• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.36
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• pp.175-197
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• 1998

This paper examined the role of social workers in the redistribution policy process in Korea, based on the materials of case studies on the Korean redistribution policy. The findings and assertions in this paper are as follows: In the Korean redistribution policy process clients could not fully reflect their interests, because they were lack of the power resources such as money, knowledge, time, social status, etc. The process was initiated by the President and bureaucrats who were not oriented to social welfare. As a result, the redistribution policy in Korea has not been well-developed in terms not only of the policy for clients, but also of the policy for social integration. In the policy process, somebody is needed that issues the policy problem, watches the agenda setting process, the polcy making process and the implementation process in order to keep the interests of the have-nots. I assert that a social worker have taken these roles in the field of the redistribution policy process, because he/she is an expert equipped with professional knowledge and skills about social action.

• Economic Analysis
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.34-83
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• 2020

This paper examines two different reunification regimes and investigates the decision making problems on tax and income transfers in a political economy model. The first reunification regime is the South-Driven regime under which the majority of South Korea choose the tax rate, the amount of transfers and the size of migration. The second is the North-Participation regime under which there is no limit on migration and the majority of Unified Korea choose the tax rate and the amount of transfers. In both regimes, Northern residents' migration decisions are endogenous and those who decide not to migrate to the Southern region have an alternative to declare fiscal independence of income redistribution taking place within the North independently. This paper shows that there is no income redistribution in a politico-economic equilibrium under the South-Driven regime. Given that, those remaining in the Northern region decide to declare fiscal independence. On the other hand, the North-Participation regime delivers an equilibrium supporting income redistribution and no fiscal independence.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.145-175
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• 2011

We analyse an overlapping generation model in which economic agents, especially their income distribution, influence environmental policy and redistributive policy through political decision making process. In an economic equilibrium which doesn't consider political process, the introduction of environmental policy is shown to increase economic growth rate. In contrast to an economic equilibrium, environmental policy can be adopted when economic inequality reduces to a certain threshold in a political economic equilibrium. The adoption of environmental policy, on the other hand, incurs the demand of strengthened redistributive policy, which in turn decreases economic growth in a short run. We discuss broad policy implications based on our political economic analyses.

• 사회경제평론
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• no.38
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• pp.9-49
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• 2012

Our luck is brute if we cannot choose or control it and, thus, we are not responsible for it. Our luck is optional if we can choose or control it and, thus, we are responsible for it. Egalitarian justice at least demands brute luck be fully neutralized. If, however, brute luck is not fully neutralized and possibly accumulated, what will happen to the Gini coefficients as a measure of inequality due to brute luck? By simulating brute luck under various combinations of the rate of accumulation and the level of, what I call, leximin-redistribution, I obtain the Gini coefficients for the distribution of the accumulated and, then, redistributed brute luck. The level of the leximin-redistribution determines the negative or positive relation between the rate of accumulation and the Gini coefficient. The minimum leximin-redistribution level that generates the negative relation between the rate of accumulation and the Gini coefficient, depends on the characteristics of the starting-point distribution of brute luck. The sooner the leximin-redistribution is ushered in, the lower the minimum level becomes. The so-called 'Growth First Redistribution Later' policy may hurt victims of brute bad luck.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.12 no.12
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• pp.661-671
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• 2012

The purpose of this study was to analyze the core policies of local government directors by performing centrality analysis on their core policies using network text analysis method. From the research results, it was verified to some extent that major policies of local government directors were changing during the path to arrive at 5th civil election. However, according to policy type by Peterson (development policy, allocation policy and redistribution policy) it was found that they still focused on development policies. However, it is encouraging that the government directors elected in the 5th election started to pay attention to 'Culture' which is one of allocation policies.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.42 no.2
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• pp.1-35
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• 2019

This paper compares the effects of income transfer and wage subsidy in a simple general equilibrium model. The redistributive effects of both policies are smaller, the more intensive in low wage workers are the luxury goods production. Wage subsidy contributes more to employment and GDP relative to income subsidy, but its redistributive effects can be smaller depending on the elasticities of labor demand supply. More complete empirical analysis appears due on the effects of both policies in order to design an optimal mix of efficiency and equity.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.1 no.3
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• pp.43-68
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• 1979

• Korea journal of population studies
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.67-71
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• 1978

• 한국사회정책
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.3-35
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• 2018

This article critically reviews the arguments that deny the financial feasbility and effectiveness of universal basic income as an alternative to existing social security systems and makes some suggestions to design effective and efficient basic income schemes. Regarding the financial feasibility of universal basic income, I argue that replacement of the existing regressive tax expenditures with universal basic income without raising tax rates can effectively reduce tax burden or provide income support to a majority of people except the rich. Addition of basic income to the tax base and reduction of the number of beneficiaries of public assistance and the amount of cash payment for them can further help save money. Regarding the redistributive effect, I note that the targeting ability of the existing social security systems is not good and that "the paradox of redistribution" that universal-type programs tend to be more redistributive than selective programs applies to universal basic income as well. I demonstrate significant redistributive effect of a hypothetical revenue-neutral basic income scheme and reviews several empirical studies done in Korea and abroad to show that basic income can be more effective in redistribution than social insurances or public assistance programs. Lastly, I emphasize the need to construct a reliable tax-benefit microsimulation model to help researchers to study redistributive effects of basic income schemes and other taxes and social policies.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.51-70
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• 1989

본고(本稿)에서는 사회보장제도확충(社會保障制度擴充)과 관련된 자원배분(資源配分)과 소득재분배효과(所得再分配效果)를 국제비교(國際比較)와 경제적(經濟的) 결과(結果)를 중심으로 논하였다. 90년대를 향한 한국사회(韓國社會)가 처한 중요한 과제는 넓은 의미에서 형평(衡平)의 제고(提高) 및 국민복지수준(國民福祉水準)의 향상(向上)이다. 따라서 장기적 측면에서 볼 때 우리의 사회보장정책(社會保障政策)의 기본방향(基本方向)은 소극적 성격의 단순한 소득이전적(所得移轉的) 복지정책(福祉政策)이 아니라 그 원인을 제거하고 발생을 예방하는 적극적 복지정책(福祉政策)이어야 한다. 이를 위하여 사회보장부문(社會保障部門)에 대한 정책(政策)의 책임이 보다 강조되어야 하며 구체적으로 재정지출(財政支出)의 우선순위(優先順位)를 높여야 한다. 그러나 우리는 형평(衡平)의 추구(追求)를 단계적(段階的)으로 추진하면서도 동시에 경제성장(經濟成長)의 효율(效率)을 상당한 수준에서 유지하는 슬기를 가져야 할 것이다.