• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.31-64
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• 2009

This paper evaluates the role of fund distributors and the appropriateness of sales fees in funds by the empirical analysis of Korean equity funds. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, this paper shows that the funds with higher sales fees do not have better performance. Rather, the higher sales fees cause the returns of funds to decrease in Korean equity funds. Second, it is not confirmed that both banks and securities firms, as fund distributors, contribute to the better performance of funds. Especially, the banks gave more negative influence on the performance of funds by imposing higher sales fees in funds than the securities firms. The empirical results suggest that the sales fees of funds are unduly imposed in comparison to the function of fund distributors and therefore, the structure of fund fees should be improved for the benefit of fund investors.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.36 no.4
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• pp.33-69
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• 2014

We investigate determinants of fund investment flows using Korean equity investment funds. Unlike previous studies which analyzed net-flows (inflow minus outflow), we analyze fund investment inflows and outflows separately that should properly reflect investors' fund selection and redemption decision. We find similar effects of past return, fund age on net-flows to existing studies based on US market data. The analysis of determinants of inflows shows that inflows are related to past return, fund age and sales fee as net-flows. In contrast, outflows are found to behave quite differently from inflows. Apparently, asymmetry exists between fund investment inflows and outflows at the Korean fund selection market. Specifically, high past returns increase fund investment inflows while increase, rather than decrease, fund outflows. Moreover, 'convexity' is detected both in inflows and outflows: higher past returns accelerate outflows as well as inflows. Effects of sales fee also differ between inflows and outflows. In the 'affiliated' fund sample, sales fee is negatively related to inflows while positively related to outflows. In the 'unaffiliated' fund sample, sales fee is positively related to inflows, but no significant relationship exists with outflows. Empirical findings of this paper imply that the rational investor's fund selection view cannot provide a consistent explanation of the Korean fund selection market. In particular, the positive and convex relationship between past returns and fund outflows is inconsistent with the rational investor view. The fact that investor's fund investment appears to display 'disposition effect', which has been reported by studies of individual investors' stock investment behaviour suggests that the behavioral finance view should be a part of explanation for the Korean fund selection market. In addition, the strikingly different patterns between the 'affiliated' funds and the 'unaffiliated' funds, imply that brokers' incentive structure is another prevailing factor for fund investment flows.

• Proceedings of the Korea Contents Association Conference
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• 2012.05a
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• pp.229-230
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• 2012

국내의 대형 기획사 및 대기업 위주의 유통사들 사이에서 음반제작, 유통, 판매 등에 들어가는 비용을 인디밴드가 감당하기란 어려운 일이다. 이러한 문제의 대안의 성격을 가지고 소셜 펀드레이징으로 음반제작을 지원하는 프로젝트가 출현했다. 소셜 펀드레이징은 불특정다수로부터 후원을 받아 아이디어나 프로젝트를 성사시키고, 그에 따른 보상을 제공하는 것을 말한다. 본 논문에서는 2011년과 2012년의 SYM(Support your music) 프로젝트를 사례로 삼아, 한국 인디밴드의 음반제작에 있어 소셜 펀드레이징이 가지는 의의를 분석한다. 이것이 기존의 음반시장에서 대안이 될 수 있는지, 또한 그 한계는 무엇인지 알아본다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.35 no.2
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• pp.133-166
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• 2013

This study analyzes the relationships between soft dollar(brokerage commission) and characteristics of funds, and between brokerage commission and return on funds, using the data on equity funds of Korea from June 2008 to November 2011. The result confirms a statistically significant negative relationship between management & sales fees and brokerage commission, meaning that rather than raising management & sales fees, which could be easily recognized by investors, it is through brokerage commission, a hidden cost, which asset management firms indirectly compensate for their services. Meanwhile, the analysis on the relationship between brokerage commission and return on funds reveals that higher brokerage commissions lead to lower return on funds, meaning at least in short-term no contribution to increasing returns in the future. These results suggest the need for streamlining the system to alleviate conflicts of interest between investors and management firms in addition to effectively controlling for principal-agent problems.