• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.32 no.5
• /
• pp.987-995
• /
• 2022

Deep learning-based profiling side-channel analysis has been many proposed. Deep learning-based profiling analysis is a technique that trains the relationship between the side-channel information and the intermediate values to the neural network, then finds the secret key of the attack device using the trained neural network. Recently, cross-device profiling side channel analysis was proposed to consider the realistic deep learning-based profiling side channel analysis scenarios. However, it has a limitation in that attack performance is lowered if the profiling device and the attack device have not the same chips. In this paper, an environment in which the profiling device and the attack device have not the same chips is defined as the different-device, and a novel deep learning-based profiling side-channel analysis on different-device is proposed. Also, MCNN is used to well extract the characteristic of each data. We experimented with the six different boards to verify the attack performance of the proposed method; as a result, when the proposed method was used, the minimum number of attack traces was reduced by up to 25 times compared to without the proposed method.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.21 no.11
• /
• pp.2199-2205
• /
• 2017

The development of modern ICT technology constitutes cyber world by using infrastructure in country and society. There is no border in cyber world. Countries around the world are carrying out cyber attacks for their own benefit. A cyber killer strategy is needed to defend cyber attacks. In order to defend the cyber attack or to determine the responsibility of attack, it is important to grasp the attacker origin point. Strategic cyber kill chains are needed to strike against the attacker origin. In this paper, we study the analysis of attacker origin. And analyze the cyber kill chain for attacker origin point strike. Study the efficient and customized cyber kill chain strategy for attacking the origin point. The cyber kill chain strategy will be a practical strategy to replace the power of nuclear and missiles with asymmetric power.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
• /
• 2017.10a
• /
• pp.306-309
• /
• 2017

The development of modern ICT technology constitutes cyber world by using infrastructure in country and society. There is no border in cyber world. Countries around the world are carrying out cyber attacks for their own benefit. A cyber killer strategy is needed to defend cyber attacks. In order to defend the cyber attack or to determine the responsibility of attack, it is important to grasp the attacker origin point. Strategic cyber kill chains are needed to strike against the attacker origin. In this paper, we study the analysis of attacker origin. And analyze the cyber kill chain for attacker origin point strike. Study the efficient and customized cyber kill chain strategy for attacking the origin point. The cyber kill chain strategy will be a practical strategy to replace the power of nuclear and missiles with asymmetric power.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.19 no.6
• /
• pp.63-70
• /
• 2009

Many research results show that RSA system mounted using conventional binary exponentiation algorithm is vulnerable to some physical attacks. Recently, Schmidt and Hurbst demonstrated experimentally that an attacker can exploit secret key using faulty signatures which are obtained by skipping the squaring operations. Based on similar assumption of Schmidt and Hurbst's fault attack, we proposed new fault analysis attacks which can be made by skipping the multiplication operations or computations in looping control statement. Furthermore, we applied our attack to Montgomery ladder exponentiation algorithm which was proposed to defeat simple power attack. As a result, our fault attack can extract secret key used in Montgomery ladder exponentiation.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.32 no.2
• /
• pp.155-162
• /
• 2022

The SITM (See-In-The-Middle) attack proposed in CHES 2020 is a type of analysis technique that combines differential cryptanalysis and side-channel analysis, and can be applied even in a harsh environment with a low SNR (Signal-to-Noise Ratio). This attack targets partial 1^st or higher order masked block cipher, and uses unmasked middle round weakness. PRESENT is a lightweight blockcipher proposed in CHES 2007, designed to be implemented efficiently in a low-power environment. In this paper, we propose SITM attacks on 14-round masked implementation of PRESENT while the previous attacks were applicable to 4-round masked implementation of PRESENT. This indicates that PRESENT has to be implemented with more than 16-round masking to be resistant to our attacks.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
• /
• v.28 no.5
• /
• pp.1079-1087
• /
• 2018

Binary scalar multiplication which is the main operation of elliptic curve cryptography is vulnerable to the side-channel analysis. Especially, it is vulnerable to the side-channel analysis which uses power consumption and electromagnetic emission patterns. Thus, various countermeasures have been studied. However, they have focused on eliminating patterns of data dependent branches, statistical characteristic according to intermediate values, or the interrelationships between data. No countermeasure have been taken into account for the secure design of the key bit check phase, although the secret scalar bits are directly loaded during that phase. Therefore, in this paper, we demonstrate that we can extract secret scalar bits with 100% success rate using a single power or a single electromagnetic trace by performing key bit-dependent attack on hardware implementation of binary scalar multiplication algorithm. Experiments are focused on the $Montgomery-L{\acute{o}}pez-Dahab$ ladder algorithm protected by scalar randomization. Our attack does not require sophisticated pre-processing and can defeat existing countermeasures using a single-trace. As a result, we propose a countermeasure and suggest that it should be applied.

• Convergence Security Journal
• /
• v.18 no.5_1
• /
• pp.93-98
• /
• 2018

Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., Ltd., Korea Electric Power Corporation, and Korea South-East Power Corporation are major infrastructure facilities of power supplying countries. If a malicious hacking attack occurs, the damage is beyond the imagination. In fact, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power has been subjected to a hacking attack, causing internal information to leak and causing social big problems. In this paper, we propose a strategy and countermeasures for stabilization of various power generation control systems by analyzing the environment and the current status of power generation control system for convergence security research, which is becoming a hot issue. We propose a method to normalize and integrate data types from various physical security systems (facilities), IT security systems, access control systems, to control the whole system through convergence authentication, and to detect risks through fusion control.

• Review of KIISC
• /
• v.31 no.1
• /
• pp.41-49
• /
• 2021

NIST(National Institute of Standards and Technology) 양자 내성 암호 표준화 사업이 3차 라운드에 접어들면서, 3라운드 후보자에 대한 실제 구현 결과 및 관심이 꾸준히 증가하고 있다. 3라운드 후보자 중 대부분(5/7)은 격자 기반 암호이며, 격자 기반 암호는 다른 기반의 양자 내성 암호보다 효율적인 연산 처리로 인해 제약적인 리소스를 가진 임베디드 환경에서도 적용이 가능한 장점이 존재한다. 그러나 특히 임베디드 환경에서는 암호 알고리즘이 동작 시 발생하는 추가적인 정보(전력, 전자파, 시간차, 오류주입 등)를 이용한 부채널 공격에 취약하다. 실제 다수의 연구가 양자 내성 암호의 부채널 공격에 대한 가능성을 제시하고 있다. 여전히 부채널 공격은 양자 내성 암호를 표준화하기 위해 상당한 장애물이며, 이에 대응하기 위해서는 구현 시 부채널 대응 기법이 적용되어야 한다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 NIST PQC 3라운드 격자 기반 암호의 부채널 대응 방안에 대한 최신 동향을 분석한다, 또한 향후, NIST PQC 3라운드 격자 기반 암호의 연구 전망을 논의한다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.20 no.11
• /
• pp.2014-2020
• /
• 2016

In general, automatic access control management system using smart door-lock must be always exposed to security vulnerability during wireless communication based on Bluetooth. In particular, important information such as a secrete key can be exposed to the attacker when the authentication protocol has been operating in the wireless section. Therefore important information exchanged in the radio section needs to be properly encrypted. In order to analyze security vulnerability for automatic access control management system of public facilities such as subway vent, GNU Radio platform and HackRF device will be considered and experimented. Proposed experimental system to perform software based power analysis attack could be very effectively applied. As a result, important information such as packet type, CRC, length of data, and data value can be easily decoded from wireless packet obtained from HackRF device on GNU Radio platform. Constructed experimental system will be applied to avoid some security problems.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
• /
• 2011.11a
• /
• pp.747-750
• /
• 2011

최근 에너지와 자원 절약 사업의 일원으로 차세대 전력 관리 시스템인 스마트 그리드에 대한 관심이 증가하고 있다. 스마트 그리드는 전력 공급자와 소비자 사이에 통신망을 기반으로 한 양방향 전력 공급 방식을 말한다. 스마트 그리드를 통하여 전력 공급자는 소비자의 전력 사용량에 따른 탄력적인 전력 생산 및 공급이 가능하고, 소비자는 자신의 소비 패턴을 통한 효율적 전력 소비를 할 수 있다. 하지만 사이버 공격에 대한 위협이 높아지면서 공용망을 기반으로 운용되는 스마트 그리드 운용 정보에 대한 보안요구사항이 증가하고 있다. 이에 본 논문에서는 소비자 전력 사용량, 전력 사용 패턴 등의 정보가 송수신되는 지능형검침인프라의 보안 위협을 분석하고, 이를 해결하기 위한 방안을 제안한다.