• Title/Summary/Keyword: Air defense systems

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A Study on the Response Plan through the Analysis of North Korea's Drones Terrorism at Critical National Facilities - Focusing on Improvement of Laws and Systems - (국가중요시설에 대한 북한의 드론테러 위협 분석을 통한 대응방안 연구 - 법적·제도적 개선을 중심으로 -)

  • Choong soo Ha
    • Journal of the Society of Disaster Information
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    • v.19 no.2
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    • pp.395-410
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    • 2023
  • Purpose: The purpose of this study was to analyze the current state of drone terrorism response at such critical national facilities and derive improvements, especially to identify problems in laws and systems to effectively utilize the anti-drone system and present directions for improvement. Method: A qualitative research method was used for this study by analyzing a variety of issues not discussed in existing research papers and policy documents through in-depth interviews with subject matter experts. In-depth interviews were conducted based on 12 semi-structured interviews by selecting 16 experts in the field of anti-drone and terrorism in Korea. The interview contents were recorded with the prior consent of the study participants, transcribed back to the Korean file, and problems and improvement measures were derived through coding. For this, the threats and types were analyzed based on the cases of drone terrorism occurring abroad and measures to establish anti-drone system were researched from the perspective of laws and systems by evaluating the possibility of drone terrorism in the Republic of Korea. Result: As a result of the study, improvements to some of the problems that need to be preceded in order to effectively respond to drone terrorism at critical national facilities in the Republic of Korea, have been identified. First, terminologies related to critical national facilities and drone terrorism should be clearly defined and reflected in the Integrated Defense Act and the Terrorism Prevention Act. Second, the current concept of protection of critical national facilities should evolve from the current ground-oriented protection to a three-dimensional protection concept that considers air threats and the Integrated Defense Act should reflect a plan to effectively install the anti-drone system that can materialize the concept. Third, a special law against flying over critical national facilities should be enacted. To this end, legislation should be enacted to expand designated facilities subject to flight restrictions while minimizing the range of no fly zone, but the law should be revised so that the two wings of "drone industry development" and "protection of critical national facilities" can develop in a balanced manner. Fourth, illegal flight response system and related systems should be improved and reestablished. For example, it is necessary to prepare a unified manual for general matters, but thorough preparation should be made by customizing it according to the characteristics of each facility, expanding professional manpower, and enhancing response training. Conclusion: The focus of this study is to present directions for policy and technology development to establish an anti-drone system that can effectively respond to drone terrorism and illegal drones at critical national facilities going forward.

China's Diplomatic Challenges and Prospect in the Xi Jinping Era (시진핑 시대 중국의 외교적 과제와 전망)

  • Cho, Young Nam
    • Strategy21
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    • s.33
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    • pp.5-36
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    • 2014
  • This article aims to analyze the diplomatic challenges currently facing China as well as the foreign policy the Xi Jinping administration is adopting to address them. With these purposes in mind, it will look into three areas: first, diplomatic tasks confronting the Xi leadership; second, foreign policy that the Xi administration has implemented since the 18th Party Congress in 2012; and third, the prospects for China's foreign policy under the Xi leadership. As the Xi Jinping administration entered into office, it has encountered two major diplomatic challenges. One is the searching for a new foreign policy, and the other the restructuring of the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. The Xi administration, during its first year in office, has responded actively to tackle these issues. To begin with, it has attempted to make some adjustments on foreign policy while maintaining the Deng Xiaoping line of foreign policy. One of these modifications is placing emphasis on national "core interest," as illustrated by changes in guideline for maritime conflicts, pushing for building maritime power, and proclamation of Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea. Second is the decision on the new guideline for peripheral diplomacy. That is, the administration regarded creating peaceful and stable environments to realize "Chinese Dream" as an important goal of foreign policy, and proposed such new guiding ideology as "familiarity, integrity, benefit, and accommodation." In additoin, the Xi administration restructured the existing foreign affairs and national security systems. Establishing the Central State Security Committee and the Internet Leading Small Group (LSG) are cases in point. As comprehensive organizations for policy coordination that encompass party, government, and military, the two LSGs are in charge of enacting related policies and fine-tuning policy implementation, based upon leadership consisting of chiefs of each relevant organs. Moreover, since Xi himself became the chief of these two newly-found organs, the conditions under which these LSGs could demonstrate unified leadership and adjusting role in its implementation of military, diplomatic, and security policies were developed. The future Chinese diplomacy will be characterized with three main trends. First, peripheral diplomacy will be reinforced. The peripheral diplomacy has become far more important since the Work Conference on Peripheral Diplomacy in October 2013. Second, economic diplomacy will be strengthened with an eye on reducing the "China Threat Theory," which still exists in Asia. Third, the policies to isolate the Philippines and Japan will continue in regard to maritime disputes. All in all, Chinese diplomacy in the Xi Jinping era is likely to feature practical diplomacy which combines both hard and soft approaches to best realize Chinese national interest.

Cost Education Effectiveness Analysis of Immersion-type and Simulator-type Virtual Reality Training Systems -Focusing on The ROK Army Virtual Reality Training System- (몰입형과 시뮬레이터형 가상현실 훈련체계 비용 대 교육효과 분석 -육군 가상현실 훈련체계를 중심으로-)

  • Kim, Do-heon;Min, Seung-hee;Kim, Yeek-hyun
    • Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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    • v.22 no.4
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    • pp.345-352
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    • 2021
  • The Republic of Korea Army (ROK Army) is trying to improve the effectiveness of education and training. On the other hand, there are many restrictions in actual training, limiting their practical education and training. Virtual reality technology is being used to overcome these limitations. Virtual reality technology is developing in various types, and the ROK Army needs to introduce a virtual reality training system for cost-effective education. The ROK Army mainly uses high-cost simulator-types that are similar to real equipment. Recently, a low-cost immersive-type virtual reality training system wearing an HMD is also being used. This study analyzed the cost education effectiveness of simulator-type and immersive-type virtual reality training systems in operation at the ROK Army air defense school. First, the research method used AHP to analyze the educational effects. Second, the cost was applied to the production cost of the virtual reality training system to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the education. The immersion-type was 3.4 times higher than the simulator-type in terms of cost effectiveness. These results can be used as basic data for analyzing the cost-effectiveness of a virtual reality training system.

Development of C2 Virtual Linked Simulator For Engineering and Engagement Level Battle Experimentation (공학-교전급 전투실험을 위한 C2 가상모의 연동 시뮬레이터 개발)

  • Lee, Sangtae;Lee, Seungyoung;Hwang, Kun-Chul;Kim, Saehwan;Lee, Kyuhyun
    • Journal of the Korea Society for Simulation
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    • v.22 no.4
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    • pp.11-19
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    • 2013
  • The Korean naval weapon systems, combat experiments establish the concept of Battle operations, and create the future of the new weapons system. Doctrine development and training as well as ranging from experiments for evaluate the performance of mission operations for combat experiments are used. The battle lab is effectively support tool for the Korean Naval battle experiments. The battle lab is through a dedicated testing facility and to build efficient and effective simulation-based acquisition supporting environment. In this paper, the ship / submarines C2 operations virtual simulator was developed to support the concept of Battle operations of naval combat experiments in training and tactical development. The ship C2 operations virtual simulator makes the anti-ship and anti-aircraft the engagement scenario for performed experiments using the SADM. The submarines C2 operations virtual simulator makes the anti-submarine engagement scenario for performed experiments using EAS. EAS System was created before reuse. EAS system by modifying the additional interfaces HLA-RTI has been reused. Reflected in the tactics and training after analysis of the results through the battle experiment. Also increase training fidelity through operator involvement. The anti-ship and anti-aircraft system architecture (SADM) and anti-submarine system architecture (EAS) requires unique design of system framework since two separate architectures should be integrated into a system. An C2 virtual linked architecture was used to integrate different system architecture. A C2 virtual linked software framework, designed that have integrated protocol for battle experimental linkage and battlefield visualization environment.

Incineration Process of Double Base Propellant for Demilitarization (더블 베이스 추진제의 비군사화 소각공정)

  • Lee, Si-Hwang;Baek, Seung-Won;Moon, Il;Park, Jung-Su;Oh, Min
    • Clean Technology
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    • v.22 no.3
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    • pp.190-195
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    • 2016
  • The thermal decomposition of waste energetic materials such as TNT, RDX and composition B in a commercial rotary kiln has previously been carried out. As part of the demilitarization process, the thermal decomposition of homogeneous double base propellant (DB) used in M8 and consisting predominantly of nitrocellulose and nitroglycerine is examined with respect to a number of operating conditions. A single condensed phase reaction with 4 species and 365 gas phase reactions and 59 species are considered. Simulation results show the sensitivity of the thermal decomposition of DB with temperature and velocity. At relatively low velocity with constant inlet hot air temperature, temperature in the rotary kiln was found to be highest, 953 K and 1300 K for cases 3 and 6 respectively. Illustrating that optimum operating temperature can be achieved by controlling the inlet velocity without additional cooling systems.

Control Policy for the Land Remote Sensing Industry (미국(美國)의 지상원격탐사(地上遠隔探査) 통제제탁(統制制度))

  • Suh, Young-Duk
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.20 no.1
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    • pp.87-107
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    • 2005
  • Land Remote Sensing' is defined as the science (and to some extent, art) of acquiring information about the Earth's surface without actually being in contact with it. Narrowly speaking, this is done by sensing and recording reflected or emitted energy and processing, analyzing, and applying that information. Remote sensing technology was initially developed with certain purposes in mind ie. military and environmental observation. However, after 1970s, as these high-technologies were taught to private industries, remote sensing began to be more commercialized. Recently, we are witnessing a 0.61-meter high-resolution satellite image on a free market. While privatization of land remote sensing has enabled one to use this information for disaster prevention, map creation, resource exploration and more, it can also create serious threat to a sensed nation's national security, if such high resolution images fall into a hostile group ie. terrorists. The United States, a leading nation for land remote sensing technology, has been preparing and developing legislative control measures against the remote sensing industry, and has successfully created various policies to do so. Through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's authority under the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, the US can restrict sensing and recording of resolution of 0.5 meter or better, and prohibit distributing/circulating any images for the first 24 hours. In 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 23 ordered a 'Shutter Control' policy that details heightened level of restriction from sensing to commercializing such sensitive data. The Directive 23 was even more strengthened in 2003 when the Congress passed US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. These policies allow Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to set up guidelines in authorizing land remote sensing, and to limit sensing and distributing satellite images in the name of the national security - US government can use the civilian remote sensing systems when needed for the national security purpose. The fact that the world's leading aerospace technology country acknowledged the magnitude of land remote sensing in the context of national security, and it has made and is making much effort to create necessary legislative measures to control the powerful technology gives much suggestions to our divided Korean peninsula. We, too, must continue working on the Korea National Space Development Act and laws to develop the necessary policies to ensure not only the development of space industry, but also to ensure the national security.

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A Study on the Governance of U.S. Global Positioning System (미국 글로벌위성항법시스템(GPS)의 거버넌스에 관한 연구 - 한국형위성항법시스템 거버넌스를 위한 제언 -)

  • Jung, Yung-Jin
    • The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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    • v.35 no.3
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    • pp.127-150
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    • 2020
  • A Basic Plan for the Promotion of Space Development (hereinafter referred to as "basic plan"), which prescribes mid- and long-term policy objectives and basic direction-setting on space development every five years, is one of the matters to be deliberated by the National Space Committee. Confirmed February 2018 by the Committee, the 3rd Basic Plan has a unique matter, compared to the 2nd Basic Plan. It is to construct "Korean Positioning System(KPS)". Almost every country in the world including Korea has been relying on GPS. On the occasion of the shooting down of a Korean Air flight 007 by Soviet Russia, GPS Standard Positioning Service has been open to the world. Due to technical errors of GPS or conflict of interests between countries in international relations, however, the above Service can be interrupted at any time. Such cessation might bring extensive damage to the social, economic and security domains of every country. This is why some countries has been constructing an independent global or regional satellite navigation system: EU(Galileo), Russia(Glonass), India(NaVic), Japan(QZSS), and China(Beidou). So does South Korea. Once KPS is built, it is expected to make use of the system in various areas such as transportation, aviation, disaster, construction, defense, ocean, distribution, telecommunication, etc. For this, a pan-governmental governance is needed to be established. And this governance must be based on the law. Korea is richly experienced in developing and operating individually satellite itself, but it has little experience in the simultaneous development and operation of the satellites, ground, and users systems, such as KPS. Therefore we need to review overseas cases, in order to minimize trial and error. U.S. GPS is a classic example.

Analysis of Munitions Contract Work Using Process Mining (프로세스 마이닝을 이용한 군수품 계약업무 분석 : 공군 군수사 계약업무를 중심으로)

  • Joo, Yong Seon;Kim, Su Hwan
    • Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
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    • v.28 no.4
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    • pp.41-59
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    • 2022
  • The timely procurement of military supplies is essential to maintain the military's operational capabilities, and contract work is the first step toward timely procurement. In addition, rapid signing of a contract enables consumers to set a leisurely delivery date and increases the possibility of budget execution, so it is essential to improve the contract process to prevent early execution of the budget and transfer or disuse. Recently, research using big data has been actively conducted in various fields, and process analysis using big data and process mining, an improvement technique, are also widely used in the private sector. However, the analysis of contract work in the military is limited to the level of individual analysis such as identifying the cause of each problem case of budget transfer and disuse contracts using the experience and fragmentary information of the person in charge. In order to improve the contract process, this study analyzed using the process mining technique with data on a total of 560 contract tasks directly contracted by the Department of Finance of the Air Force Logistics Command for about one year from November 2019. Process maps were derived by synthesizing distributed data, and process flow, execution time analysis, bottleneck analysis, and additional detailed analysis were conducted. As a result of the analysis, it was found that review/modification occurred repeatedly after request in a number of contracts. Repeated reviews/modifications have a significant impact on the delay in the number of days to complete the cost calculation, which has also been clearly revealed through bottleneck visualization. Review/modification occurs in more than 60% of the top 5 departments with many contract requests, and it usually occurs in the first half of the year when requests are concentrated, which means that a thorough review is required before requesting contracts from the required departments. In addition, the contract work of the Department of Finance was carried out in accordance with the procedures according to laws and regulations, but it was found that it was necessary to adjust the order of some tasks. This study is the first case of using process mining for the analysis of contract work in the military. Based on this, if further research is conducted to apply process mining to various tasks in the military, it is expected that the efficiency of various tasks can be derived.

The lesson From Korean War (한국전쟁의 교훈과 대비 -병력수(兵力數) 및 부대수(部隊數)를 중심으로-)

  • Yoon, Il-Young
    • Journal of National Security and Military Science
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    • s.8
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    • pp.49-168
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    • 2010
  • Just before the Korean War, the total number of the North Korean troops was 198,380, while that of the ROK(Republic of Korea) army troops 105,752. That is, the total number of the ROK army troops at that time was 53.3% of the total number of the North Korean army. As of December 2008, the total number of the North Korean troops is estimated to be 1,190,000, while that of the ROK troops is 655,000, so the ROK army maintains 55.04% of the total number of the North Korean troops. If the ROK army continues to reduce its troops according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the total number of its troops will be 517,000 m 2020. If North Korea maintains the current status(l,190,000 troops), the number of the ROK troops will be 43.4% of the North Korean army. In terms of units, just before the Korean War, the number of the ROK army divisions and regiments was 80% and 44.8% of North Korean army. As of December 2008, North Korea maintains 86 divisions and 69 regiments. Compared to the North Korean army, the ROK army maintains 46 Divisions (53.4% of North Korean army) and 15 regiments (21.3% of North Korean army). If the ROK army continue to reduce the military units according to [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of ROK army divisions will be 28(13 Active Division, 4 Mobilization Divisions and 11 Local Reserve Divisions), while that of the North Korean army will be 86 in 2020. In that case, the number of divisions of the ROK army will be 32.5% of North Korean army. During the Korean war, North Korea suddenly invaded the Republic of Korea and occupied its capital 3 days after the war began. At that time, the ROK army maintained 80% of army divisions, compared to the North Korean army. The lesson to be learned from this is that, if the ROK army is forced to disperse its divisions because of the simultaneous invasion of North Korea and attack of guerrillas in home front areas, the Republic of Korea can be in a serious military danger, even though it maintains 80% of military divisions of North Korea. If the ROK army promotes the plans in [Military Reform Plan 2020], the number of military units of the ROK army will be 32.5% of that of the North Korean army. This ratio is 2.4 times lower than that of the time when the Korean war began, and in this case, 90% of total military power should be placed in the DMZ area. If 90% of military power is placed in the DMZ area, few troops will be left for the defense of home front. In addition, if the ROK army continues to reduce the troops, it can allow North Korea to have asymmetrical superiority in military force and it will eventually exert negative influence on the stability and peace of the Korean peninsular. On the other hand, it should be reminded that, during the Korean War, the Republic of Korea was attacked by North Korea, though it kept 53.3% of troops, compared to North Korea. It should also be reminded that, as of 2008, the ROK army is defending its territory with the troops 55.04% of North Korea. Moreover, the national defense is assisted by 25,120 troops of the US Forces in Korea. In case the total number of the ROK troops falls below 43.4% of the North Korean army, it may cause social unrest about the national security and may lead North Korea's misjudgement. Besides, according to Lanchester strategy, the party with weaker military power (60% compared to the party with stronger military power) has the 4.1% of winning possibility. Therefore, if we consider the fact that the total number of the ROK army troops is 55.04% of that of the North Korean army, the winning possibility of the ROK army is not higher than 4.1%. If the total number of ROK troops is reduced to 43.4% of that of North Korea, the winning possibility will be lower and the military operations will be in critically difficult situation. [Military Reform Plan 2020] rums at the reduction of troops and units of the ground forces under the policy of 'select few'. However, the problem is that the financial support to achieve this goal is not secured. Therefore, the promotion of [Military Reform Plan 2020] may cause the weakening of military defence power in 2020. Some advanced countries such as Japan, UK, Germany, and France have promoted the policy of 'select few'. However, what is to be noted is that the national security situation of those countries is much different from that of Korea. With the collapse of the Soviet Unions and European communist countries, the military threat of those European advanced countries has almost disappeared. In addition, the threats those advanced countries are facing are not wars in national level, but terrorism in international level. To cope with the threats like terrorism, large scaled army trops would not be necessary. So those advanced European countries can promote the policy of 'select few'. In line with this, those European countries put their focuses on the development of military sections that deal with non-military operations and protection from unspecified enemies. That is, those countries are promoting the policy of 'select few', because they found that the policy is suitable for their national security environment. Moreover, since they are pursuing common interest under the European Union(EU) and they can form an allied force under NATO, it is natural that they are pursing the 'select few' policy. At present, NATO maintains the larger number of troops(2,446,000) than Russia(l,027,000) to prepare for the potential threat of Russia. The situation of japan is also much different from that of Korea. As a country composed of islands, its prime military focus is put on the maritime defense. Accordingly, the development of ground force is given secondary focus. The japanese government promotes the policy to develop technology-concentrated small size navy and air-forces, instead of maintaining large-scaled ground force. In addition, because of the 'Peace Constitution' that was enacted just after the end of World War II, japan cannot maintain troops more than 240,000. With the limited number of troops (240,000), japan has no choice but to promote the policy of 'select few'. However, the situation of Korea is much different from the situations of those countries. The Republic of Korea is facing the threat of the North Korean Army that aims at keeping a large-scale military force. In addition, the countries surrounding Korea are also super powers containing strong military forces. Therefore, to cope with the actual threat of present and unspecified threat of future, the importance of maintaining a carefully calculated large-scale military force cannot be denied. Furthermore, when considering the fact that Korea is in a peninsular, the Republic of Korea must take it into consideration the tradition of continental countries' to maintain large-scale military powers. Since the Korean War, the ROK army has developed the technology-force combined military system, maintaining proper number of troops and units and pursuing 'select few' policy at the same time. This has been promoted with the consideration of military situation in the Koran peninsular and the cooperation of ROK-US combined forces. This kind of unique military system that cannot be found in other countries can be said to be an insightful one for the preparation for the actual threat of North Korea and the conflicts between continental countries and maritime countries. In addition, this kind of technology-force combined military system has enabled us to keep peace in Korea. Therefore, it would be desirable to maintain this technology-force combined military system until the reunification of the Korean peninsular. Furthermore, it is to be pointed out that blindly following the 'select few' policy of advanced countries is not a good option, because it is ignoring the military strategic situation of the Korean peninsular. If the Republic of Korea pursues the reduction of troops and units radically without consideration of the threat of North Korea and surrounding countries, it could be a significant strategic mistake. In addition, the ROK army should keep an eye on the fact the European advanced countries and Japan that are not facing direct military threats are spending more defense expenditures than Korea. If the ROK army reduces military power without proper alternatives, it would exert a negative effect on the stable economic development of Korea and peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsular. Therefore, the desirable option would be to focus on the development of quality of forces, maintaining proper size and number of troops and units under the technology-force combined military system. The tableau above shows that the advanced countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, and Austria spend more defense expenditure per person than the Republic of Korea, although they do not face actual military threats, and that they keep achieving better economic progress than the countries that spend less defense expenditure. Therefore, it would be necessary to adopt the merits of the defense systems of those advanced countries. As we have examined, it would be desirable to maintain the current size and number of troops and units, to promote 'select few' policy with increased defense expenditure, and to strengthen the technology-force combined military system. On the basis of firm national security, the Republic of Korea can develop efficient policies for reunification and prosperity, and jump into the status of advanced countries. Therefore, the plans to reduce troops and units in [Military Reform Plan 2020] should be reexamined. If it is difficult for the ROK army to maintain its size of 655,000 troops because of low birth rate, the plans to establish the prompt mobilization force or to adopt drafting system should be considered for the maintenance of proper number of troops and units. From now on, the Republic of Korean government should develop plans to keep peace as well as to prepare unexpected changes in the Korean peninsular. For the achievement of these missions, some options can be considered. The first one is to maintain the same size of military troops and units as North Korea. The second one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea in terms of military force index. The third one is to maintain the same level of military power as North Korea, with the combination of the prompt mobilization force and the troops in active service under the system of technology-force combined military system. At present, it would be not possible for the ROK army to maintain such a large-size military force as North Korea (1,190,000 troops and 86 units). So it would be rational to maintain almost the same level of military force as North Korea with the combination of the troops on the active list and the prompt mobilization forces. In other words, with the combination of the troops in active service (60%) and the prompt mobilization force (40%), the ROK army should develop the strategies to harmonize technology and forces. The Korean government should also be prepared for the strategic flexibility of USFK, the possibility of American policy change about the location of foreign army, radical unexpected changes in North Korea, the emergence of potential threat, surrounding countries' demand for Korean force for the maintenance of regional stability, and demand for international cooperation against terrorism. For this, it is necessary to develop new approaches toward the proper number and size of troops and units. For instance, to prepare for radical unexpected political or military changes in North Korea, the Republic of Korea should have plans to protect a large number of refugees, to control arms and people, to maintain social security, and to keep orders in North Korea. From the experiences of other countries, it is estimated that 115,000 to 230,000 troops, plus ten thousands of police are required to stabilize the North Korean society, in the case radical unexpected military or political change happens in North Korea. In addition, if the Republic of Korea should perform the release of hostages, control of mass destruction weapons, and suppress the internal wars in North Korea, it should send 460,000 troops to North Korea. Moreover, if the Republic of Korea wants to stop the attack of North Korea and flow of refugees in DMZ area, at least 600,000 troops would be required. In sum, even if the ROK army maintains 600,000 troops, it may need additional 460,000 troops to prepare for unexpected radical changes in North Korea. For this, it is necessary to establish the prompt mobilization force whose size and number are almost the same as the troops in active service. In case the ROK army keeps 650,000 troops, the proper number of the prompt mobilization force would be 460,000 to 500,000.

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A Study about the Direction and Responsibility of the National Intelligence Agency to the Cyber Security Issues (사이버 안보에 대한 국가정보기구의 책무와 방향성에 대한 고찰)

  • Han, Hee-Won
    • Korean Security Journal
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    • no.39
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    • pp.319-353
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    • 2014
  • Cyber-based technologies are now ubiquitous around the glob and are emerging as an "instrument of power" in societies, and are becoming more available to a country's opponents, who may use it to attack, degrade, and disrupt communications and the flow of information. The globe-spanning range of cyberspace and no national borders will challenge legal systems and complicate a nation's ability to deter threats and respond to contingencies. Through cyberspace, competitive powers will target industry, academia, government, as well as the military in the air, land, maritime, and space domains of our nations. Enemies in cyberspace will include both states and non-states and will range from the unsophisticated amateur to highly trained professional hackers. In much the same way that airpower transformed the battlefield of World War II, cyberspace has fractured the physical barriers that shield a nation from attacks on its commerce and communication. Cyberthreats to the infrastructure and other assets are a growing concern to policymakers. In 2013 Cyberwarfare was, for the first time, considered a larger threat than Al Qaeda or terrorism, by many U.S. intelligence officials. The new United States military strategy makes explicit that a cyberattack is casus belli just as a traditional act of war. The Economist describes cyberspace as "the fifth domain of warfare and writes that China, Russia, Israel and North Korea. Iran are boasting of having the world's second-largest cyber-army. Entities posing a significant threat to the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure assets include cyberterrorists, cyberspies, cyberthieves, cyberwarriors, and cyberhacktivists. These malefactors may access cyber-based technologies in order to deny service, steal or manipulate data, or use a device to launch an attack against itself or another piece of equipment. However because the Internet offers near-total anonymity, it is difficult to discern the identity, the motives, and the location of an intruder. The scope and enormity of the threats are not just focused to private industry but also to the country's heavily networked critical infrastructure. There are many ongoing efforts in government and industry that focus on making computers, the Internet, and related technologies more secure. As the national intelligence institution's effort, cyber counter-intelligence is measures to identify, penetrate, or neutralize foreign operations that use cyber means as the primary tradecraft methodology, as well as foreign intelligence service collection efforts that use traditional methods to gauge cyber capabilities and intentions. However one of the hardest issues in cyber counterintelligence is the problem of "Attribution". Unlike conventional warfare, figuring out who is behind an attack can be very difficult, even though the Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has claimed that the United States has the capability to trace attacks back to their sources and hold the attackers "accountable". Considering all these cyber security problems, this paper examines closely cyber security issues through the lessons from that of U.S experience. For that purpose I review the arising cyber security issues considering changing global security environments in the 21st century and their implications to the reshaping the government system. For that purpose this study mainly deals with and emphasis the cyber security issues as one of the growing national security threats. This article also reviews what our intelligence and security Agencies should do among the transforming cyber space. At any rate, despite of all hot debates about the various legality and human rights issues derived from the cyber space and intelligence service activity, the national security should be secured. Therefore, this paper suggests that one of the most important and immediate step is to understanding the legal ideology of national security and national intelligence.

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