• Journal of Environmental Impact Assessment
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• v.24 no.4
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• pp.332-343
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• 2015

It would be the most effective way to have government take care of social problems and hazardous material danger due to odor. It is also well known that odor acceptance and their willingness to pay for resolving the odor problem vary person by person. This is why public sector's intervention is required to get ride of any possibility of market failure resulted from negative external effect of human. This paper has tried to do empirical research based on survey of residents who are currently living in the area of Ochang industrial complex in North Chong-chung province. According to the empirical research results, first of all, it was proven residents' perception of legal regulation has a negative effect on odor acceptance. That is, the more residents are aware of law and regulation, the less they tend to accept odor. In addition, resident's perception on need to improve odor regulation has a positive impact on their odor acceptance. Finally, residents' satisfaction on the legal complaints to local government has an interaction effect to causative relationship between the perception of improving odor regulation and odor acceptance.

• Journal of Hydrogen and New Energy
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• v.34 no.5
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• pp.389-397
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• 2023

This study compares domestic and foreign research on renewable energy-based water electrolysis clean hydrogen. Domestic studies from 2010 to 2023 focused on technological efficiency, energy efficiency, and system efficiency, with few analyzing infrastructure and technology trends. Overseas research initially focused on technological efficiency and stability, but has since shifted to economic and environmental impact, policy effectiveness, industry-university-research cooperation, and sustainability. To improve water electrolysis technology production, this study suggests prioritizing technology stability over efficiency, resolving government regulations and resident acceptance issues, promoting industry-university-institute cooperation for rapid commercialization of research results, and developing a strategy for sustainable development of renewable energy-based water electrolysis technology.

• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.7 no.4
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• pp.105-134
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• 2008

Local opposition and protest constitute single greatest hurdle to the siting of locally unwanted land uses(LULUs), especially siting of high-level radioactive disposal not only throughout Korea but also throughout the industrialized world. It can be attributed mainly to the NIMBYism, equity problem, and lack of participation. These problems are arisen from rational planning process which emphasizes instrumental rationality. But planning is a value-laden political activity, in which substantive rationality is central. To achieve this goals, we need a sound planning process for siting LULUs, which should improve the ability of citizens to influence the decisions that affects them. By a sound planning process, we mean one that is open to citizen input and contains accurate and complete information. In other word, the public is also part of the goal setting process and, as the information and analyses developed by the planners are evaluated by the public, strategies for solutions can be developed through consensus-building. This method is called as a co-operative siting process, and must be structured in order to arrive at publicly acceptable decisions. The followings are decided by consensus-building method. 1. Negotiation will be held? 2. What is the benefits and risks of negotiation? 3. What are solutions when collisions between national interests and local ones come into? 4. What are the agendas? 5. What is the community' role in site selection? 6. Are there incentives to negotiation. 7. Who are the parties to the negotiation? 8. Who will represent the community? 9. What groundwork of negotiation is set up? 10. How do we assure that the community access to information and expert? 11. What happens if negotiation is failed? 12. Is it necessary to trust each other in negotiations? 13. Is a mediator needed in negotiations?