• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.37-57
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• 2017

An arbitrator in Pakistan is required to file an arbitral award in a civil court of competent jurisdiction for its recognition and enforcement if an arbitral award is domestic or before the concerned High Court if the arbitral award is international. The court of law is required to issue a decree upon submitted arbitral award if an interested party do not apply for modification or remission of an arbitral award and do not challenge it for setting it aside or for revocation of its recognition and enforcement within a prescribed time limit. The challenging process of an arbitral award can be started by the aggrieved party of an arbitration agreement at the seat of arbitration or at the place where recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award is sought. The aggrieved party to an arbitration agreement is required to challenge an arbitral award within a prescribed time limit if contracting parties have not excluded the right to challenge an arbitral award. Limitation for challenging an arbitral award in Pakistan is 30 days under article 158 of the Limitation Act 1908, starting from the date of service of notice of filling of an arbitral award before the court of law. Generally, 90 days are given for an appeal against decision of the civil court of law under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, it is therefore highly recommended that challenging time of an arbitral award should be increased from 30 to 90 days.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.49
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• pp.61-86
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• 2011

Korea Supreme Court has given thirty-nine time's judgments on enforcement of Arbitral awards for thirty-six arbitration cases and made four time's decision on the arbitration cases since Korea arbitration act was enacted in 1966. Most of the arbitration cases appealed to the Supreme Court was to obtain the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards or to set aside the arbitral awards according to the Korea arbitration Act article 36 and article 37, by reason of (a) a party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity under the law applicable to him or the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, (b) a party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case (c) the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. However, 5 cases of these arbitral awards were refused to obtain the enforcement of Arbitral awards and have been cancelled finally by the Supreme Court only by the New York Convention of 1958.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.26 no.4
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• pp.3-41
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• 2016

This paper reviews the problems on the arbitral awards enforcement in the 2016 Korean Arbitration Act. In order to get easy and rapid enforcement of the arbitral awards, the new arbitration act changed the enforcement procedure from an enforcement judgement procedure to an enforcement decision procedure. However, like the old arbitration act, the new act is still not arbitration friendly. First of all, there are various problems in the new act because it does not approve that an arbitral award can be a schuldtitel (title of enforcement) of which the arbitral award can be enforced. In this paper, several problems of the new act are discussed: effect of arbitral award, approval to res judicata of enforcement decision, different trial process and result for same ground, possibility of abuse of litigation for setting aside arbitral awards and delay of enforcement caused by setting aside, infringement of arbitration customer's right to be informed, and non-internationality of enforcement of interim measures of protection, inter alia. The new arbitration act added a proviso on article 35 (Effect of Arbitral Awards). According to article 35 of the old arbitration act, arbitral awards shall have the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive judgement of the court. The proviso of article 35 in the new act can be interpret two ways: if arbitral awards have any ground of refusal of recognition or enforcement according to article 38, the arbitral awards do not have the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive judgement of the court; if arbitral awards have not recognised or been enforced according to article 38, the arbitral awards do not have the same effect on the parties as the final and conclusive judgement of the court. In the case of the former, the parties cannot file action for setting aside arbitral awards in article 36 to the court, and this is one of the important problems of the new act. In the new act, same ground of setting aside arbitral awards can be tried in different trial process with or without plead according to article 35 and 37. Therefore, progress of enforcement decision of arbitral awards can be blocked by the action of setting aside arbitral awards. If so, parties have to spend their time and money to go on unexpected litigation. In order to simplify enforcement procedure of arbitral awards, the new act changed enforcement judgement procedure to enforcement decision procedure. However, there is still room for the court to hear a case in the same way of enforcement judgement procedure. Although the new act simplifies enforcement procedure by changing enforcement judgement procedure to enforcement decision procedure, there still remains action of setting aside arbitral awards, so that enforcement of arbitral awards still can be delayed by it. Moreover, another problem exists in that the parties could have to wait until a seventh trial (maximum) for a final decision. This result in not good for the arbitration system itself in the respect of confidence as well as cost. If the arbitration institution promotes to use arbitration by emphasizing single-trial system of arbitration without enough improvement of enforcement procedure in the arbitration system, it would infringe the arbitration customer's right to be informed, and further raise a problem of legal responsibility of arbitration institution. With reference to enforcement procedure of interim measures of protection, the new act did not provide preliminary orders, and moreover limit the court not to recognize interim measures of protection done in a foreign country. These have a bad effect on the internationalization of the Korean arbitration system.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.25-42
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• 2021

Arbitration is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism based on the parties' agreement to resolve any disputes parties may have by arbitration rather than litigation in court. Parties' consent to arbitrate, which must be manifest in the parties' arbitration clause or agreement, is the foundation for arbitration; thus, the language of an arbitration agreement is often of utmost importance in determining the intent of the parties regarding many aspects of arbitration proceedings, such as, the scope of arbitral proceedings, arbitral seat, and authority of arbitral tribunals, among others. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela (2019) that ambiguity in arbitration agreement as to availability of class arbitration should be resolved in favor of individual arbitration, and therefore, class arbitration would be precluded. Such holding was met with criticism by four separate dissenting opinions, in which the dissenting Justices have disagreed with the majority's interpretation of the arbitration agreement at issue, as well as, its rejection of application of state law in resolving contractual ambiguity. This article analyzes the Supreme Court's decision and reviews the Court's approach in construction of the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court declined to provide clear guidelines as to precisely what contractual basis is required to permit class arbitration, either silence or ambiguity in arbitration agreements will be resolved by disallowing class arbitration.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.55-84
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• 2005

The arbitral award is the decision of the arbitrators on the dispute that had been submitted to them by the parties, either under the arbitration clause providing for the determination of future disputes or under submission of an existing controversy. The arbitral award has the same effect between the parties as a final and binding court judgment. The arbitration award shall acquire, as soon as it is given and delivered to each parties, the authority of res judicata in respect of the dispute it settles. The validity of an award is a condition precent for its recognition or enforcement. The validity of an award depends on the provisions of the arbitration agreement including any arbitration rules incorporated in it, and the law which is applicable to the arbitration proceedings. Such provisions usually address both the form and the content of the award. As the 'form', requires article 32 of Arbitration Act of Korea that an arbitral award should, at least, (1) be made in writing and be signed by all arbitrators. (2) state the reasons upon which it is based unless the parties have agreed that it should not, (3) state its date and place of arbitration. There are some further requirement which may have to be observed before an award which has been made by a tribunal can be enforced. (4) The duly authenticated award signed by the arbitrators shall be delivered to each of the parties and the original award shall be sent to and deposited with the competent court, accompanied by a document verifying such delivery. This rule can be interpreted as if the deposit of an arbitral award with the competent court is always required as a condition for its validity or as a preliminary to its enforcement in Korea. However, we must regard this rule which requires the deposit of an arbitral award with court, as rule of order, but not as condition of its validity. Because that the date on which the award is delivered to each party is important as it will generally determine the commencement of time limits for the making of any appeal which may be available. Furthermore, the party applying for recognition or enforcement merely has to supply the appropriate court with the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof, not any document which proves that an the arbitral award is sent to and deposited with the competent court. In order to avoid some confusion which can be caused by its interpretation and application, the Article 32 (4) of Arbitration Act of Korea needs to be abolished or at least modified.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.32 no.3
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• pp.29-46
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• 2022

Until recently, there has been a circuit split as to whether parties to foreign private arbitral proceedings could seek assistance from the U.S. courts for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1782. The circuit courts have differed on the issue of whether a private arbitral proceeding may be considered a "proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" in terms of the statute, which would ultimately allow or disallow judicial assistance in taking of evidence by the U.S. district courts for use in the requested proceedings. While the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the applicability of §1782 in its Intel decision in 2004, it had not established a test as to what constitutes a foreign or international tribunal for the purposes of §1782, thereby leaving it open for lower courts to continue to interpret §1782 in their own ways, as requests for judicial assistance in taking of evidence are filed. In the recent decision of ZF Auto. US, Inc., v. Luxshare, Ltd., the Supreme Court has finally clarified that in order for an arbitral panel to be a "foreign or international tribunal" under §1782, such panels must exercise governmental authority conferred by one nation or multiple nations. Therefore, private commercial arbitral panels are not "foreign or international tribunal(s)" for the purposes of §1782 because they do not constitute governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative bodies. Such holding is necessary and legitimate for interested parties in international arbitration, as well as, potential parties of arbitration who are contemplating alternative dispute resolution for their dispute(s).

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.225-261
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• 2005

Under Article IV of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention), in order to obtain the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, a party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall supply (a) the duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof and (b) the original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. In addition, if the arbitral award or arbitration agreement is not made in an official language of the country in which the award is relied upon, the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the award shall produce a translation of these documents into such language, and the translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent. In a case where a Vietnamese company which had obtained a favorable arbitral award in Vietnam applied for recognition and enforcement of a Vietnamese arbitral award before a Korean court, the recent Korean Supreme Court Judgment (Docket No. 2004 Da 20180. 'Judgment') rendered on December 12, 2004 has alleviated the document requirements as follows : The Judgment held that (i) the party applying for recognition andenforcement of a foreign arbitral award does not have to strictly comply with the document requirements when the other party does not dispute the existence and the content of the arbitral award and the arbitration agreement and that (ii) in case the translation submitted to the court does not satisfy the requirement of Article 4, the court does not have to dismiss the case on the ground that the party applying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award has failed to comply with the translation requirement under Article 4, and instead may supplement the documents by obtaining an accurate Korean translation from an expert translator at the expense of the party applying for recognition and enforcement of the foreign arbitral award. In this regard, the author fully supports the view of the Judgment. Finally, the Judgment held that, even though the existence of a written arbitration agreement was not disputed at the arbitration, there was no written arbitration agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant and wenton to repeal the judgment of the second instance which admitted the existence of a written arbitration agreement between the parties. In this regard, the author does not share the view of the Judgment. The author believes that considering the trend of alleviating the formality requirement of arbitration agreements under Article 2 of the New York Convention, the Supreme Court could have concluded that there was a written arbitration agreement because the defendant participated in thearbitration proceedings in Vietnam without disputing the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement. Or the Supreme Court should have taken the view that the defendant was no longer permitted to dispute the formality requirement of the arbitration agreement because otherwise it would be clearly against the doctrine of estoppel.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.3-21
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• 2007

Arbitration is a private and contractual means of dispute resolution. As a creature of contract, any particular arbitration owes its existence-and attendant limitations-to an arbitral agreement. This means that, in practice, the parties select their own judges, forum, and rules. By agreeing to arbitration, parties hope to achieve several goals. And arbitration has proven to be quicker, cheaper, and more predictable than litigation as a means of resolving many types of claims. As a primary method of conflict resolution, it is now worthwhile to consider carefully any procedural mechanism designed to promote the central aims of this alternative to litigation. It is helpful to frame any particular analysis according to (1) the type of decision for which preclusive effect is sought (arbitral award or court judgment) and (2) the type of subsequent proceeding in which preclusion is sought (an arbitration or a litigation). Res judicata may well bar litigation of that claim between the parties, but non-parties (affiliates or individuals) will not benefit from this bar unless the arbitral tribunal makes findings sufficient to satisfy the elements of collateral estoppel. The final permutation to be considered involves an arbitral award's preclusive effect on a subsequent arbitration. Whether a prior court decision should preclude issues or claims in a subsequent arbitration presents the easiest case for analysis. It is the easiest primarily because there is generally little room to debate whether adequate procedures were followed in a litigation. That is, one can safely assume that the rules of evidence and the rules of civil procedure were followed and that formal records sufficiently memorialize both the proceeding itself and the ultimate decision. Procedural regularity is mentioned not necessarily because it is an analytic tool, but because so many jurists and scholars see it as an impediment to the application of preclusionary doctrines.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.35
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• pp.101-124
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• 2007

This paper purposes to examine the setting aside and the refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards and their implications for practitioners. The aim of challenging an award before a national court at the seat, or place, of arbitration is to have it modified in some way by the relevant court, or more usually, to have that court declare that the award is to be disregarded (i.e. "annulled" or "set aside") in whole or in part. If an award is set aside or annulled by the relevant court, it will usually be treated as invalid and accordingly unenforceable, not only by the courts of the seat of arbitration but also by national courts elsewhere. This is because, under both the 1958 New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law, the competent court may refuse to grant recognition and enforcement of an award that has been "set aside" by a court of the seat of arbitration. The New York Convention set out various grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award. The provisions of the Model Law governing recognition, enforcement or setting-aside of awards are almost identical to those set out in the Convention. Especially, the New York Convention and the Model Law state that an arbitral award may be refused and set aside if a national court of the place of arbitration finds that the award is in conflict with the public policy of its own country. Each state has its own concept of what is required by its "public policy". It is possible to envisage, for example, a dispute over the division of gaming profits from a casino. In many states, the underlying transaction that led to the award would be regarded as a normal commercial transaction and the award would be regarded as valid. Indeed, it is a consistent theme to be found in the legislation and judical decision of many countries. If a workable definition of "international public policy" could be found, it would provide an effective way of preventing an award in an international arbitration from being set aside and refusal for purely domestic policy consideration.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.131-152
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• 2018

On October 31, 2013, the Singapore Court of Appeals handed down a landmark decision in the case of PT First Media TBK v Astro Nusantara International and Others [2013] SGCA 57. The case arose out of an arbitration in Singapore involving the Malaysian conglomerate Astro and the Indonesian conglomerate Lippo, which culminated in a USD 250 million award in favor of Astro. The final award was given to three Astro subsidiaries who were not parties to the arbitration agreement, but who were joined in the arbitration pursuant to an application by Astro. Lippo then applied to the Singapore High Court to set aside the enforcement orders. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the High Court's decision, and found that Astro was only entitled to enforce the awards. Also, the Court of Appeals undertook a detailed analysis of the use of active and passive remedies to defeat an arbitral award at the seat and the place of enforcement, respectively. It also touches on the innovation of forced joinders of third parties in arbitrations, which have garnered significant interest in the arbitration community. This decision is therefore expected to have a significant impact on the practice of international arbitration, including in relation to how awards can be enforced or defeated, as the case may be.