• Title/Summary/Keyword: Anonymizing Networks

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Source-Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks (무선 센서 네트워크에서의 소스 위치 프라이버시)

  • Lee, Song-Woo;Park, Young-Hoon;Son, Ju-Hyung;Kang, Yu;Choe, Jin-Gi;Moon, Ho-Gun;Seo, Seung-Woo
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.17 no.2
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    • pp.125-137
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    • 2007
  • This paper proposes a new scheme to provide the location privacy of sources in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Because the geographical location of a source sensor reveals contextual information on an 'event' in WSN, anonymizing the source location is an important issue. Despite abundant research efforts, however, about data confidentiality and authentication in WSN, privacy issues have not been researched well so far. Moreover, many schemes providing the anonymity of communication parties in Internet and Ad-hoc networks are not appropriate for WSN environments where sensors are very resource limited and messages are forwarded in a hop-by-hop manner through wireless channel. In this paper, we first categorize the type of eavesdroppers for WSN as Global Eavesdropper and Compromising Eavesdropper. Then we propose a novel scheme which provides the anonymity of a source according to the types of eavesdroppers. Furthermore, we analyze the degree of anonymity of WSN using the entropy-based modeling method. As a result, we show that the proposed scheme improves the degree of anonymity compared to a method without any provision of anonymity and also show that the transmission range plays a key role to hide the location of source sensors.

Anonymity of Tor Users on Unsecured Applications (비 암호화 프로그램 사용자의 토르망 익명성 보장 분석)

  • Shin, Seok-Joo;Dahal, Saurav;Pudasaini, Amod;Kang, Moon-Soo
    • The Journal of the Korea institute of electronic communication sciences
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    • v.12 no.5
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    • pp.805-816
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    • 2017
  • Tor is a popular, low-latency open network that offers online anonymity to users by concealing their information from anyone conducting traffic analysis. At the same time, a number of conventional passive and active attacking schemes have been proposed to compromise the anonymity provided by the Tor network. In addition to attacks on the network through traffic analysis, interacting with an unsecured application can reveal a Tor user's IP address. Specific traffic from such applications bypasses Tor proxy settings in the user's machine and forms connections outside the Tor network. This paper presents such applications and shows how they can be used to deanonymize Tor users. Extensive test studies performed in the paper show that applications such as Flash and BitTorrent can reveal the IP addresses of Tor users.