• Title/Summary/Keyword: 3PAKE

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A Study on Enhanced 3PAKE Scheme against Password Guessing Attack in Smart Home Environment (스마트홈 환경에서 패스워드 추측 공격에 안전한 개선된 3PAKE 기법에 대한 연구)

  • Lee, Dae-Hwi;Lee, Im-Yeong
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.26 no.6
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    • pp.1471-1481
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    • 2016
  • As concern about IoT is increasing recently, various IoT services are being launched. Smart home is closely related to our daily life by combining IoT with user's residential space. Therefore, if an unauthorized user accesses a device inside a Smart home, it can cause more serious damage to user as it is related with daily lives. For instance executing the command allowing unauthenticated access for the internal locking device can be a real harm to user's property like a home invasion. To prevent this problem, this paper introduces 3PAKE Techniques, which provides authenticated Key exchange through Home gateway using Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange(PAKE).

Multi-party Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Scheme with Privacy Preservation for Mobile Environment

  • Lu, Chung-Fu
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • v.9 no.12
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    • pp.5135-5149
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    • 2015
  • Communications among multi-party must be fast, cost effective and secure. Today's computing environments such as internet conference, multi-user games and many more applications involve multi-party. All participants together establish a common session key to enable multi-party and secure exchange of messages. Multi-party password-based authenticated key exchange scheme allows users to communicate securely over an insecure network by using easy-to-remember password. Kwon et al. proposed a practical three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-PAKE) scheme to allow two users to establish a session key through a server without pre-sharing a password between users. However, Kwon et al.'s scheme cannot meet the security requirements of key authentication, key confirmation and anonymity. In this paper, we present a novel, simple and efficient multi-party password-based authenticated key exchange (M-PAKE) scheme based on the elliptic curve cryptography for mobile environment. Our proposed scheme only requires two round-messages. Furthermore, the proposed scheme not only satisfies security requirements for PAKE scheme but also achieves efficient computation and communication.

Security Proof for a Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Establishment Protocol

  • Shin, Seong-Han;Kazukuni Kobara;Hideki Imai
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.14 no.4
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    • pp.75-90
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    • 2004
  • At Asiacrypt 2003, Shin et al., have proposed a new class for Authenticated Key Establishment (AKE) protocol named Leakage-Resilient AKE ${(LR-AKE)}^{[1]}$. The authenticity of LR-AKE is based on a user's password and his/her stored secrets in both client side and server side. In their LR-AKE protocol, no TRM(Tamper Resistant Modules) is required and leakage of the stored secrets from $.$my side does not reveal my critical information on the password. This property is useful when the following situation is considered :(1) Stored secrets may leak out ;(2) A user communicates with a lot of servers ;(3) A user remembers only one password. The other AKE protocols, such as SSL/TLS and SSH (based or PKI), Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) and Threshold-PAKE (T-PAKE), do not satisfy that property under the above-mentioned situation since their stored secrets (or, verification data on password) in either the client or the servers contain enough information to succeed in retrieving the relatively short password with off-line exhaustive search. As of now, the LR-AKE protocol is the currently horn solution. In this paper, we prove its security of the LR-AKE protocol in the standard model. Our security analysis shows that the LR-AKE Protocol is provably secure under the assumptions that DDH (Decisional Diffie-Hellman) problem is hard and MACs are selectively unforgeable against partially chosen message attacks (which is a weaker notion than being existentially unforgeable against chosen message attacks).