• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제25권2호
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• pp.97-118
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• 2015

As China has quickly emerged as a global economic power, the total number of international commercial disputes arbitrated by Chinese arbitral institutions has increased dramatically. Along with this, the annulment procedure of arbitral awards in China have been newly brought to the fore. In accordance with the historical background and the demand of the times, the Chinese annulment procedure of arbitral awards reveals distinctive Chinese features. Although it was enacted in the face ofof an unwarranted prejudice against the dispute settlement system by arbitration as well as a deep mistrust of domestic arbitral institutions, the annulment procedure of arbitral awards showed a certain degree of justification and rationality in its initial stages of legislation. However, it is also the case that it has not adapted well to new domestic or foreign arbitration circumstances in the last twenty years. At present, there is a keen interest in revisions to and debates on arbitration law of China. It is necessary to take an active part in the amendment discussion and process of arbitration law. Moreover, we need to reform the annulment procedure of arbitral awards in order to meet the global trend of arbitration law.

• 무역상무연구
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• 제69권
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• pp.543-566
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• 2016

This article examines the Annulment Procedure of ICSID Arbitration Award. Although the ICSID annulment procedure is not substantially different from arbitration procedure, it does have certain unique features. Article 52 of the Convention provides that the application for annulment must be made within 120days after the date on which the award was rendered. ICSID Arbitration Rule 50, in turn, stipulates that a request for annulment of a award must: i)be addressed in writing to the Secretary-General; ii)identify the award to which it relates; iii)indicated the date of the application; and iv)state in detail the grounds for annulment on which it is based. The grounds for annulment are limited to those in Article 52(1) of the Convention. With respect to the possibility of waiving the right to annulment in advance, commentators are divided. Some authors admit the possibility of agreements eliminating the right to request annulment. Other authors, instead, have taken the position that parties cannot waive their right to annulment in advanced because no provision in the Convention allows the parties to do so, and thus the right to request annulment is inalienable. In accordance with Article 52(4), annulment decisions must comply with the requirements for awards stipulated in Article 48. Therefore; i)the committee decide questions by majority; ii)the decision must be in writing and must be signed by the members of the committee who voted for it; iii)any member of the committee may attach his individual opinion to the award; and iv)ICSID must not publish the decision without the consent of the parties. Finally, under Article 52(4), parties are not allowed to request the interpretation, revision, or annulment of a decision on annulment. Even if the committee allegedly manifestly exceeded its powers or engaged in any conduct sanctioned by Article 52(1), the parties cannot request the annulment of the decision on annulment.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제30권2호
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• pp.43-68
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• 2020

The "arbitration" system resolves disputes through judgments on rights relations or claims between disputed parties by judging by private trial, but it does not have organizational and material bases to execute the contents of these judgments. Therefore, unless the parties succeed in voluntarily surrendering to the results of the arbitration award, the implementation of the award will be accomplished by the enforcement of the assistance of the National Court. However, unlike the court's ruling, the arbitration tribunal does not generate enforcement power from the judgment itself, and it must be filed with the court for execution. In this regard, Germany provides for arbitration proceedings in the Civil Procedure Act Volume 10. In particular, Article 1060 governs the approval and enforcement of domestic arbitral awards. Accordingly, the procedure for declaring the feasibility of domestic arbitration proceedings and the execution of forced execution are commenced. Regarding the enforceable declaration of a domestic arbitral award, it differs from the simpler process requirements compared to the procedure in a foreign arbitral award, and usually has the same effect as a final judgment between the parties without a separate approval procedure. However, the arbitration award does not constitute an enforceable power that can be implemented, but is enforced through the national court's declaration procedure. However, if there is a ground for cancellation as provided for in Article 1059 (2) of the German Civil Procedure Act, the arbitral award is canceled and the application for enforcement is dismissed.

• 한국중재학회지:중재연구
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• 제29권4호
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• pp.187-210
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• 2019

This article examines the necessity for the introduction of an ICSID Appellate System. In comparison with the WTO appellate system, the ICSID ad hoc Committee has a very limited mandate. An annulment inquiry under the ICSID arbitration system barely focuses on whether the arbitral decision resulted from a justifiable process. As long as there is procedural legitimacy, the resulting awards remain unaffected under the annulment procedure, irrespective of mistakes of fact or law. In contrast, in the WTO DSS the AB substantively reviews panel rulings and suggestions that are founded on any deficiency of objectivity or error in the interpretation of a particular WTO provision. This defect intrinsic in the annulment procedure could cause injustice to a party earnestly interested in correcting recognized misapplication of law by ICSID tribunals. Accordingly, the establishment of an appellate system would result in a more substantive and procedural review of awards. The creation of such an ICSID appellate system would ensure thorough scrutiny of the decisions of the tribunal of first instance, leading to better reasoned outcomes. This could lead to a crystallization of predictability in investment relations. The end result would be that fairness, clarity, reliability, and legality in the ICSID adjudicative process would be unassailable, to the advantage of all the contracting parties.