• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.121-145
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• 2009

South Korea has investment agreements such as FTAs, BITs with several countries. Up to now, no single case has been registered against the Korean government on breach of investment agreements, but it is likely that the number of such cases would increase. Therefore, an investor-state dispute settlement system, an arbitral procedure by which a foreign investor may seek compensation of damage against the host country, is gaining its importance. The provision of the ISDS has been one of the hottest issues in Korea while the Kor-US FTA was being signed. In this respect, with the growing number of regional agreements such as BITs and FTAs, a careful scrutiny on the ISDS is necessary for Korea. I have therefore studied theoretically subjects including the National Treatment(NT), the Most-Favored Nation(MFN), Fair and Equitable Treatment and Expropriation - those that have been the objects of protection on investors. And I have analyzed ICSID arbitral awards and provided implications. In the ICSID arbitral awards, the Fair and Equitable Treatment turned out to be the most recognized violation on investors by the host State in terms of investor protection. On the other hand, Indirect Expropriation - a matter of which public anxiety was shown led by civic groups - was not generally recognized in arbitral awards. This study is written for sake of governments, local autonomous entities and public enterprises that are in charge of FTAs and BITs.

• Journal of Legislation Research
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• no.55
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• pp.193-237
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• 2018

The recent surge in the ISD lawsuit filed against the Korean government is likely to cause major domestic confusion. This is because in most cases, foreign investors have claimed billions of won in damages filed against Korea in the ISD lawsuit. Public opinion will be generated to abolish the ISD lawsuit system, which is included in the international investment agreement, when a decision comes out in the Elliott/Mason case or Lone Star case, which has already been completed by the hearing. It is clear that the ISD clause, which is commonly included in most of the BITs, FTAs, can be a limiting factor in the government's public policy, as shown by many investment disputes. However, it is not necessary to have a negative view of the ISD clause itself, given that it is a system that can protect Korean investors from illegal and inappropriate actions by local governments. Since Korea already allows the system of ISD lawsuits with many countries through FTAs and BITs, and negotiations are underway to sign FTAs with new countries, the possibility that foreign investors will refer to the ISD proceeding further to our government's public policy will increase. In order to prepare for an ISD lawsuit, the Korean government has launched a response team consisting of government practitioners, private scholars, and legal professionals in the central government ministries to review major legal issues that are controversial in the cases of the ISD. In particular, local governments and public institutions, which fail to recognize the importance of international investment regulations and ISD clause, need to share and train relevant information so that all processes for public policy planning and implementation comply with international investment rules such as BITs and FTAs.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.33-52
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• 2014

Although climate change is a global scale question, some concerns have been raised that principles of investment arbitration may not adequately address the domestic implementation of climate change measures. A recent ICSID investment arbitration of Vattenfall v. Germany with regard to the investor's alleged damages from the phase-out of nuclear plants is a salient climate change case. The 2005 Kyoto Protocol was made to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and it provides a number of flexible mechanisms such as Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol allows dispute settlement through investor-state arbitration. Any initiation of stricter emission standards can violate the prohibition on expropriations in investment agreements, regardless of the measures created to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The effect-based expropriation doctrine can charge changes to existing emission standards as interference with the use of property that goes against the legitimate expectation of a foreign investor. In regulatory chill, threat of investor claims against the host state may preclude the strengthening of climate change measures. Stabilization clauses also have a freezing effect on the hosting state's regulation and a new law applicable to the investment. In the fair and equitable standard, basic expectations of investors when entering into earlier carbon-intensive operations can be affected by a regulation seeking to change into a low-carbon approach. As seen in the Methanex tribunal, a non-discriminatory and public purpose of environmental protection measures should be considered as non-expropriation in the arbitral tribunal unless its decision would intentionally impede a foreign investor's investment.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.369-387
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• 2012

Throughout intensive negotiations on the KORUS FTA and even after its ratification on March 15, 2012, ISD (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) has been at the center of many controversies within the FTA. Although the original function of the ISD is intended to be a protectional measure for foreign investors, there have been many foreign investors who tried to use the ISD as a tool to attack a government and nullify the public policy demanding tremendous amount of compensation. Many of the NAFTA ISD cases including Ehtyl v. Canada and UPS v. Canada demonstrate such a behavior by foreign investors. It is the right time for Korean government to conduct in depth studies on NAFTA ISD cases because the precedents provide invaluable insights including the legal reasoning by the decision making authorities including ICSID and UNCITRAL. The lessons we would learn from those cases would prepare Korean government for expected ISD claims by foreign investors and enable the government to maximize its efficiency in policy making process under a new international trade environment, the KORUS FTA.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.29-53
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• 2013

Chinese ISD has been changed a lot since the reformation policy in 1978 and it is expected that China will present a changed attitude toward its advantage as its industrialization continues to advance. This study generally examines the ISD in BIT and also considers not only the attitude of China with regard to ISD but also the changes on the Chinese side. Moreover, this study determines the areas on which the Chinese government focuses. In order to conduct this study, the author attempts to classify the attitudes on ISD into chronical change and treaty powers based on the analysis of BIT. In addition, the paper examines the main contents of ISD in BIT which previously involved an agreement such as arbitral institution, arbitral range, counter-measures of local country, standard for admitting the nationality of corporate investors, and recognition and enforcement of arbitral award. Based on analysis, this paper mentions matters that require attention and caution in the Korea-China FTA as regards investment negotiation, and also suggests instructions for investors who may face dispute with the Chinese government.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.28 no.2
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• pp.201-216
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• 2018

After the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Union's Common Commercial Policy now belongs to the exclusive competence area of the EU, including the foreign direct investment (FDI) policy. Regarding the bilateral investment protection treaties (BITs) between the EU Member States, the European Commission is of the view that such BITs should be discarded. On March 6, 2018, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held in the Achmea BV v. Slovakia case that a BIT between the EU Member States, as well as arbitral awards based on that BIT, is not subject to request for preliminary rulings under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and thus they are not compatible with the EU law. However, the judgment did not silence the controversy. Instead, many people questioned the legal reasoning and the legitimacy of judgment, and therefore the problem is still ongoing.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.68
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• pp.89-121
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• 2015

Investor-State Dispute Settlement(ISDS) grants a foreign investor the right to access an international arbitrator, if he believes actions taken by a host government are in breach of commitments made in an investment agreement or an investment treaty. The arbitration procedure of ICSID is made specifically to resolve investment disputes, so most of investment disputes have been settled in accordance with the procedure. Owing to limitation of dispute settlements through the ICSID arbitration procedure, several investment dispute conciliation schemes have been emerged as alternatives. In the case of a conciliation, the conciliation procedure will be in progress based on arbitrary agreement between parties, and if both parties agree on a conciliation program, then the arbitrary execution rate is relatively higher than that of arbitration procedures. In addition, it is evaluated that the time duration of conducting a conciliation procedure is in general rather short in 8 to 24months, and its incumbent cost is also rather inexpensive. Most of all, through amicable settlement of a dispute between a foreign investor and a host state, the foreign investor may continue his investment activities without a hitch, while the host state may invite more investment without any risk of losing its external credibility. In conclusion, it is desirable to lead any investment dispute between a foreign investor and a host state settle in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure as specified in the relevant investment agreement. In addition, to make the foreign investor continue his investment activities, it will be necessary to provide a separate investment dispute conciliation system aside from such arbitration procedures to cope any unexpected incident flexibly.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.409-431
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• 2012

This article deals with the nature of ISDS along with the admissibility thereof, for the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. ICSID as an organization of World Bank Group, has been established in 1966 and as of May in 2011, 157 nations ratified its convention. As for the Republic of Korea(ROK) it has been involved in the problematic situation with regard to ISDS of the KORUS FTA in negotiation with the United States. The ruling Grand National Party is pushing the FTA for ratification including ISDS. However, the opposition party, the Unified Democratic Party rejected the ISDS with a view to a toxin infringing on its judiciary sovereignty. The ROK has invested in the US 3.5 times more than the US did in Korea up to now. As a result, it seems that the ROK is more concerned about ISDS than the US is, considering that exhausting local remedy through the US local courts, applying even a municipal ordinance in their decisions which will be unsatisfactory toward the ROK side. The ROK is now struggling with the ISDS as a political issue between the ruling party and the opposition party mostly based on sovereignty with a reference on AUSFTA which excluded the ISDS. Australian model about ISDS has been impacted by the experience from the NAFTA which allowes direct claims against each other(the US against Canada and Canada against the US). It seems not to be much sympathy for developed countries because it has long been held to standards for pressing on developing countries. Australia is also struggling with ISDS from the political point of view likewise the ROK. And the ISDS is destined to the political situations established within the domestic countries among the political parties in relation with the acceptance or rejection of thereof.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.131-160
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• 2017

When any investment dispute arises, the investor has to exhaust the local remedies available in the host state, and according to the agreement between the parties, the investor is filed to the ICSID arbitral tribunal to seek arbitral awards. At this time, if the arbitral tribunal decides that the investment agreement has been violated, it normally demands the host state to provide financial compensations to the investor for economic loss. According to the rules of the investment agreement, the host state is supposed to fulfill the arbitral awards voluntarily. If it is unwilling to provide financial compensations according to the arbitral awards, however, the investor may ask the domestic court of the host state for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. In addition, if the host state is unwilling to fulfill arbitral awards on account of state immunity, the investor may ask his own country (state of nationality) for diplomatic protection and urge it to demand the fulfillment of arbitral awards. Effectiveness for pecuniary damages, a means to solve problems arising in the enforcement of investment arbitral awards, is found to be rather ineffective. For such cases, this study suggests an alternative to demand either a restitution of property or a corrections of violated measures subject to arbitral awards.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.24 no.1
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• pp.25-44
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• 2014

Conflict between transnational environmental issues and foreign investment in capital-importing states can be commonly found. Actually, several investor-state dispute arbitration cases like Bilcon v. Canada, S.D. Myers v. Canada, and Metalclad v. Mexico concerned environmental matters. States are worried about their measures for securing the environment might be deemed to go against international investment agreements and foreign investors also are anxious because of excessive regulations. Against this backdrop, stakeholders attempt to strike a balance between securing foreign investment and preserving the environment. This article argues that the investment chapter of the Korea-US FTA tries to solve environment-investment collision in investor-state disputes. Before analyzing the provisions of the investment chapter most relevant to environmental issues, this article points out the most typical types of environmental clauses included in international investment agreements. The investment chapter of the Korea-US FTA has provisions which effectively prevent measures from becoming useless when those measures are legitimate measures relevant to environmental matters. This does not mean that the Korea-US FTA completely solves the conflict between environmental issues and the protection of foreign investment, but still it paves the way for a prudent solution which would hash out this thorny problem.