• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.48-52
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• 2015

In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on SSB having same structure in encryption and decryption proposed in 2011. The target algorithm was designed using advanced encryption standard and has advantage about hardware implementations. The differential fault analysis is one of side channel attacks, combination of the fault injection attacks with the differential cryptanalysis. Because SSB is suitable for hardware, it must be secure for the differential fault analysis. However, using proposed differential fault attack in this paper, we can recover the 128 bit secret key of SSB through only one random byte fault injection and an exhausted search of $2^8$. This is the first cryptanalytic result on SSB having same structure in encryption and decryption.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.1117-1127
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• 2014

Differential Fault Analysis(DFA) is widely known for one of the most powerful method for analyzing block cipher. it is applicable to block cipher such as DES, AES, ARIA, SEED, and lightweight block cipher such as PRESENT, HIGHT. In this paper, we introduce a differential fault analysis on the lightweight block cipher LEA for the first time. we use 300 chosen fault injection ciphertexts to recover 128-bit master key. As a result of our attack, we found a full master key within an average of 40 minutes on a standard PC environment.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.30 no.6
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• pp.1263-1270
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• 2020

The differential fault attacks (DFA) are cryptoanalysis methods that reveal the secret key utilizing differences between the normal and faulty ciphertexts, which occurred when artificial faults are injected into an encryption device. The conventional DFA methods use faults to falsify intermediate values. Meanwhile, we propose the novel DFA method that uses a fault to skip a function. The proposed method has a very low attack complexity that reveals the secret key using one fault injected ciphertext within seconds. Also, we proposed a method that filters out ciphertexts where the injected faults did not occur the function-skipping. It makes our method realistic. To demonstrate the proposed method, we performed fault injection on the Riscure's Piñata board. As a result, the proposed method can filter out and reveal the secret key within seconds on a real device.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.33-41
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• 2012

A differential fault analysis(DFA) is one of the most important side channel attacks on block ciphers. Most block ciphers, such as DES, AES, ARIA, SEED and so on., have been analysed by this attack. PRESENT is a 64-bit block cipher with 80/128-bit secret keys and has a 31-round SP-network. So far, several DFAs on PRESENT have been proposed. These attacks recovered 80, 128-bit secret keys of PRESENT with 8~64 fault injections. respectively. In this paper, we propose an improved DFA on PRESENT-80/128. Our attack can reduce the complexity of exhaustive search of PRESENT-80(resp. 128) to on average 1.7(resp. $2^{22.3}$) with 2(resp. 3) fault injections, From these results, our attack results are superior to known DFAs on PRESENT.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.16 no.5
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• pp.871-878
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• 2012

LBlock is a 64-bit ultra-light block cipher suitable for the constrained environments such as wireless sensor network environments. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on LBlock. Based on a random nibble fault model, our attack can recover the secret key of LBlock by using the exhaustive search of $2^{25}$ and five random nibble fault injection on average. It can be simulated on a general PC within a few seconds. This result is superior to known differential fault analytic result on LBlock.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.485-494
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• 2012

The block cipher HIGHT is designed suitable for low-resource hardware implementation. It established as the TTA standard and ISO/IEC 18033-3 standard. In this paper, we propose a differentail fault attack against the block cipher HIGHT. In the proposed attack, we assume that an attacker is possible to inject a random byte fault in the input value of the 28-th round. This attack can recover the secret key by using the differential property between the original ciphertext and fault cipher text pairs. Using 7 and 12 error, our attack recover secret key within a few second with success probability 87% and 51%, respectively.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.22 no.5
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• pp.1009-1017
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• 2012

The fault injection attack has been developed to extract the secret key which is embedded in a crypto module by injecting errors during the encryption process. Especially, an attacker can find master key of AES using injection of just one byte. In this paper, we proposed a countermeasure resistant to the these fault attacks by checking the differences between input and output. Using computer simulation, we also verified that the proposed AES implementation resistant to fault attack shows better fault detection ratio than previous other methods and has small computational overheads.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.510-517
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• 2012

Piccolo-80 is a 64-bit ultra-light block cipher suitable for the constrained environments such as wireless sensor network environments. In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on Piccolo-80. Based on a random byte fault model, our attack can the secret key of Piccolo-80 by using the exhaustive search of $2^{24}$ and six random byte fault injections on average. It can be simulated on a general PC within a few seconds. This result is the first known side-channel attack result on Piccolo-80.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.4 no.3
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• pp.105-108
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• 2015

In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on symmetric SPN block cipher with bitslice involution S-box in 2011. The target block cipher was designed using AES block cipher and has advantage about restricted hardware and software environment using the same structure in encryption and decryption. Therefore, the target block cipher must be secure for the side-channel attacks. However, to recover the 128-bit secret key of the targer block cipher, this attack requires only one random byte fault and an exhausted search of $2^8$. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on the target block cipher.

• Journal of Advanced Navigation Technology
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.568-573
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• 2013

In this paper, we propose a differential fault analysis on symmetry structured SPN block cipher proposed in 2008. The target algorithm has the SPN structure and a symmetric structure in encryption and decryption process. To recover the 128-bit secret key of the target algorithm, this attack requires only one random byte fault and an exhaustive search of $2^8$. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on the target algorithm.