• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.111-135
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• 2011

The purpose of this article is to understand the present situation of energy maritime logistics and to suggest a safe way for maritime transportation. In addition, this study is going to assess the risk of maritime transport of energy and propose alternatives in terms of strategy and policy. We examine the security of the Strait of Hormuz, near the east coast of Somalia, the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca where the Korean tankers pass through and discuss countermeasures responding to a variety of dangerous situations. This article also provides plans for stable supply of energy in case of Korea peninsula crisis and emphasizes the need of establishing cooperation with neighbor countries.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.188-211
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• 2019

중국 해군의 성장은 동아시아의 안보환경 변화에 지대한 영향을 미치고 있으며, 한국 해군 또한 그 영향에서 벗어날 수 없는 실정이다. 대한민국은 중국과 지리적으로 맞닿아 있으며, 현재 불법 중국어선 및 이어도 문제 등 중국과의 수많은 해양갈등을 겪고 있는 상황으로, 이에 대한 적절한 대응을 위해서 한국 해군은 중국 해군의 현대화에 대한 대응을 준비해야만 한다. 본고는 중국과 한국의 해군력을 로버트 토마스 전 미 해군 중장이 제시한 지휘, 통제, 능력, 수량의 네 가지 측면에서 분석 및 비교하였다. 중국 해군은 적의 접근을 원해에서부터 차단하는 것을 목표로 하고(지휘), 그에 걸맞게 C4I 능력을 확충해나가고 있으며(통제), 전력투사. 수중/수상전, 해상재보급 역량을 늘려가고(능력), 최근 4년간 세계 대다수 해군의 총 톤수를 능가하는 수준의 함정건조 추세를 보이고 있다(수량). 한국 해군은 90년대 이후 "대양해군"을 목표로 해왔으며(지휘) 아덴만까지 실시간으로 통제 가능한 뛰어난 C4I 능력을 갖추었으나(통제), 아직 대양해군에 걸맞는 능력 및 전력을 구비하였다고 보기는 어렵다. 한국 해군이 상기 네 가지 측면에서 중국 해군을 따라잡는 것은 거의 불가능에 가깝다. 중국은 GDP의 2% 이내에서 국방비를 책정함에도 매년 GDP의 2.7%를 국방비에 투자하는 한국 국방비의 6배를 상회하며, 이 격차는 계속 커져가는 추세이다. 따라서, 대한민국 해군은 첫째, 잠수함 등 비대칭 전력 확보에 주력하고 방공/대잠능력 등 방어력을 향상시켜야 하며, 둘째, 관련국과의 긴밀한 협력을 통해 동아시아 및 서태평양 지역에서의 해양안보 안정화를 위해 노력해야한다. ADMM+3 등 다자 안보의 틀 안에서 역내 해양의 안정을 꾀할 수 있도록 한국 해군은 정책적 노력을 경주해야할 것이다.

• Aerospace Industry
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• s.96
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• pp.12-21
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• 2007

제6회 "한국 항공우주 및 방위산업 전시회 2007"이 오는 10월 16일부터 21일까지 6일간 서울공항(경기도 성남 소재)에서 국내외 인사 및 민∙관∙군 주요 관계자들이 참가한 가운데 개최된다. 이번 행사는 항공우주무기체계는 물론 지∙해상 미래 최첨단 무기체계까지 함께 전시돼 급변하는 미래 안보환경에 대응하기 위한 세계 각국의 첨단 군사장비 및 방위산업 기술의 현재와 미래를 직접 확인하고 살펴볼 수 있는 기회가 될 것으로 보인다.

• Defense and Technology
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• no.5 s.135
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• pp.72-78
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• 1990

ASEAN 회원국들은 2000년대까지는 재래식 전투능력을 발전시키려는 그들의 현재의 노력으로 인해 상당한 진전을 보일 것이다. 특히 그들의 해상영역은 더욱 빈틈없이 관리되고, 힘을 과시한 제한된 수단을 소유할 것이다. 이 지역 불안정의 잠재적 원인은 스프래틀리 군도에 대한 상충하는 영토권 주장, 그리고 정도는 덜하지만 권력의 승계에 뿌리한 국내적 불안(수하르토 이후의 인도네시아, 아키노 이후의 필리핀, 부미폴 왕 이후의 태국)과 회교 근본주의(특히 말레이지아, 인도네시아, 브루나이)이다

• Defense and Technology
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• no.12 s.298
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• pp.68-79
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• 2003

잠수함은 전쟁억제 및 보복, 해상교통로 보호 및 파괴, 공세적 방어 및 심리전 등을 수행할 수 있는 전략적 능력을 보유하고 있고, 이러한 임무를 수행하기에 가장 경제적이고, 효과적이며, 생존성이 높은 무기체계이다. 이러한 능력을 보유한 잠수함을 건조하는 잠수함산업은 자주적 군사력 건설 및 국가안보태세 완비를 위한 국방산업의 핵심산업이며, 세계 정치.경제 질서 차원에서 우리의 영향력을 확보하기 위해 육성해야 할 중요한 산업이다. 또한 잠수함 산업은 자주국방의 기술기반 구축을 위한 필수 산업이며, 동시에 민수산업에 대한 파급표과가 대단히 큰 산업이다.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2012.06a
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• pp.299-301
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• 2012

제주 강정항은 우리나라 남방해역의 보호라는 안보적인 측면과 대형 크루즈선 유치를 통한 관광산업의 활성화를 위해 해군기지와 민항의 기능을 가진 민 군복항으로 건설되고 있다. 본 연구에서는 제주 강정항 계류시설의 대상선박인 15만톤급 초대형 크루즈선의 입 출항 및 통항 안전성 판별을 위해 실시하는 선박조종시뮬레이션의 일반 수행 절차와 선행 연구 등을 분석한다. 이는 선행 연구에서 제기된 주요 쟁점사항들을 명확하게 분석함으로써 객관적이고 신뢰성 높은 선박조종시뮬레이션 연구를 수행하고자 하는 것으로, 주요 검토 사항은 수역시설인 선회장과 진입항로의 교각, 크루즈선의 풍압면적과 적용 풍속 등을 면밀하게 고찰하여 시뮬레이션에 반영하고자 함이다. 또한 제주 강정한 건설은 사회적 관심이 매우 큰 국책사업임을 감안하여 선박조종시뮬레이션 분석 및 평가 등에 해상교통안전 및 선박운용 분야의 전문가그룹을 자문위원으로 구성했고, 연구 결과의 타당성 확보를 위해 해상교통안전진단제도에 명시된 선박조종시뮬레이션 표준절차와 평가 방법 등을 적용하였다.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.239-276
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• 2020

The failure of early economic sanctions aimed at hurting the overall economies of targeted states called for a more sophisticated design of economic sanctions. This paved way for the advent of 'smart sanctions,' which target the supporters of the regime instead of the public mass. Despite controversies over the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a coercive tool to change the behavior of a targeted state, the transformation from 'comprehensive sanctions' to 'smart sanctions' is gaining the status of a legitimate method to impose punishment on states that do not conform to international norms, the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in this particular context of the paper. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council proved that it can come to an accord on imposing economic sanctions over adopting resolutions on waging military war with targeted states. The North Korean nuclear issue has been the biggest security threat to countries in the region, even for China out of fear that further developments of nuclear weapons in North Korea might lead to a 'domino-effect,' leading to nuclear proliferation in the Northeast Asia region. Economic sanctions had been adopted by the UNSC as early as 2006 after the first North Korean nuclear test and has continually strengthened sanctions measures at each stage of North Korean weapons development. While dubious of the effectiveness of early sanctions on North Korea, recent sanctions that limit North Korea's exports of coal and imports of oil seem to have an impact on the regime, inducing Kim Jong-un to commit to peaceful talks since 2018. The purpose of this paper is to add a variable to the factors determining the success of economic sanctions on North Korea: preventing North Korea's evasion efforts by conducting illegal transshipments at sea. I first analyze the cause of recent success in the economic sanctions that led Kim Jong-un to engage in talks and add the maritime element to the argument. There are three conditions for the success of the sanctions regime, and they are: (1) smart sanctions, targeting commodities and support groups (elites) vital to regime survival., (2) China's faithful participation in the sanctions regime, and finally, (3) preventing North Korea's maritime evasion efforts.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.33-59
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• 2019

There have many research papers to see China's evolution of maritime strategy and naval modernization in terms of its naval mind-set. However, this article focuses on assessing how China uses its all sorts of maritime strength to achieve 'a building maritime great power.' The aim of the article is to introduce a new perspective to this debate by analysing China's diversified ma maritime capabilities and a new way of implementation in maritime security strategy. In recent years, China has been developing not only unpredictable maritime military capabilities but also maritime supporting forces - Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. And recently China adopted up-to-date operational concept aimed at gaining military superiority in Asia-Pacific waters. By taking salami slicing strategy, gray zone strategy and cabbage strategy, China has been trying to exercise surpassing influences in regional maritime area, also in western Pacific region. This article provides a stepping stone to comprehend the aspect of China's recent maritime strategic actions, especially in Yellow Sea. In conclusion, this article suggests some policy recommendations for countering China's coercive maritime strategy. First, Korea should make sure a strategic concept of maritime security, instead of land warfare focused strategic concept. Second, it is needed to set up suitable naval forces for actively responding to neighbor nation's offensive actions.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.20 no.1
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• pp.87-107
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• 2005

Land Remote Sensing' is defined as the science (and to some extent, art) of acquiring information about the Earth's surface without actually being in contact with it. Narrowly speaking, this is done by sensing and recording reflected or emitted energy and processing, analyzing, and applying that information. Remote sensing technology was initially developed with certain purposes in mind ie. military and environmental observation. However, after 1970s, as these high-technologies were taught to private industries, remote sensing began to be more commercialized. Recently, we are witnessing a 0.61-meter high-resolution satellite image on a free market. While privatization of land remote sensing has enabled one to use this information for disaster prevention, map creation, resource exploration and more, it can also create serious threat to a sensed nation's national security, if such high resolution images fall into a hostile group ie. terrorists. The United States, a leading nation for land remote sensing technology, has been preparing and developing legislative control measures against the remote sensing industry, and has successfully created various policies to do so. Through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's authority under the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, the US can restrict sensing and recording of resolution of 0.5 meter or better, and prohibit distributing/circulating any images for the first 24 hours. In 1994, Presidential Decision Directive 23 ordered a 'Shutter Control' policy that details heightened level of restriction from sensing to commercializing such sensitive data. The Directive 23 was even more strengthened in 2003 when the Congress passed US Commercial Remote Sensing Policy. These policies allow Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State to set up guidelines in authorizing land remote sensing, and to limit sensing and distributing satellite images in the name of the national security - US government can use the civilian remote sensing systems when needed for the national security purpose. The fact that the world's leading aerospace technology country acknowledged the magnitude of land remote sensing in the context of national security, and it has made and is making much effort to create necessary legislative measures to control the powerful technology gives much suggestions to our divided Korean peninsula. We, too, must continue working on the Korea National Space Development Act and laws to develop the necessary policies to ensure not only the development of space industry, but also to ensure the national security.

• Maritime Security
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• v.4 no.1
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• pp.83-113
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• 2022

Although China's maritime militia has not been well known despite its long history, it is recently emerging as a serious threat to maritime security, causing neighboring countries' security concerns due to the growing number of maritime disputes with China. In this regard, it is now time to clearly define the true nature of the Chinese maritime militia. A close look at the organization and roles of the Chinese maritime militia reveals that it is an organization that is systematically managed and operated by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army of China. Its role is to serve the purpose of "contributing to the protection and expansion of China's marine interests." In addition, the threat factors of the Chinese maritime militia were analyzed by examining the cases of maritime disputes between the Chinese maritime militia and neighboring countries. First, the Chinese maritime militia has implemented the "Gray Zone Strategy." Second, it is a systematic organization supported by the Chinese government and the People's Liberation Army. Third, it is a maritime power that cannot be ignored as the world's largest militia organization. Fourth, it has a strategic flexibility that enables the execution of the dual mission of working for a living such as commercial fishing and serving in the maritime militia. The threats of the Chinese maritime militia are not limited to Southeast Asian countries located in the South China Sea. This is also the case in Korea as the country cannot avoid maritime disputes with China such as the Ieodo issue and the boundary delimitation of the West Sea. Accordingly, this study was focused on presenting a predictable scenario and countermeasures based on the analysis through a scenario technique with respect to the two cases that are most likely to occur in Korea-China relations. Finally, beyond identifying the nature of the Chinese maritime militia, this study takes a further step to share considerations as to how the organization may operate and develop in the future and how we can cope with its moves.