• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.35
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• pp.73-108
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• 2012

Researches about the Horaknonjaeng(湖洛論爭) have succeeded by focusing on the Osangnonbyeon(五常論辨)?Mibalnonbyeon(未發論辨). In a way of these researches, philosophic thought of Gwon Sangha(權尙夏) is dealt in a comparison and in that process his philosophic thought seems to be known. However, these researches are treating several thoughts so it is difficult to find accurately what point describes the position of his thought in the korean confucian thought as origin of Hohak(湖學). In this paper, therefore, I examine Gwon Sangha's theory of mind-nature by focusing on the understanding the concept of mind-nature in Hansujaejib(寒水齋集) and find its position in history of thought as an origin of forming Hohak. Before 1709, Horaknonjaeng don't break out, Gwan Sangha had been formed that Inmulseongsangi(人物性相異) of Osangpyeonjeon(五常偏全) based on the understanding of the fact that ensuring of Bonyeonjiseong(本然之性 性善) in Gijiljiseong(氣質之性) and under this influence scholars of Hohak formed thoughts and insisted Osangpyeonjeon(五常偏全 人物性相異) during Horaknonjaeng. In the point of Simseongilmul(心性一物) focusing on nature, he didn't admit the Jujaeseong(主宰性) of mind. This is the efforts of finishing the controversy of Simseongigi(心性二岐) and the efforts of finding the relation between Simseon(心善). Such thoughts are set before the Horaknonjaeng and basing on these influences, scholars of Hohak formed their thoughts and insisted the Gibulyongsa(氣不用事 未發氣質有善惡).

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.35
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• pp.7-42
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• 2012

The Ho-Rak controversy is an internal dispute in the Kiho School. Both Ho and Rak adopt the theories of Yulgok(栗谷) as their common standard of right arguments. The controversy continues almost two hundred years after the dispute between LEE Gan(李柬) and HAN Wonjin(韓元震). However, it does not develop rich theoretical resources. The fundamental issue of Ho-Rak controversy is how to define the relation of mind(心) and temper(氣質). Ho School regard temper as material of the mind, and so they insist that mind and temper are ultimately the same. But Rak School regard temper as desire of the body, and so they insist that mind and temper are the another one. The viewpoint of Rak School does not correspond to the view of the traditional Neo-confucianism. So we should understand that mind and temper are ultimately the same. However if we define that mind and temper are the same, and they act at the same time, then we can not insure the foundation of pure goodness in human mind. LEE Chulyoung(李喆榮) defines that mind and temper are ultimately the same, but they act alternately. It is the exact definition about the relation of mind and temper.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.54
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• pp.77-113
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• 2017

In late Chosen(朝鮮), the concept of illustrious virtue(明德) became an important issue of debate. However, previous studies did not focus on how the concept emerged as an issue. This paper aimed to explore the problem, and for this purpose, paid attention to Horak(湖洛) debate. Oiam(巍巖) Yi Gan(李柬), in the course of discussion with Namdang(南塘), finally argued that mind(心) clearly distinguishes from temperament(氣質). The goals of the claim were to clearly divide mind and temperament, and to emphasize mind's control of temperament. Through this, he wanted to reject the possibility of being affected by temperament in aroused state(未發). And he presented the concept of illustrious virtue as a critical evidence supporting his argument. He argued that because mind is same with illustrious virtue, it has a special status that essentially distinguished from the temperament, even if both mind and temperament are all material force(氣). This argument led to new discussion trend in the debate. it was to form a definition of the mind, based on defining the relationship between spiritual perception(虛靈知覺), temperament and illustrious virtue. The trend was reflected in the debate on 'Whether illustrious virtue is the same for everyone or varies from person to person(明德分殊)'. Through the process of analysis in this paper, we could detect a tendency that definition of mind has become an independent subject.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.36
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• pp.43-74
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• 2013

This paper aims to analyse Han Wonjin's criticism centered on Kim Changhyup's theory of Jigak(知覺). In the early 18th century, Kim Changhyup whose position considered as the leader of Rakhak(洛學) circle was the central figure in the debate on the controversial subject of Jigak. Han Wonjin as an opinion leader of Hohak(湖學)'s legacy was required to argue with his counterpart in order to establish his circle's standpoint. The main issue they discussed was the relationship between Ji(智) and Jigak. Kim contends that Ji and Jigak belong to different categories, and that the substance-function(體用) relation cannot be applied to them. According to him, the relation between Ji and Jigak is that of Do(道) and Gi(器). Similarly, the relation between Sim(心) and Sung(性) is that of subject and object. He also maintains that Jigak is not the phenomenalized mode of Ji, but the innate capability that employs Sung as the source of morality and turns it into feelings. In contrast, Han argues that Ji, as a ontological foundation of Jigak, is what enables Jigak to be a moral activity. In criticizing Kim Changhyup, Han maintains that if one denies the relation between Ji and Jigak, then one would have to characterize Jigak as a blind function with no moral sense. If one admits Jigak can have moral contents on its own without the connection with Ji, then one would have to allow two moral foundation, which leads one's idea into heretical beliefs. Han holds that Jigak can a moral function only when it is grounded upon Ji. In conclusion, Han emphasizes Ji as the base of Jigak that enables Jigak to realize morality while Kim emphasizes the role of Jigak as the principal agent of moral activity.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.59
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• pp.9-38
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• 2018

Joseon Neo-Confucianism had important disputes throughout its hundred years of history. Starting in mid-16th century, Four-Seven Dispute focused on 'Qing (情, emotion)' while Horak Dispute that emerged in early 18th century put emphasis on whether people and things have the same 'Xing (性, nature).' These two disputes lasted until late Joseon. In that process, their issues were clearly recognized and consequently, characteristics of Joseon Neo-Confucianism were well demonstrated. With Western power surging in since mid-18th century, Joseon Neo-Confucianism should develop logic to cope with the Western power. One of responding logics was Zhulilun (主理論, theory of reason) in Neo-Confucianism. Diverse discussions particularly on 'Xin (心, mind)' were expansively made. From the notion of Xin Tong Xing Qing (心統性情) that Xin converges with Xing and Qing, an argument that Xin should be seen as 'Li (理, reason)' and another that Xin is basically 'Qi (氣, force of nature)' were up against each other. The academia heated up with issues raised such as whether Xin and Mingde (明德, bright virtue) are the same notion and whether Mingde should be seen as 'Li' or 'Qi', etc. Defining morality dispute in the late Joseon along with Four-Seven Dispute and Horak Dispute as 'three major disputes in Joseon Neo-Confucianism,' this paper focuses on clarifying their status, actuality and significance. Morality dispute was not only a theoretical dispute. It has significance in the aspect of 'topicality.' It directly and indirectly affected movements against Western and Japanese power, loyal troop's activities and independence movement as well. Compared to Four-Seven Dispute and Horak Dispute, morality dispute is more complex and expansive. In addition, it requires systematic organization of data. Intercomparison of three major disputes is one of key topics to determine characteristics of Joseon Neo-Confucianism.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.48
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• pp.225-252
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• 2012

In this paper, the writer examined the procedural changes of Zhuzi(朱子)'s theory of ZhongHe(中和), and also investigated the evaluations thereof made by the later generations. In the stage of ZhongHeJiuShuo(中和舊說), Zhuzi(朱子) ignored the theory of Lidong(李?), which was traditional theory argued by DaoNam School(道南學派). He met Zhangshi(張?) of HuXiang School(湖湘學派) and followed the school's philosophy, 'XianChaShiHouHanYang(先察識後涵養)', meaning what you should do first prior to making great efforts in self-cultivation is to examine the past, when desiring to know yourself. Even though Zhuzi(朱子) had learned the method of moral cultivation from Lidong(李?), he was fascinated by such method of moral cultivation as 'XianChaShiHouHanYang(先察識後涵養)' advocated by HuXiang School(湖湘學派) through discussion with Zhangshi(張?). This tells that he only recognized the fact that there were no achievements WeiFa(未發), but only the achievements YiFa(已發). In the stage of ZhongHeXinShuo(中和新說), he realized the mistakes committed in the time of ZhongHeJiuShuo(中和舊說), and put emphasis upon the achievements in the time WeiFa(未發). Zhuzi(朱子) had explained the relationships among mind, nature, and emotional bond as by his theory, 'XinTongXingQing(心統性情)', meaning that mind controls humans' original nature. Also he followed self-cultivation of Respect, no longer believing the Huhong(胡宏)'s XianChaShiHouHanYang(先察識後涵養). Such a method of self-cultivation means that his method of moral cultivation centered on the achievements YiFa(已發), which was originated from HuXiang School(湖湘學派), had been changed into the method of moral cultivation with a focus on the achievements WeiFa(未發), which was theory argued by DaoNam School(道南學派). However, Zhuzi(朱子)'s theory of ZhongHe(中和) that had seemed perfect began to be discussed and polished again during Joseon Period through the debates between Ligu(栗谷) and Niuxi(牛溪) in the 16th century, and through the debates between Youan(尤庵) and Yuxuan(寓軒) in the 17th century, also through the HuLuoLunZheng(湖洛論爭) represented by Nantang(南塘) and Weiyan(巍巖). Since Zhuzi(朱子)'s theory of ZhongHe(中和) had some flaws, it had to put through such debates as mentioned above. Those debates were generated because imperfections were found in the theory of ZhongHe(中和) by Zhuzi(朱子).