analysis and new system design in procurement auction. In the study, we analyze the effect of two factors on relative winning price empirically by using real auction data from MRO procurement outsourcing company in Korea. From the results, we find the winning price is lower when the frequency of auction with same item category is lower. The low frequency of auctions means participating bidders have limited information of previous auctions and they bid their best price to win the current auction due to less opportunity of reopening the auction in near future. The larger purchase amounts of MRO items didn’t results in lower winning price, contrary to our hypothesis. The possible reason is that the price of MRO items already reflects the economy of scales and the increased volume per auction do not cause the further discount of MRO items from the auction.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.27-51
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• 2007

We analyze the effects of the sellers' strateiges on the final bid prices in internet auctions. We focus on the following three strategies of the seller adoption of the buy-price, setting the starting bid price, and adoption of 'the effective fixed price' which means that the starting bid price is set near the buy-price. In addition, the number of units sold single-unit or multi-unit, and item characteristics, such as whether the food is a search product (functional product) or an experience product (non-functional product), are also considered. We use real data on bids for 4 items from an online auction site. We find that in an auction for experience products when sold as single units, adopting the buy-price strategy raises the final bid price. We also find that in multi-unit auctions, starting the auction at 'the effective fixed price' raises the final bid price.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.205-214
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• 2019

In Korea, the first-price sealed bid auction and the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction(buchal-je in Korean) have been used alternatively as procurement auctions. In this paper, we characterize the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction in the context of mechanism design. We consider the general ?-bidder case in which each bidder has private information. Under the assumptions of uniformly distributed valuations and linear strategies, we derive the equilibrium of the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency and the expected revenue of this auction mechanism in comparison with the first-price sealed bid auction. Finally, we conclude with the critical remarks on the practical intention of the government which uses this auction.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.43 no.3
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• pp.55-77
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• 2021

In Korea, local governments and local agencies had to apply a version of the first price auction augmented by an ex-post screening process when they procure construction contracts. However, this first price auction had been criticized because it was felt that too much price competition could lead to poor ex-post performance in construction. In response, the existing auction method was recently replaced by a version of the average price auction with a similar screening process. This paper empirically examines the effectiveness of this reform and finds that the replacement only increases the fiscal burden of local governmental bodies without making any improvement in the ex-post performance.

• Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.141-155
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• 2005

It is very important that sellers provide reasonable reserve prices for auction items in internet auction systems. Recently, an agent has been proposed to generate reserve prices automatically based on the case similarity of information retrieval theory and the moving average of time series analysis. However, one problem of the previous approaches is that the recent trend of auction prices is not well reflected on the generated reserve prices, because it simply provides the bid price of the most similar item or an average price of some similar items using the past auction data. In this paper. in order to overcome the problem. we propose a method that generates reserve prices based on the moving average. the exponential smoothing, and the least square of time series analysis. Through performance experiments. we show that the successful bid rate of the new method can be increased by preventing sellers from making unreasonable reserve prices compared with the previous methods.

• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.201-212
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• 2009

This study analyzed the structure of pricing in the automobile auction market by using real trade data. We focused on the bidding behavior of bidders and the contract price of exhibits. First, we proposed a relational framework among exhibits, number of bidders, and the contract price. Next, we utilized a neural network model to estimate the number of bidders and the contract price. Subsequently, we investigated the relationship between the number of bidders and the contact price, and evaluated our method through an analysis that employed verifying data. Lastly, we listed our suggestions for bidding in auction markets.