• Journal of Navigation and Port Research
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• v.46 no.1
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• pp.18-25
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• 2022

MOF strengthen the law and institutions for safety management after the capsize accident of passenger ship "Sewol" on April 16, 2014. Nevertheless, about 13 cases of marine accidents such as collisions, contact, and stranding have occurred in coastal passenger ships over the past 5 years. Particularly, according to the judgment of KMST, most of the main causes of passenger ship accidents occurred within harbor areas because of the master's improper ship-handling or inattention. And so, this study analyzed four cases of marine accidents on passenger ships that occurred in the port areas and examined the environmental, institutional, material, and human factors that contributed to the master's improper ship-handling and behavior, and the results are as follows. First, as an environmental factor, the size of the turning basin was not enough. Second, as an institutional factor, the VTS control was not properly supported, the master lacked sufficient training for safe ship-handling in the port area and up-to-date charts were not provided. Third, as a material factor, the digital type speed log capable of the ship's speed in real-time was not installed on the ship's wing bridge. Lastly, as a human factor, the master could not take proper bridge resources and the passage plan was not proper. Therefore, it is suggested in this paper that the size of the turning basin should be adjusted to meet the prescribed standards, the master of passenger ships should receive the ship-handling simulation training among other safety training to ensure safe ship-handling of the master in the port area as improvement measures.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.254-261
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• 2022

Every vessel shall proceed at a safe speed to avoid collision. Additionally, every vessel shall comply with the speed limit rules in the territorial water and internal waters of Korea. The VTS operator shall properly control the compliance of the vessel with the safe speed and speed limit rules. Safe speed under the COLREG 1972 is not explicitly stipulated in knots. However, under the Domestic law for traffic safety-specific sea areas, etc., the speed limit is specified in knots and complied with. This speed limit rule is mainly based on the 'speed made good over the ground'; however, in some places, it is based on the 'speed making way through the water'. In this paper, I analyzed marine accidents that occurred in the past 5 years and the rate of violation of speed limits. Furthermore, I reviewed safe speed under the COLREG 1972, speed limit rules under domestic and foreign laws, and cases of non-compliance with safe speed in the judgment of the Korea Maritime Safety Tribunal. Resultantly, I suggested in this paper that the speed limit rules in the domestic law must be observed by vessels to prevent marine accidents, and the rules which are stipulated in terms of 'speed making way through the water' must be revised as 'speed made good over the ground' such that the vessels can easily comply with them and the VTS operator can control the vessel properly.

• Journal of the Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.83-90
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• 2022

About 90.5 % of barge-towing tugs weigh less than 200 gross tonnage and most are served by the master alone. They are also not subject to the regulations on the working hours and manning levels stipulated in the Seafarers' Act. Therefore, the master of barge-towing tugs cannot take sufficient rest during the navigational watch. Moreover, barge-towing tugs do not satisfy the human seaworthiness due to the inevitable performance of the navigational watch which must be alternately undertaken with an unqualified person, called the "Boatswain". Furthermore, there are many cases in which the master or owner of a tug fails to comply with the additionally required minimum manning levels stipulated in the Ship Of icers' Act when a tug tows a barge. This study reviews the following: (1) the regulations on the working hours and manning levels that are stipulated in the Seafarers' Act, (2) the regulations on the minimum manning levels for ship of icers of the tug's deck part that are stipulated in the Ship officers' Act, (3) marine accidents in the barge-towing tugs. As a result I suggested that one additional deck officer should be on board when a tug tows a barge through the revision of the minimum manning level for ship of icer on the deck part in order to prevent marine accidents of tugs effectively. Especially, the Act on the Punishment, etc. of the Serious Accident came into effect on January 27, 2022. If marine casualties occur continuously at sea due by the same cause, and the cause of such marine casualties would be turned out by the fatigue of the ship of icer caused by insufficient institutional arrangements, the administrator of competent Authorities of Maritime and Port could be punished, so it seems to prepare for it.