• Journal of Life Science
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.2-10
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• 1994

과학과 형이상학은 포퍼에게서는 분명히 구별된다. 그럼에도 불구하고 전형적인 형이상학적 이론인 실재론, 비결정론, 출현이론은 과학 활동의 전제 조건으로 수용된다 하지만 폴라니에게서는 과학과 형이상학이 서로 다른 차원으로 분리되지 않는다. 형이상학적 믿음은 과학 자체의 구조를 이루고 있다. 과학은 형이상학적 개념이라 할 수 있는 진리, 선, 미, 정의 등의 본질적 가치에 따라 현실의 드러냄을 목적으로 삼는 인간의 통합적 행위이다. 다라서 폴라니에게 형이상학은 두 가지의 차원을 갖는다. 한편으로 형이상학에는 주관적인 차원이 있다. 도덕적 태도, 지적 열정, 이론의 미적 차원에 대한 감각, 종교적 관점 등 주체로서의 인간의 자기 이해와 관련된 차원이 있다. 진리에 대한 열정과 현실의 의미 추구를 자신의 과학적 활동의 본질적 부분으로 볼 수 있는 과학자는 바로 그 자체는 하나의 훌륭한 형이상학자가 되는 것이다.

• Journal for History of Mathematics
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.67-74
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• 2005

The purpose of this paper is to analysis with contents on thoughts and problems of philosophy of mathematics concerning around harmonical types of metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics. Moreover, we were gratefully acknowledged that the questions at issue of metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics are possible only in a philosophical position of mathematics in relation to nature of mathematical ion. These attitudes, important as they are in the study of an individual thinker, also have a pronounced effect on the future relation of mathematics to philosophy. And we can guess that many mathematician's research will have significant meaning in the future.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.144
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• pp.285-318
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• 2017

The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the basic conception and attitude of Aristotelian philosophy by observing the transmission of his writings. The attempt to understand Aristotelian philosophy as a consistent, uniform, and unique system seems to be a natural expectation in the face of the scientific position of this philosophy. But if one looks at the history of the transmission and the edition of his works, this expectation does not correctly understand the Aristotelian philosophy, but misunderstands it. From this problem-consciousness I examine the structural features of Aristotelian philosophy by drawing attention to the work of Andronicus of Rhodes, who was the first editor of the Corpus Aristotelicum around the 1st century BC. This study is related to the historical understanding of the transmission of the Aristotelian writings, and to the classical-philological view of the transmission of writings, and also to the broad and profound understanding of the whole philosophy of Aristotle. Finally, I conclude that it is best to understand the Aristotelian philosophy in the pluralistic perspective as Aristotle himself did.

• 기호학연구
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• no.56
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• pp.45-70
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• 2018

Criticism of the postmodern philosophy of the system of representation, which has continued since the Renaissance, is based on a critique of the dichotomy that separates the subjects and objects and the environment from the human being. Interactivity, highlighted in a series of works emerging as postmodern trends in the 1960s, was transmitted to an interactive aspect of digital art in the late 1990s. The key feature of digital art is the possibility of infinite variations reflecting unpredictable changes based on public participation on the spot. In this process, the importance of computer programs is highlighted. Instead of using the existing program as it is, more and more artists are creating and programming their own algorithms or creating unique algorithms through collaborations with programmers. We live in an era of paradigm shift in which programming itself must be considered as a creative act. Simulation technology and VR technology draw attention as a technique to represent the meaning of reality. Simulation technology helps artists create experimental works. In fact, Baudrillard's concept of Simulation defines the other reality that has nothing to do with our reality, rather than a reality that is extremely representative of our reality. His book Simulacra and Simulation refers to the existence of a reality entirely different from the traditional concept of reality. His argument does not concern the problems of right and wrong. There is no metaphysical meaning. Applying the concept of simulation to algorithmic art, the artist models the complex attributes of reality in the digital system. And it aims to build and integrate internal laws that structure and activate the world (specific or individual), that is to say, simulate the world. If the images of the traditional order correspond to the reproduction of the real world, the synthesized images of algorithmic art and simulated space-time are the forms of art that facilitate the experience. The moment of seeing and listening to the work of Ian Cheng presented in this article is a moment of personal experience and the perception is made at that time. It is not a complete and closed process, but a continuous and changing process. It is this active and situational awareness that is required to the audience for the comprehension of post-representation's forms.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.50
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• pp.89-120
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• 2013

The concept of virtue seems to be one of the rare cases where the European and the Chinese traditions coincide. The meaning of the Latin word virtus and of Greek $aret{\acute{e}}$ seems to be similar to the Chinese $d{\acute{e}}$德. Most striking in virtue is that it is a capacity for self-realisation through action which is unique to man. On the other hand, there is something physical about it. It is the strength to do something. This strength overcomes the resistance of what is naturally given, it transforms the world, turns the natural world into a human one. In the Chinese tradition, $d{\acute{e}}$ 德, i.e. virtue, is therefore always connected with $da{\grave{o}}$ 道, the totality of natural forces. In the Chinese tradition, as opposed to the European one, virtue is itself considered to be a natural force that is present in man. This force sustains man's connectedness, unity and harmony with the surrounding world. Things exist through the unity of principle理 and ether氣. But the knowledge of this unity is due to principle. Moral and legal norms are shifted totally to the sphere of principle. Therefore their have found the final dissolution from a heroic models. Above all the classical Confucians, but also the other schools, would reply to this that there is nothing more precise than a concrete successful action. Its result fits the world perfectly. The difference is due to the differing interest of ethical thought. In the case of the Confucians the path is more direct. The actor establishes a precise pattern for other actions. Education therefore lies in detailed knowledge about forms of behaviour, not so much in conceptual differentiation. It is quite possible that generalisation may be a methodical prerequisite for success in this endeavour. That problem, too, is discussed. But the success of conceptualisation lies in the successful performance of individual actions, not in shaping actions in accordance with normative concepts.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.56
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• pp.147-170
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• 2014

To divide by the concept of Cheon (天) before and after the period of Song Dynasty: before Song Dynasty; according to the ancient Book of Odes (Sigyeong-詩經), "Cheon (天) gives birth to a large number of people", and, Confucius(孔子) say "Cheon(天) gave me Virtue(德)." Mencius(孟子) say "The person done with all his heart knows Seong(性, personality), so if he knows such Seong(性, personality), then he knows Cheon(天)." In Doctrine of the Mean(中庸), it says "Cheon(天) ordered it to be called - Seong(性, personality)." So, Cheon(天) had a religious meaning, such as Sangje(上帝) - Supreme Ruler. During the Song period, Cheon(天), the source of its existence, had construed as Mugeuk i Taegeuk Non(無極而太極論 - Theory of Supreme Ultimate while being Indeterminate) and Theory of li and ki (iginon-理氣論). Juja (朱子, a honorary name of Juhui, 朱熹) had said a reasonable Cheon(天), that is, Heavenly Principle (天理 - Cheolli) by interpreting Cheon(天) as Taegeuk(太極 - Supreme Polarity) and li(理) of Muwi(無爲 - uncontrived action). That's why Juja had lost the religiosity because of his reasonable frame. The purpose of this dissertation is to identify of the quality of being religious of li(理) on the basis of attribute of Cheon(天) argued by Toegye and Juja. In the text of Seomyeong(西銘 - Western Inscription), we can see their interpretation of the content that Toegye as "西銘考證講義"(Lecture on Historical Research of Western Inscription), and Juja as "西銘解"(Commentary on the Western Inscription). Seomyeong(西銘 - Western Inscription) was expounded as a logic of 'iil bunsu' (理一分殊 - coherence is one and distinguished into many). '理一分殊' means to live in as meaningful as possible according to the human nature that has been bestowed upon thyself. Juja and Toegye both said that in the aspect of 'iil'(理一 - coherence is one), Reverence(事天) ought to be done, but to look into the aspect of 'bunsu'(分殊-distinguished into many), Juja argued that people should follow the order of Heavenly Principle(天理 - Cheolli), and Toegye argued that people should have to perform the filial piety(孝). There are differences in methods of Toegye and Juja on account of distinction between attributes of Cheon(天). Such a distinction affects the attribute of li(理). Juja said divisively that Soiyeon(所以然-why its principle is so) is li(理), and Sodangyeon(所當然-what should be so) is Sa(事-divine project). Toegye argued that Sodangyeon(所當然-what should be so) is indeed li(理). It is the position of Toegye that to know Seong(性-the personality) of Sodangyeon(所當然-what should be so) is the first, rather than to know Cheon(天) of Soiyeon(所以然-why its principle is so) that is out of reach in a faraway place. Seong(性-the personality) is li(理) that bestowed by Cheon(天). In view of discussion about the essence and existence, for Toegye, the existence is the first, rather than the essence. The issues of existence is now enabled to talk about amid the discussion of metaphysics, namely li(理). Different from Juja, a theory noticed in Toegye is the theory of 'Lijado'(理自到). 'Lijado'(理自到) denotes 'Li(理) leads on their own.' It tells that separate from thing-in-itself, there is an energy that moves and oversees the thing. This is an issue of response between "I" as the principal agent and other people. If "I" as the principal agent is sincere to others, the others will come to me insomuch as they will be revealed through me. Here, a problem between the host and guest arises. Toegye perceived this problem that do not see me and others as same, and also do not see me and others as two. This is the logic of 'ilii iiil'(一而二 二而一 - looks like one but two, looks like two but one) of '理一分殊' (coherence is one and distinguished into many). The first thing to do between these two processes is to recognize the existence of 'iil'(理一). Toegye strongly displays a religious attitude identifying Cheon(天)=Li (理)=Sangje(上帝- Supreme Ruler) in the same light.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.1-25
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• 2017

Kant's doctrine of virtue shows how an actor should behave morally in an individual situation with moral law defines the limits of human action. There is latitude for action in the course of formulating the maxims of action by an actor. And moral judgement, as Aristotle's Pronesis, is very important in the latitude for action. In the doctrine of virtue, Kant suggests two kinds of duty of virtue: one's own perfeciton as an obligatory end, and the happiness to others as an obligatory end-and raises the question of casuistics for each. However, this was the practice and training for the human moral life by application of the moral law. In particular, Kant saw that ethics does not give laws for action, but only give laws for the maxims of action, and further intended to realize the practice in a proper way of seeking truth through casuistical questions. Thus, Kant points out that the casuistic is related only to ethics in a fragmentary way and is added to ethics only as a comment on the system. According to Kant, virtue and judgment are inevitable to apply categorical imperative in the empirical and realistic world. In other words, virtue and judgment are necessary to enable people who are likely to act in accordance to inclination to live a moral life in accordance with the command of reason. Thus Kant saw that in order to take wide duty into narrow ones, human beings must not only have to cultivate virtues as a strong power of will, but also to exercise judgment. In addition, the distinction between duty of law(narrow obligation) and duty of virtue(wide obligation) is dependent on whether there is a latitude for action in the application of both duties. So the role of virtue and training of judgement is very important in the latitude for action that occurs in the process of formalizing actor's maxims. In detail, as the duty is wider, so man's obligation to action is more imperfect, but the closer to narrow duty(Law) he brings the maxim of observing this duty(in his attitude of will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. Thus, it was an effort to show how Kant's best moral principles, that is categorical imperative could be applied to the real world at the time of criticism. Of course, even if it is difficult to assess Kant's efforts as successful, criticizing Kant's ethics as 'formal', 'abstract', or 'monologous' is not persuasive because of critics did not understand his ethics as a whole.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.114
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• pp.177-212
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• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.