• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.59-89
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• 2009

The objectives of the 1963 Tokyo Convention cover a variety of subjects, with the intention of providing safety in aircraft, protection of life and property on board, and promoting the security of civil aviation. These objectives will be treated as follows: first, the unification of rules on jurisdiction; second, the question of filling the gap in jurisdiction; third, the scheme of maintaining law and order on board aircraft; fourth, the protection of persons acting in accordance with the Convention; fifth, the protection of the interests of disembarked persons; sixth, the question of hijacking of aircraft; and finally some general remarks on the objectives of the Convention. The Tokyo Convention mainly deals with general crimes such as murder, violence, robbery on board aircraft rather than aviation terrorism. The Article 11 of the Convention deals with hijacking in a simple way. As far as aviation terrorism is concerned 1970 Hague Convention and 1971 Montreal Convention cover the hijacking and sabotage respectively. The Problem of national jurisdiction over the offence and the offender was as tangled at the Hague and Montreal Convention, as under the Tokyo Convention. Under the Tokyo Convention the prime base of jurisdiction is the law of the flag (Article 3), but concurrent jurisdiction is also allowed on grounds of: territorial principle, active nationality and passive personality principle, security of the state, breach of flight rules, and exercise of jurisdiction necessary for the performance of obligations under multilateral agreements (Article 4). No Criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law is excluded [Article 3(2)]. However, Article 4 of the Hague Convention(hereafter Hague Article 4) and Article 5 of the Montreal Convention(hereafter Montreal Article 5), dealing with jurisdiction have moved a step further, inasmuch as the opening part of both paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Hague Article 4 and the Montreal Article 5 impose an obligation on all contracting states to take measures to establish jurisdiction over the offence (i.e., to ensure that their law is such that their courts will have jurisdiction to try offender in all the circumstances covered by Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5). The state of registration and the state where the aircraft lands with the hijacker still on board will have the most interest, and would be in the best position to prosecute him; the paragraphs 1(a) and (b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraphs 1(b) and (c) of the Montreal Article 5 deal with it, respectively. However, paragraph 1(b) of the Hague Article 4 and paragraph 1(c) of the Montreal Article 5 do not specify if the aircraft is still under the control of the hijacker or if the hijacker has been overpowered by the aircraft commander, or if the offence has at all occurred in the airspace of the state of landing. The language of the paragraph would probably cover all these cases. The weaknesses of Hague Article 4 and Montreal Article 5 are however, patent. The Jurisdictions of the state of registration, the state of landing, the state of the lessee and the state where the offender is present, are concurrent. No priorities have been fixed despite a proposal to this effect in the Legal Committee and the Diplomatic Conference, and despite the fact that it was pointed out that the difficulty in accepting the Tokyo Convention has been the question of multiple jurisdiction, for the reason that it would be too difficult to determine the priorities. Disputes over the exercise of jurisdiction can be endemic, more so when Article 8(4) of the Hague Convention and the Montreal Convention give every state mentioned in Hague Article 4(1) and Montreal Article 5(1) the right to seek extradition of the offender. A solution to the problem should not have been given up only because it was difficult. Hague Article 4(3) and Montreal Article 5(3) provide that they do not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law. Thus the provisions of the two Conventions create additional obligations on the state, and do not exclude those already existing under national laws. Although the two Conventions do not require a state to establish jurisdiction over, for example, hijacking or sabotage committed by its own nationals in a foreign aircraft anywhere in the world, they do not preclude any contracting state from doing so. However, it has be noted that any jurisdiction established merely under the national law would not make the offence an extraditable one under Article 8 of the Hague and Montreal Convention. As far as international aviation terrorism is concerned 1988 Montreal Protocol and 1991 Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detention are added. The former deals with airport terrorism and the latter plastic explosives. Compared to the other International Terrorism Conventions, the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions do not have clauses of the passive personality principle. If the International Aviation Terrorism Conventions need to be revised in the future, those clauses containing the passive personality principle have to be inserted for the suppression of the international aviation terrorism more effectively. Article 3 of the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Article 5 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages and Article 6 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation would be models that the revised International Aviation Terrorism Conventions could follow in the future.

• The Korean Journal of Nuclear Medicine
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.445-455
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• 2005

Purpose: We developed an animal SPECT system using clinical Philips ARGUS scintillation camera and pinhole collimator with specially manufactured small apertures. In this study, we evaluated the physical characteristics of this system and biological feasibility for animal experiments. Materials and Methods: Rotating station for small animals using a step motor and operating software were developed. Pinhole inserts with small apertures (diameter of 0.5, 1.0, and 2.0 mm) were manufactured and physical parameters including planar spatial resolution and sensitivity and reconstructed resolution were measured for some apertures. In order to measure the size of the usable field of view according to the distance from the focal point, manufactured multiple line sources separated with the same distance were scanned and numbers of lines within the field of view were counted. Using a Tc-99m line source with 0.5 mm diameter and 12 mm length placed in the exact center of field of view, planar spatial resolution according to the distance was measured. Calibration factor to obtain FWHM values in 'mm' unit was calculated from the planar image of two separated line sources. Te-99m point source with i mm diameter was used for the measurement of system sensitivity. In addition, SPECT data of micro phantom with cold and hot line inserts and rat brain after intravenous injection of [I-123]FP-CIT were acquired and reconstructed using filtered back protection reconstruction algorithm for pinhole collimator. Results: Size of usable field of view was proportional to the distance from the focal point and their relationship could be fitted into a linear equation (y=1.4x+0.5, x: distance). System sensitivity and planar spatial resolution at 3 cm measured using 1.0 mm aperture was 71 cps/MBq and 1.24 mm, respectively. In the SPECT image of rat brain with [I-123]FP-CIT acquired using 1.0 mm aperture, the distribution of dopamine transporter in the striatum was well identified in each hemisphere. Conclusion: We verified that this new animal SPECT system with the Phlilps ARGUS scanner and small apertures had sufficient performance for small animal imaging.

• Korean Journal of Ecology and Environment
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• v.57 no.2
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• pp.102-110
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• 2024

This study presents a fine scale distribution of the endangered species, Odontobutis obscura, through field surveys and literature reviews. Using the mark-recapture method, the population size in major habitats was determined. Field surveys conducted on 18 streams in Geoje Island revealed that the O. obscura was only found in the main streams and tributaries of the Sanyang, Gucheon, and Buchun Streams, which are part of the Sanyang Stream watershed. The O. obscura exhibited relative abundances ranging from 0.5% to 35.3% at different locations, with certain spots showing higher relative abundances (18.8% to 35.3%), indicating major habitat areas. A review of six literature studies confirmed the presence of the O. obscura, although there were differences in occurrence status depending on the purpose, scope, and duration of the studies. Combining the results of field and literature surveys, it was found that the O. obscura inhabits the main and tributary streams of the Sanyang, Gucheon, and Buchun Streams, from the upper to lower reaches. Currently, the O. obscura population in the Sanyang Stream watershed maintains a stable habitat, but its limited distribution range suggests potential issues such as genetic diversity deficiency in the long term. The population size of the O. obscura was confirmed at two specific locations, with densities of 0.5 to 1.5 individuals per m². The average movement distance from the release point was 13.1 m, indicating the limited mobility characteristic of ambush predators. Understanding the distribution and population size of endangered species is the first step towards their conservation and protection. Based on this information, further research could significantly contribute to the conservation of the O. obscura.

• The Korean Journal of Nuclear Medicine
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• v.39 no.6
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• pp.464-472
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• 2005

Purpose: SPECT using a fan-beam collimator improves spatial resolution and sensitivity. For the reconstruction from fan-beam projections, it is necessary to implement direct fan-beam reconstruction methods without transforming the data into the parallel geometry. In this study, various fan-beam reconstruction algorithms were implemented and their performances were compared. Materials and Methods: The projector for fan-beam SPECT was implemented using a ray-tracing method. The direct reconstruction algorithms implemented for fan-beam projection data were FBP (filtered backprojection), EM (expectation maximization), OS-EM (ordered subsets EM) and MAP-EM OSL (maximum a posteriori EM using the one-step late method) with membrane and thin-plate models as priors. For comparison, the fan-beam protection data were also rebinned into the parallel data using various interpolation methods, such as the nearest neighbor, bilinear and bicubic interpolations, and reconstructed using the conventional EM algorithm for parallel data. Noiseless and noisy projection data from the digital Hoffman brain and Shepp/Logan phantoms were reconstructed using the above algorithms. The reconstructed images were compared in terms of a percent error metric. Results: for the fan-beam data with Poisson noise, the MAP-EM OSL algorithm with the thin-plate prior showed the best result in both percent error and stability. Bilinear interpolation was the most effective method for rebinning from the fan-beam to parallel geometry when the accuracy and computation load were considered. Direct fan-beam EM reconstructions were more accurate than the standard EM reconstructions obtained from rebinned parallel data. Conclusion: Direct fan-beam reconstruction algorithms were implemented, which provided significantly improved reconstructions.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.1
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• pp.351-370
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• 1997

This study concerns possible measures to prevent separatists' terrorist acts against overseas Korean businessmen. Of late, many Korean enterprises are helping a number of foreign countries develop their economy, by building factories and manning regional offices in those countries. But recent development of terrorism especially against Korean businessmen is alarming. This report discusses the need for Korean enterprises heading overseas to prepare themselves with awareness of terrorism and possible protective measures against it, besides their routine pursuance of profits; and for the government and prospective enterprises to refrain from investing in those countries having active separatist movements. If an investment has become inevitable, a careful survey of the region in conflict should be conducted and self-protective measures should be put in place through security information exchange, emergency coordination and training of personnel, etc. This study will first review the past terrorist incidents involving employees of overseas Korean enterprises, and then will focuss on seeking effective measures on the basis of the reported incidents. In carrying out the study, related literature from both home and abroad have been used along with the preliminary materials reported and known on the Internet from recent incidents. 1. The separatist movements of minority groups Lately, minority separatist groups are increasingly resorting to terrorism to draw international attention with the political aim of gaining extended self rule or independence. 2. The state of terrorism against overseas Korean enterprises and Koreans Korean enterprises are now operating businesses, and having their own personnel stationed, in 85 countries including those in South East Asia and Middle East regions. In Sri Lanka, where a Korean enterprise recently became a target of terrorist bombing, there are 75 business firms from Korea and some 700 Korean employees are stationed as of August 1996. A total of 19 different terrorist incidents have taken place against Koreans abroad since 1990. 3. Terrorism preventive measures Terrorism preventive measures are discussed in two ways: measures by the government and by the enterprises. ${\blacktriangleleft}$ Measures by the government - Possible measures at governmental level can include collection and dissemination of terrorist activity information. Emphasis should be given to the information on North Korean activities in particular. ${\blacktriangleleft}$ Measures by individual enterprises - Organizational security plan must be established by individual enterprises and there should also be an increase of security budget. A reason for reluctant effort toward positive security plan is the perception that the security budget is not immediately linked to an increment of profit gain. Ensuring safety for overseas personnel is a fundamental obligation of an enterprise. Consultation and information exchange on security plan, and an emergency support system at a threat to security must be sought after and implemented. 4. Conclusion Today's terrorism varies widely depending on reasons and causes, and its means has become increasingly informationalized and scientific as well while its method is becoming more clandestine and violent. Terrorist organizations are increasingly aiming at enterprises for acquisition of budgets needed for their activities. Korean enterprises have extended their business realm to foreign countries since 1970, exposing themselves to terrorism. Enterprises and their employees, therefore, should establish their own security measures on the one hand while the government must provide general measures, on the other, for the protection of the life and property of Korean residents abroad from terrorist attacks. In this regard, set-up of a counter terrorist organization that coordinates the efforts of government authorities in various levels in planning and executing counter terrorist measures is desired. Since 1965, when the hostile North Korea began to step up its terrorist activities against South Koreans, there have been 7 different occasions of assassination attempt on South Korean presidents and some 500 cases of various kidnappings and attempted kidnappings. North Korea, nervous over the continued economic growth and social stabilization of South Korea, is now concentrating its efforts in the destruction and deterioration of the national power of South Korea for its earlier realization of reunification by force. The possibility of North Korean terrorism can be divided into external terrorist acts and internal terrorist acts depending on the nationality of the terrorists it uses. The external terrorist acts include those committed directly by North Korean agents in South Korea and abroad and those committed by dissident Koreans, hired Korean residents, or international professionals or independent international terrorists bought or instigated by North Korea. To protect the life and property of Korean enterprises and their employees abroad from the threat of terrorism, the government's administrative support and the organizational efforts of enterprises should necessarily be directed toward the planning of proper security measures and training of employees. Also, proper actions should be taken against possible terrorist acts toward Korean business employees abroad as long as there are ongoing hostilities from minority groups against their governments.

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.