자궁경부암용 팬톰을 이용한 HDR (High dose rate) 근접치료의 선량 평가 (Dose Verification Using Pelvic Phantom in High Dose Rate (HDR) Brachytherapy)
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- 한국의학물리학회지:의학물리
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- 제14권1호
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- pp.15-19
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- 2003
HDR (High dose rate) 근접 치료는 기존의 LDR (Low dose rate) 근접 치료에서 야기되었던 치료 시간이나 선량 최적화 등의 문제점을 해결하였기 때문에 자궁경부암 치료에 많이 사용되고 있다. 그러나, 단시간에 고선량이 조사되는 HDR 근접치료에서 치료 효과를 극대화시키기 위해서는 선량 계산 알고리즘, 위치 계산 알고리즘, 최적화 알고리즘이 정확하게 검증되어야 한다. 이를 위해서는 인체 등가 팬톰과 치료 계획 컴퓨터의 선량 분포 곡선을 비교함으로써 검증할 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 이러한 검증이 가능하도록 자궁경부암용 팬톰을 설계, 제작하여 HDR 치료 계획 컴퓨터와 팬톰과의 선량을 비교, 평가하는 것이다 이 자궁경부암용 팬톰은 높은 해상도를 가진 선량 측정기를 사용하여 정량적인 평가가 가능하도록 제작되었고, 인체 등가물질인 물과 아크릴을 사용하여 제작하였다 또한, 팬톰 내의 방사선량 측정을 위해서
본 연구는 AVHRR(Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer)과 MODIS(MODerate-resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) 위성관측을 바탕으로 산출된 남한지역의 장기간(1981-2006년) 순 일차생산량(Net Primary Production, NPP)의 시공간적 변화를 분석하고 그 변화에 영향을 미치는 기후요소와의 상관성을 분석하였다. 남한지역의 AVHRR과 MODIS에서는 연간순 열차생산량이 AVHRR의 경우 893-1068
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Statute in Article III.A.5 allows it“to establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy”. Safeguards are essentially a technical means of verifying the fulfilment of political obligations undertaken by States and given a legal force in international agreements relating to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The main political objectives are: to assure the international community that States are complying with their non-proliferation and other peaceful undertakings; and to deter (a) the diversion of afeguarded nuclear materials to the production of nuclear explosives or for military purposes and (b) the misuse of safeguarded facilities with the aim of producing unsafeguarded nuclear material. It is clear that no international safeguards system can physically prevent diversion. The IAEA safeguards system is basically a verification measure designed to provide assurance in those cases in which diversion has not occurred. Verification is accomplished by two basic means: material accountancy and containment and surveillance measures. Nuclear material accountancy is the fundamental IAEA safeguards mechanism, while containment and surveillance serve as important complementary measures. Material accountancy refers to a collection of measurements and other determinations which enable the State and the Agency to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of material balance areas, i. e. areas where all material entering or leaving is measurab e. A containment measure is one that is designed by taking advantage of structural characteristics, such as containers, tanks or pipes, etc. To establish the physical integrity of an area or item by preventing the undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment. Such measures involve the application of tamper-indicating or surveillance devices. Surveillance refers to both human and instrumental observation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material. The verification process consists of three over-lapping elements: (a) Provision by the State of information such as - design information describing nuclear installations; - accounting reports listing nuclear material inventories, receipts and shipments; - documents amplifying and clarifying reports, as applicable; - notification of international transfers of nuclear material. (b) Collection by the IAEA of information through inspection activities such as - verification of design information - examination of records and repo ts - measurement of nuclear material - examination of containment and surveillance measures - follow-up activities in case of unusual findings. (c) Evaluation of the information provided by the State and of that collected by inspectors to determine the completeness, accuracy and validity of the information provided by the State and to resolve any anomalies and discrepancies. To design an effective verification system, one must identify possible ways and means by which nuclear material could be diverted from peaceful uses, including means to conceal such diversions. These theoretical ways and means, which have become known as diversion strategies, are used as one of the basic inputs for the development of safeguards procedures, equipment and instrumentation. For analysis of implementation strategy purposes, it is assumed that non-compliance cannot be excluded a priori and that consequently there is a low but non-zero probability that a diversion could be attempted in all safeguards ituations. An important element of diversion strategies is the identification of various possible diversion paths; the amount, type and location of nuclear material involved, the physical route and conversion of the material that may take place, rate of removal and concealment methods, as appropriate. With regard to the physical route and conversion of nuclear material the following main categories may be considered: - unreported removal of nuclear material from an installation or during transit - unreported introduction of nuclear material into an installation - unreported transfer of nuclear material from one material balance area to another - unreported production of nuclear material, e. g. enrichment of uranium or production of plutonium - undeclared uses of the material within the installation. With respect to the amount of nuclear material that might be diverted in a given time (the diversion rate), the continuum between the following two limiting cases is cons dered: - one significant quantity or more in a short time, often known as abrupt diversion; and - one significant quantity or more per year, for example, by accumulation of smaller amounts each time to add up to a significant quantity over a period of one year, often called protracted diversion. Concealment methods may include: - restriction of access of inspectors - falsification of records, reports and other material balance areas - replacement of nuclear material, e. g. use of dummy objects - falsification of measurements or of their evaluation - interference with IAEA installed equipment.As a result of diversion and its concealment or other actions, anomalies will occur. All reasonable diversion routes, scenarios/strategies and concealment methods have to be taken into account in designing safeguards implementation strategies so as to provide sufficient opportunities for the IAEA to observe such anomalies. The safeguards approach for each facility will make a different use of these procedures, equipment and instrumentation according to the various diversion strategies which could be applicable to that facility and according to the detection and inspection goals which are applied. Postulated pathways sets of scenarios comprise those elements of diversion strategies which might be carried out at a facility or across a State's fuel cycle with declared or undeclared activities. All such factors, however, contain a degree of fuzziness that need a human judgment to make the ultimate conclusion that all material is being used for peaceful purposes. Safeguards has been traditionally based on verification of declared material and facilities using material accountancy as a fundamental measure. The strength of material accountancy is based on the fact that it allows to detect any diversion independent of the diversion route taken. Material accountancy detects a diversion after it actually happened and thus is powerless to physically prevent it and can only deter by the risk of early detection any contemplation by State authorities to carry out a diversion. Recently the IAEA has been faced with new challenges. To deal with these, various measures are being reconsidered to strengthen the safeguards system such as enhanced assessment of the completeness of the State's initial declaration of nuclear material and installations under its jurisdiction enhanced monitoring and analysis of open information and analysis of open information that may indicate inconsistencies with the State's safeguards obligations. Precise information vital for such enhanced assessments and analyses is normally not available or, if available, difficult and expensive collection of information would be necessary. Above all, realistic appraisal of truth needs sound human judgment.
목 적 : 변형 근치적 유방절제술(modified radical mastectomy, MRM)후 흉벽에 전자선 치료를 받는 환자에게 3D-bolus와 step-bolus를 각각 적용하여 유용성을 비교 평가하였다. 대상 및 방법 : 본 연구는 광자선과 전자선을 이용한 역하키스틱법 방식으로 치료계획이 수립된 총 6명의 유방암 환자를 대상으로 하였다. 전방흉벽에 대한 전자선 처방선량은 회당 180 cGy로 3D 프린터(CubeX, 3D systems, USA)로 제작된 3D-bolus와 본원에서 자체 제작한 기존의 stepbolus를 적용하였다. 3D-bolus와 step-bolus에 대한 표면선량은 GAFCHROMIC EBT3 film (International specialty products, USA)을 이용하여, bolus의 다섯 측정지점(iso-center, lateral, medial, superior, and inferior)에 대한 선량 값을 통해 비교 분석하였다. 또한 3D-bolus와 step-bolus 적용에 따른 치료계획을 각각 수립하여 그 결과를 비교하였다. 결 과 : 표면선량은 3D-bolus 적용 시 평균 179.17 cGy이고 step-bolus는 172.02 cGy였다. 처방선량 180 cGy에 대한 평균 값의 오차율은 3D-bolus 적용 시 -0.47%이고 step-bolus는 -4.43%였다. 측정지점 iso-center에서의 오차율은 3D-bolus 적용 시 최대 2.69%의 차이를 보였고, step-bolus는 5.54%였다. 치료의 오차범위는 step-bolus에서 약 6%이고, 3D-bolus는 약 3%였다. 치료계획을 통해 비교한 흉벽의 평균 표적선량은 0.3%로 큰 차이를 나타내지 않았다. 그러나 폐와 심장의 평균 표적선량은 step-bolus에 비해 3D-bolus에서 -11%와 -8%로 감소하였다. 결 론 : 본 연구 결과로 볼 때 흉벽에 대한 피부표면의 접촉면이 고려된 3D-bolus는 step-bolus에 비하여 환자 피부에 잘 밀착되고, 정밀한 흉벽두께 보상이 가능하기 때문에 선량 균일성이 향상됨을 확인하였다. 또한 흉벽에 대한 선량은 동일하지만 인접장기의 선량을 감소시켜 정상조직을 더 많이 보호함으로써 3D-bolus가 임상적으로 유용한 보상체로 사용될 것으로 사료된다.
두경부암 환자의 헤드 홀더를 사용하는 경우 모의 치료 시 환자는 테이블 위에 위치하지만, 방사선 치료를 시행하는 경우 헤드 홀더를 치료 테이블에 걸쳐서 사용하기 때문에 체중 및 여러 가지 요소로 인한 기하학적 불일치로 상, 하, 좌, 우 및 처짐의 현상이 발생할 수 있다. 이러한 환자 Set-Up의 재현성의 불일치를 개선하기 위해 두경부암 전용 헤드 홀더를 자체 고안하여 제작 및 개발하여 유용성을 평가하였다. Alderson Rando Phantom을 이용하여 전산화단층촬영장치(High Advantage, GE, U.S.A)를 통해 이미지를 획득하였고, 광자선 4MV 세기변조 방사선치료(IMRT) 방식을 적용하여 최적화된 치료 계획을 실시하였다. 선형가속기(21EX, Varian, U.S.A)를 이용하여 모의 치료와 동일한 상태에서 환자를 set-up한 후 에 치료기에 장착된 CBCT를 이용하여 각각의 무게(0,15,30Kg)의 차이를 통해 교정 전, 후 X, Y, Z축의 오차를 5회 반복 측정한 결과는 다음과 같다. 0Kg에서
본원에서는 비심장 수술환자의 수술 전후 심장사건의 위험도 평가를 위해 심근관류 SPECT를 시행하고 있다. 암환자의 경우 수술 전에 전신 뼈 검사 혹은 전신 PET 검사로 암 전이 여부 확인 후 심근관류 SPECT를 시행하여 불필요한 검사 처방을 막고 있다. 하지만 단기 병동 입원 환자의 경우 재원 일수를 줄이고자 전신 뼈 검사 후 최소 16시간의 간격을 두고
목적 : 환자를 통과한 투과선량으로부터 알고리즘을 이용하여 종양선량을 계산하는 새로운 개념의 온라인 선량측정시 인체 조직내의 폐 등 불균질조직의 존재는 인체내 종양선량 및 투과선량에 영향을 미친다. 인체내에 불균질조직이 존재하는 경우 측정된 투과선량으로부터 종양선량 환산시 밀도를 이용한 보정의 정확도를 확인하기 위하여 실험을 시행하였다. 방법: 폐조직의 밀도와 유사한 재질인 코르크 (밀도
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70
The wall shear stress in the vicinity of end-to end anastomoses under steady flow conditions was measured using a flush-mounted hot-film anemometer(FMHFA) probe. The experimental measurements were in good agreement with numerical results except in flow with low Reynolds numbers. The wall shear stress increased proximal to the anastomosis in flow from the Penrose tubing (simulating an artery) to the PTFE: graft. In flow from the PTFE graft to the Penrose tubing, low wall shear stress was observed distal to the anastomosis. Abnormal distributions of wall shear stress in the vicinity of the anastomosis, resulting from the compliance mismatch between the graft and the host artery, might be an important factor of ANFH formation and the graft failure. The present study suggests a correlation between regions of the low wall shear stress and the development of anastomotic neointimal fibrous hyperplasia(ANPH) in end-to-end anastomoses. 30523 T00401030523 ^x Air pressure decay(APD) rate and ultrafiltration rate(UFR) tests were performed on new and saline rinsed dialyzers as well as those roused in patients several times. C-DAK 4000 (Cordis Dow) and CF IS-11 (Baxter Travenol) reused dialyzers obtained from the dialysis clinic were used in the present study. The new dialyzers exhibited a relatively flat APD, whereas saline rinsed and reused dialyzers showed considerable amount of decay. C-DAH dialyzers had a larger APD(11.70