• 한국ITS학회:학술대회논문집
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• 2004.11a
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• pp.338-342
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• 2004

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.4 no.1 s.6
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• pp.81-88
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• 2005

Cooperation among network users would be possible in a near future, as real time communication between them can be available by telematics. This implies that non-cooperative assumption like Wardrop's principle, which has been widely used so far in network modelling may not be appropriate for route choice problem. So a new principle requires for describing such cooperative case. This paper presents a criterion, which represents cooperative route choice behaviour among network users. With some examples, we compare the non-cooperative principle and the cooperative one presented in this paper. Numerical results from the examples show that the new principle would be better than the existing one.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.28 no.5
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• pp.117-129
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• 2010

This study presents a sensitivity analysis method for stochastic user equilibrium of multi-modal network flows. We consider a multi-modal network consisting of a road network for passenger cars physically separated from a transit network for public transport. We first establish a sensitivity analysis method with respect to arbitrary link parameters and perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to link capacity and transit line frequency as practical link parameters. Next, We establish a sensitivity analysis method and perform the sensitivity analysis with respect to modal split by passenger car and public transit. As with the elasticity of economics, these results can be important information for analyzing changes in travel behavior due to the changes in operation and policy of transportation facilities, as well as for analyzing the effects of these operational changes and policies. These results also can be utilized as a tool to constitute a multi-modal network design problem by using cooperative game theory.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.23 no.4 s.82
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• pp.37-45
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• 2005

This paper presents a relationship between Nash bargaining game and Wardrop user equilibrium, which has been widely used in transportation modeling for route choice problem. Wardrop user equilibrium assumes that drivers in road network have perfect information on the traffic conditions and they choose their optimal paths without cooperation each other. In this regards, if the bargaining game process is introduced in route choice modeling, we may avoid the strong assumptions to some extent. For such purpose, this paper derives a theorem that Nash bargaining solution is equivalent to Wardrop user equilibrium as the barging process continues and prove it with some numerical examples. The model is formulated based on two-person bargaining game. and n-person game is remained for next work.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartA
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• v.11A no.4
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• pp.257-266
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• 2004

Mobile agents are defined as processes which can be autonomously delegated or transferred among the hosts in a network in order to perform some computations on behalf of the user and co-operate with other agents. Currently, mobile agents are used in various fields, such as electronic commerce, mobile communication, parallel processing, search of information, recovery, and so on. In pure P2P network environment, if mobile agents that require computing resources rashly migrate to another peers without consideration on the peer's capacity of resources, the peer may have a problem that the performance of the peer is degraded due to lack of resources. To solve this problem, we propose resource reservation based load balancing scheme of using RMA(Resource Management Agent) that monitors workload information of the peers and that decides migrating agents and destination peers. In mobile agent migrating procedure, if the resource of specific peer is already reserved, our resource reservation scheme prevents other mobile agents from allocating the resource.

• Journal of Korea Society of Industrial Information Systems
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• v.20 no.4
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• pp.1-9
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• 2015

This paper proposes CAC method that is more efficient for RRM using game theory combined with Multiple Attribute Decision Making(MADM). Because users request services with different Quality of Service(QoS), the network preference values to alternative networks for each service are calculated by MADM methods such as Grey Relational Analysis(GRA), Simple Additive Weighting(SAW) and Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution(TOPSIS). According to a utility function representing preference value, non-cooperative game is played, and then network provider select the requested service that provide maximum payoff. The appropriate service is selected through Nash Equilibrium that is the solution of game and the game is played repeated. We analyze two overlaid networks among four Wireless LAN(WLAN) systems with different properties. Simulation results show that proposed MADM techniques have same outcomes for every game round.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.303-311
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• 2022

Recently the telemedicine platform firms which have been temporarily permitted since COVID-19 outbreak have increasingly provided online prescription drugs delivery, causing concerns among incumbent providers of medicine, some of whom began to take aggressive actions again them. In this study, using game theoretic market entry - deterrence model, we show that although the incumbent medicine provider can effectively deter entry by the telemedicine platform firms by its preemptive action, accommodation could be a optimal action when telemedicine platform firms already have penetrated the market with their being permitted to do business due to the COVID-19. However, for the incumbent to cooperate for the successful change in the retail market for medicines, policies like placing a ceiling on the maximum number of taking prescriptions by the pharmacists a day in the telemedince platform network, providing favorable exposure of community pharmacists on the telemedicine platform user interface, and allowing community pharmacies to participate as shareholders of the telemedicine platform firms in its initial public opening of capital, are suggested.