• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.77-105
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• 2023

This paper investigates the management stability of KOSPI-listed energy public enterprises from the perspective of median voter theory. We analyze the profitability and stability of five energy public enterprises during the period 2011~2022, and conduct an empirical analysis to determine whether they are related to the preferences of median voters who can represent the general public. Our analysis of the profitability and stability of the energy public enterprises shows that the stability of their has been deteriorating in recent years. The results of the empirical analysis also show that the management stability of the energy public enterprises is related to the preference of median voter. Specifically, they indicate that when the median voter's income is smaller than the average income, the profitability of the utility decreases and the debt ratio increases. This paper suggests that from the median voter's point of view, excessive utility and energy bills may strengthen the incentives for governments and politicians to suppress rate increases, leading to lower profitability and higher debt for public enterprises.

• Economic Analysis
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.34-83
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• 2020

This paper examines two different reunification regimes and investigates the decision making problems on tax and income transfers in a political economy model. The first reunification regime is the South-Driven regime under which the majority of South Korea choose the tax rate, the amount of transfers and the size of migration. The second is the North-Participation regime under which there is no limit on migration and the majority of Unified Korea choose the tax rate and the amount of transfers. In both regimes, Northern residents' migration decisions are endogenous and those who decide not to migrate to the Southern region have an alternative to declare fiscal independence of income redistribution taking place within the North independently. This paper shows that there is no income redistribution in a politico-economic equilibrium under the South-Driven regime. Given that, those remaining in the Northern region decide to declare fiscal independence. On the other hand, the North-Participation regime delivers an equilibrium supporting income redistribution and no fiscal independence.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.107-131
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• 2018

This paper presents a model for the Minimum Wage Commission's decision process and analyzes the strategic actions of the participants in the process. The Minimum Wage Commission has used two ways of setting the minimum wage. The commission has voted either on the labor's against the management' final proposals or has voted on the public interest commissioners' proposal. According to the model, the minimum wage is determined at a level that is very close to or at a level preferred by the median voter among the public interest commissioners. But the probability of adopting labor or management proposal is ex-ante the same. Empirical evidence from the minimum wage decision process is consistent with the predictions of the model. The probability of adopting the labor's proposal in the minimum wage commission voting is not statistically significantly different from 50%. The model also suggests that the preference of the median voter among public interest commissioners determines the minimum wage level. Since the government appoints public interest commissioners and thus, in fact, the median voters, the government can decide the minimum wage level. This proposition is also consistent with data. The annual growth rate of the minimum wage under the progressive governments is higher than under conservative governments.