• Korean Journal of Logic
• /
• v.9 no.2
• /
• pp.117-175
• /
• 2006

이 논문은 매디가 왜 수학적 실재론을 포기하고 그녀 특유의 수학적 자연주의를 표방하게 되었는지를 탐구하려 한다. 이 문제에 관하여 널리 받아들여지고 있는 한 가설에 따르면, 매디의 입장 변화는 콰인-퍼트남 필수불가결성 논증을 비판하고 포기함으로써 야기되었다. 필자는 이 가설이 지닌 설득력을 인정하지만, 그것만으로는 실재론의 포기의 충분한 이유가 될 수 없다고 생각하며, 그 대신 과학과 수학의 유비 문제가 매디의 입장 변화를 이해하는 데 더 나은 조망을 제공한다는 점을 보여주고자 한다. 이를 위해서는 콰인과 괴델에 크게 빚졌던 실재론자 시절 매디의 사유가 얼마만큼 수학과 과학의 유비에 지배되었는지를 살펴보아야 하는 동시에, 왜 매디가 이 유비를 포기함으로써 실재론을 포기하게 되는지를 이해하여야 한다. 아울러 이 유비의 포기에 대한 다소의 비판적 검토를 통해 매디의 수학적 존재론의 지적 여정을 왜 필자가 존재론적 퇴보라 믿는지에 대한 몇 가지 이유가 시사될 것이다.

• Korea Trade Review
• /
• v.42 no.5
• /
• pp.161-182
• /
• 2017

This study is to conduct a stakeholder analysis using Project Stakeholder Management Model established by US Project Management Institute (or PMI) in order to identify current stakeholder related to Korea's trade policy and to establish the stakeholder management process for Korea's trade negotiation. Project Stakeholder Management Model includes four stages such as identifying, planning, managing, and controling stakeholder. The stakeholder management process for Korea's trade negotiation classifies domestic stakeholder into two category; internal stakeholder and external stakeholder. This research suggests that Korea should invite consumer groups, labor unions, and farmer's association into the official communication channel of trade authority while unifying the current stakeholder management divisions and relevant advisory committees within the trade ministry.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.7 no.1
• /
• pp.446-453
• /
• 2021

This paper deals with two methods regarding fact and value. One is the method of H. Putnam, which is to break the boundary between fact and value and to make a world where the two have an inherent connection. The other is the method of J. Habermas, which regards fact and value as the product of an intersubjective agreement based on argumentation. Putnam, through his position of internal realism, moves from realism to pragmatism, especially by combining the rationalist tradition of Kant and Dewey's pragmatic views. Habermas also stands in the tradition of rationalism and universalism in Kant, at the same time emphasizing the practicability of truth in Hegel's tradition of historical reason. The significance of the strategy of Putnam and Habermas is that they have attempted to revive the realm of value against the strict dichotomy of facts and values and the subsequent devaluation of rationality in the realm of value. The starting point of this attempt is that the practical foundation of rationality is laid on life and practice. This could provide the room for escaping from rationality, which prioritizes only truths that reveal facts, that is, instrument-reduced rationality, the room for the revival of practical rationality through reflection on what is the purpose of life, and, in turn, the room for resisting to pass the realm of values and norms to the logic of habitual routines or customs. However, despite such common goal, there are clear limitations to Putnam's approach due to the differences in the strategies taken on facts and values. Putnam's method can demolish the whole universal framework that is the foundation where pragmatic pluralism will be fostered, eliminating the difference between the specificity of values and the universality of norms and shaking up the status of universal ethics. Therefore, Habermas' ethical theory is proposed as an alternative to establish a basis for universal ethics by relying on communication rationality and to secure the coercion of norms and blossom cultural pluralism as a diverse lifestyle based on this coercion.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.120
• /
• pp.109-130
• /
• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.