• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.23-51
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• 2014

Christine M. Korsgaard believes that constructivism can respond to moral skepticism without depending upon moral realism. The purpose of this paper is to examine Korsgaard's kantian constructivism and her positions on moral realism. According to Korsgaard moral realism cannot answer normative questions in that it sees the function of moral concepts as describing the reality and so accepts the model of applied knowledge for action. In contrast Korsgaard insists that constructivism is better at justifying normativity since it regards moral concepts as representing the solutions to practical problems and so shows that moral principles are necessarily involved in the practical problems of agency. Korsgaard's constructivism has antirealistic elements such as pure proceduralism, the constitutive model to exclude ontological, metaphysical meanings, and the account of human beings as the sources of values. In spite of those antirealistic elements it is difficult to jump to a conclusion that Korsgaard's constructivism is antirealism. Korsgaard, in the early book, The Sources of Normativity, says that kantian constructivism has something to do with a form of realism, or procedural moral realism. And in the following books she argues that constructivism is compatible with realism although she pays attention to the practical implications of constructivism and then sets aside its ontological relevance. That is, Korsgaard does not want that her constructivism results in antirealism. Korsgaard's realism, however, is too weak to be called as realism. There is, also, a question why one would rather take a constructivist approach if one holds on to realism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.117-146
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• 2018

This paper discusses, whether religion is possible even in the age of artificial intelligence, and whether humans alone are the subject of religious faith or ultra intelligent machines with human minds can be also subjects of faith. In order for ultra intelligent machines to be subjects of faith in the same conditions as humans, they must be able to have unique characteristics such as emotion, will, and self-consciousness. With the advent of ultra intelligent machines with the same level of cognitive and emotional abilities as human beings, the religious actions of artificial intelligence will be inevitable. The ultra intelligent machines after 'singularity' will go beyond the subject of religious belief and reign as God who can rule humans, nature and the world. This is also the common view of Morabeck, Kurzweil and Harari. Leonhart also reminds us that technological advances should make us used to the fact that we are now 'gods'. But we fear we may face distopia despite the general affluence of the 'Star Trec' economy. For this reason, even if a man says he has learned the religious truth, one can't help but wonder if it is true. Kant and Bloch are thinkers who critically reflected on our religious ideals and highest concept in different world-view premises. Kant's concept of God as 'idea of pure reason' and 'postulate of practical reason', can seem like a 'god of gap' as Jesse Bering said earlier. Kant recognized the need for religious faith only on a strict basis of moral necessity. The subjects of religious faith should always strive to do the moral good, but such efforts themselves were not enough to reach perfection and so postulated immortality of the soul. But if an ultra intelligent machines that has emerged above a singularity is given a new status in an intellectual explosion, it can reach its morality by blocking evil tendencies and by the infinite evolution of super intelligence. So it will no longer need Kant's 'Postulate for continuous progress towards greater goodness', 'Postulate for divine grace' and 'Postulate for infinite expansion of the kingdom of God on earth.' Artificial intelligence robots would not necessarily consider religious performance in the Kant's meaning, and therefore religion will also have to be abolished. Ernst Bloch transforms Kant's postulate to be Persian dualism. Therefore, in Bloch, even though the ultra intelligent machines is a divine being, one must critically ask whether it is a wicked or a good God. Artificial intelligence experts warn that ultra intellectual machine as Pandora's gift will bring disaster to mankind. In the Kant's Matrix, a ultra intelligent machines, which is the completion of morality and God itself, may fall into a bad god in Bloch's Matrix. Therefore, despite the myth of singularity, we still believe that ultra intelligent machines, whether as God leads us to the completion of one of our only religious beliefs, or as bad god to the collapse of mankind through complete denial of existence.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• no.96
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• pp.39-70
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• 2012

In order to locate Kant's concept of the highest good within ethics and the theory of moral religion, it needs to be approached with some qualifications: there are two rough ways to be suggested. The first way is to focus on the concept of the highest good that is explained in terms of the happiness in proportion to a rational being's virtue or to his/her worthiness to be happy. But the happiness determined in the sense outlined above would be (increasingly or decreasingly) changeable according to each one's individual morality-this is what is meant by each one's 'worthiness' here-, and would not be seen as the perfect one. It might even be said that this kind of happiness is possible in a sensible world generally taken, if the existence of God thought of as harmonizing natural phenomena and the moral order is successfully presupposed. The other way is to understand the concept of the highest good literally: in this view, the highest good shows that a rational being's character is completely appropriate to the moral law and for him/her, its corresponding idea, i.e., the perfect happiness, is considered with full justification. But the highest good in the sense sketched above-along with the existence of God and the immortality of the soul-is expected to be realized only in an intelligible world generally taken. This means that it should be appraised as an ideal of the highest good that includes the so-called 'physical happiness' specified in terms of the first way as its element. In this regard, it is seen to be somewhat restricted. Between the two concepts of the highest good already touched upon, the highest good of the possible world would be the one established in terms of the first way. In other words, it is not the highest good in an intelligible world, but the highest good in this world. Of course, it is true that we cannot help but assume the existence of God-a being as higher, as moral, as most holy, and as omnipotent-in order to explain the highest good in this world (namely, in order to establish the possibility of the combination of the happiness and the worthiness). For as long as both morally good acts and the happiness are considered to happen in a natural world, the cause of the nature (i.e., the existence of its creator), that is, God, must be able to be presupposed. In this vein, Kant interprets that most people view that the key of the Bible is to show that the best world which is characterized by an intelligible or heavenly kingdom is also actually feasible in this world. The wish of the people who have the morally good character is that God's kingdom comes and his will is properly achieved in this world. But we cannot know what God really does in order to realize his world in this world. Nonetheless, we are fully aware of what we should do in order to make ourselves a member of his world. It is specified like this: we should do our ethical duties and further proceed to establish an ethical community. Viewed this manner, it is concluded that an ethical community is not a merely ideal thing like the kingdom of the ends, but a human apparatus or institution that exists in this world.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.143
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• pp.267-290
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• 2017

At the end of the 'observing reason' of the chapter of 'the Reason' in Hegel's PhdG, reads that 'Spirit is a bone' and it is an 'infinite judgement'. We will concentrate on the following problems to clarify the meaning of this infinite judgement. First, this paper introduces the various interpretations on the meaning of the 'Spirit is a bone' and makes a comparative investigation of that problem. If we do not examine the various interpretations, there may be the probability of arbitrary interpretation of this judgement. Second, we will discern the difference between Kant's and Hegel's interpretations with regard to the meaning of the infinite judgement. Hegel obviously understands the content more than the meaning of Kant's forms of infinite judgement (S is not-P). If we do not explicate the reason which Hegel expands beyond the form to the content, it is difficult to understand the meaning which Hegel has said on it. With regard to this, we do not restrict our study to the PhdG. We also refer to the meaning of the infinite judgement on 'the judgement of Dasein' in Hegel's small and large Logics. Third, We are going to explore the various interpretations concerning those problems. Above all, we note ${\check{Z}}i{\check{z}}ek^{\prime}s$ interpretation who relates it to Psychoanalysis. While examining ${\check{Z}}i{\check{z}}ek^{\prime}s$ interpretation, we expecially note how he can interpret it well.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.145-164
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• 2017

In his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty raises a question of why he has to ask what phenomenology is again. This study assumes that the question can be answered in a new understanding of the "nature" concept and finds its possible grounds in the nature concepts of Schelling and Merleau-Ponty. Schelling and Merleau-Ponty develop philosophical thinking from a critical point of view on the Cartesian and Kantian philosophies "Thing-in-itself" by Kant is, in particular, one of important questions that has to be answered in the philosophy of Schelling since Kant further solidifies a dualistic world by leaving thing-in-itself. Schelling solves the question with the concept of identity and Merleau-Ponty solves the question with body-subject. What we notice in this article is the understanding of Shelling and Merleau-Ponty about nature. Schelling believes there are the creative activities of unconscious intelligence in nature, but spirit or intelligence in his nature concept cannot induce an existential being. Here we see that Schelling is still beyond the traditional epistemological framework. To restore the original nature of nature, we must begin with an understanding of the totality of nature. Nature must also be explained through relationships with humans. Merleau-Ponty shows the entanglement of nature and spirit through the body-subject. In Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, the body is the equivalent of nature. Understanding the forces of nature that Schelling and Merleau-Ponty are trying to show, and at the same time explaining the problem of how the mind or human beings emerge from nature, we will be able to discover the true nature of nature.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2006.10d
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• pp.98-100
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• 2006

본 논문은 기존의 고속 인쇄기용 레지스터 컨트롤러가 고가의 외국 제품을 사용해 온 것에 반해 이를 대체 할 뿐 아니라 저렴한 가격의 레지스터 칸트롤러를 개발 하는 것을 목표로 하고 기존 250mpm(meter per minute)의 두 배인 500mpm의 고속 인쇄에서도 사용할 수 있도록 레지스터 컨트롤러를 개발해 오차 보정을 좀 더 정확하고 신속하게 하는 것에 그 목적이 있다.

• Journal of Chest Surgery
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.325-330
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• 1982

A case of a 7 year old girl with rare congenital anomalies is reported. The anomalies as called Cantrell`s pentalogy is consisted of defect in supraumbilical abdominal wall, ventral diaphragm, adjacent pericardium, and lower sternum associated with cardiac malformation. Her cardiac lesion was muscular diverticulum of left ventricle. The diverticulum was resected and the other defects were repaired successfully.

• Proceedings of the SAREK Conference
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• 2007.06a
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• pp.166-166
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• 2007

• The monthly packaging world
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• s.286
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• pp.78-83
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• 2017

(사)한국포장협회(회장 신동호)가 지난해 9월 19일부터 12월 3일까지 총 11주간 진행한 제26기 포장기술관리사(Packaging Professional) 통신 교육 결과, 총 92명의 포장기술관리사를 배출했다. 이번 제26기 포장기술관리사 통신교육에서는 신진욱 신흥글로벌(주) 과장이 총 1백점 만점에 96.3점을 획득해 최고 성적 우수자로 선정됐으며, 윤정운 플레어코리아(주) 사원이 94.6점으로 2등으로 수료했다. 또한 한지석 (주)데시칸트 영업팀 과장과 정광신 동원시스템즈(주) 압연영업팀 부장이 91.1점으로 3등으로 수료했다. 다음에 제26기 포장기술관리사 우수성적수료자들의 통신교육에 대한 견해를 살펴보도록 한다.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Geothermal and Hydrothermal Energy
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.45-50
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• 2011

Hybrid desiccant cooling system(HDCS) consists of desiccant rotor, regenerative evaporative cooler, heat pump and district heating hot water coil. In this study, TRNSYS and EES, dynamic and steady simulation programs were used for studying hybrid desiccant cooling system which is applied to an apartment house from June to August. The results show that power consumption of the hybrid desiccant cooling system is 70 kWh in June, 199 kWh in July and 241 kWh in August. Sensible and latent heats removed by the hybrid desiccant cooling system are 300 kWh, 301 kWh in June, 610 kWh, 858 kWh in July and 719 kWh, 1010 kWh in August. COP of the hybrid desiccant cooling system is 8.6 in June, 7.4 in July and 7.2 in August. COP of the hybrid desiccant cooling system decreases when latent heat load increases. Operation time of the system is 70 hours in June, 190 hours in July and 229 hours in August. Since the cooling load is largest in August, the operation time of August is longest for maintaining the indoor temperature at $26^{\circ}C$. Due to the characteristics of hybrid desiccant cooling system for efficiently handling both sensible and latent loads, this system can handle sensible and latent heat loads efficiently in summer.