• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.35-59
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• 2018

Professor Bin Cheng said that outer space was res extra commercium, while the moon and the other celestial bodies were res nullius before the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST). However, Article 2 of the OST made the moon and other celestial bodies have the legal status as res extra commmercium, not appropriated by any country or private enterprises or individual person, but the resources there can be freely available, as those on the high seas. The non-appropriation principle was introduced to corpus juris spatialis internationalis. Whether or not the non-appropriation principle is binding for the non-parties of the OST, many scholars see this principle as an international customary law, even developing into jus cogens. Article 11(2) of the Moon Agreement(MA) reconfirms the nonappropriation principle of Article 2 of the OST, but it has much less effect than the OST because the MA binds only the 18 parties involved. The MA applies only to the moon and celestial bodies other than the Earth in the Solar System, the OST's application scope extends to the Galaxy because the OST has no such substantive enactment. As referred to in the 2015 CSLCA of USA or Luxembourg's Law of Space Resources, allowing individuals and enterprises run by other countries to commercially explore and utilize the space resources, the question may arise whether this violates the non-appropriation principle under Article 2 of the OST and Article 11 of the MA. In the case of the CSLCA, the law explicitly specifies that sovereignty, possessory rights, and judiciary rights to a specific celestial body cannot be claimed, let alone ownership. This author believes that this law respects the legal status of outer space and the celestial bodies as res extra commmercium. As long as any countries or private enterprises or individuals respect the non-appropriation principle of outer space and the celestial bodies, they could use, exploit it. Another question might be raised in the difference between res extra commercium on the high seas and res extra commercium in outer space and the celestial bodies. Collecting resources on the high seas and exploiting space resources should be interpreted differently. On the high seas, resources can be collected without any obstacles like fishing, whereas, in the case of the deep sea-bed area, the Common Heritage of Mankind principles under the UNCLOS should be operated by the International Seabed Authority as an international regime. The nature or form of the sea resources found on the high seas are thus different from that of space resources, which are fixed on the moon and the celestial bodies without water. Thus, if individuals or private enterprises collect these resources from outer space and the celestial bodies, they might secure a certain section and continue collecting or mining works without any limitation. If an American enterprise receives an approval from the U.S. government, secures the best location and collects resources on the moon, can other countries' enterprises access to this area? How large the exploiting place can be allotted on the moon? How long should such a exploiting activity be lasted? Under the current international space law, these matters might be handled according to the principle of "first come, first served." As a consequence, the international community should provide a guideline or a proposal for the settlement of any foreseeable disputes during the space activity to solve plausible space legal questions in the near future.