• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.147
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• pp.59-76
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• 2018

What are the conditions make a being x a moral agent? Can an artifact be moral agent? A moral agent is considered to be a rational being capable of distinguishing between right and wrong. This study critically analyzed Davidson's position on the condition of the rational being and argued that the network of beliefs with propositional attitude and the beliefs as their background cannot be a requisite for the rational being. Later, it proves that the conditions proposed by $Proke{\check{s}}ov{\acute{a}}$ are merely paratactically listed superficial elements. The moral agent in this study includes the rational agent and it is proven that the strong first person viewpoint is the necessary and sufficient condition for rational agent and moral agent. In conclusion, it suggested a the sketch of moderate skepticism which sets the tentative limit on the agent potential in an artifact by suggesting conditions for moral agent instead of intense skepticism that strongly denies the potential as the moral agent.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.89-101
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• 1984

오늘날 교통계획분야에서 개별적, 행태론적 선택모형의 사용이 급격히 일반화 되어 가고 있는 추세를 보이고 있다. 이는 종래의 집합적 모형에 비하여, 구조적으로 경제학에서 말하는 이성적 선택행위를 보다 잘 설명하고 있어, 선택행위의 인과관계를 나타낸다고 보여 지기 때문이다. 그러나 이들 모형이 주어진 선택범위내에서의 선택만을 다루고 있어, 선택범 위를 결정하는데 임의성이 내재되어 있을 뿐만 아니라, 선택대상이 많은 경우에는 곤란하다 는 것이 문제점으로 지적되고 있다. 본 논문에서는, 선택행위에 관한 경제학적, 심리학적 이 론에 근거하여 비교적 실용적인 선택범위결정과정을 개발하여 기존의 개별적, 행태론적 모 형과 복합적으로 활용할수 있는 방안을 제시하였다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.239-267
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• 2018

In the matter of ethical and moral practice, Thomas Aquinas's thought is called "intellectualism". It does not mean only that intelligence is more important than will in moral practice, but that it has epistemological, metaphysical, and psycho-psychological implications significance. The first means affirming "the first principles of knowing" as the problem of certainty of knowing. In Thomism, there are surely above suspicion notions in the domain of practice as well as in the domain of reason, which are obviously self-evident, and because of that certainty, they become the basis of certainty of all other knowings that follow. The principle to know these knowings is the first principle of knowing, reason and Synderesis(conscience). Therefore, the "intellectualism" of Tomism is the basis for providing the ground of metaphysics. In the case of reason, it is classified into superior reason and inferior reason according to whether it is object. The object of higher reason is "metaphysical object" which human natural reason can not deal with. This affirmation of superior reason provides a basis for human "autonomy" in the moral and religious domain. This is because even in areas beyond the object of natural reason, it is possible to derive certain knowledge through self-reasoning, and thus to be able to carry out the act through their own choosing. Likewise, for Thomas Aquinas, "Synderesi" as the first principle of good and evil judgment can be applied to both the superior reason and the inferior reason, and thus, except for the truth by the direct divine revelation, precedes any authority of the world, scrupulous Act always guarantees truth and good. This means "subjectivity" that virtually in the act of moral practice, it can become the master of one's act. Furthermore, "consciousness(conscientia)", which means the ability to comprehend everything in a holistic and simultaneous manner, is based on conscience(synderesis). So, at least in principle, correct behavior or moral behavior in Tomism is given firstly in correct knowledge. Therefore, it can be said that true awareness (conscious awareness) in Thomas Aquinas's thought coincide with practical practice, or at least knowledge can be said to be a decisive 'driver' for practice. This will be the best explanation of the definition of "intellectualism" by Thomism.

• Journal of Korea Entertainment Industry Association
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• v.13 no.6
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• pp.211-220
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• 2019

It helps to wisely abstain from errors of the a priori subjective emotions related to human emotions, and orders emotions to make rational choices. These emotional happiness of human and moral sensitivities work directly or indirectly in rational choice of rational thought and reason. Abraham would have been troubled by the divine mandate to sacrifice a son who was only one, and a son who had been healed. Was his reason reasonable at this time? In rational reason, it can be said that the act of dedicating his son is an appropriate act, but is it possible in the human mind? Aristoteles also called human virtue virtue in good for human beings. Because happiness is also a mental activity, we have to know a certain degree about the mind. This ψυχή(psyche, spirit) spirit is an irrational element that is invisible but an intervention in rational principles. Also C. G. Jung states that all human beings have four dynamic psychological functions that are not visible, and that the mind is driven by these four functional dimensions. This means that the elements of S, Sensing, N, Intuition, T, Thinking, and Feeling are combined. David Hume also emphasized the principle of empathy, asserting that morality can not be derived from reason, and Max Ferdinand Scheler, before grasping the visual characteristics of a person, has already captured the whole feeling of the person, And that the value given to this feeling is the value, and that the function of emotion that is elevated to the perceived object by grasping the value through this process and the value is always preceded by the reason. Emmanuel Levinas states that emotional emotions of love are ahead of reason and that emotions precede human reasoning and rationality is the inability of emotional control that we need rational thought and rational and wise action as reason of control and temperance. As part of human emotional education, in the 7th curriculum, Bloom's cognitive, perceptive, and behavioral domain, which is a person with integrated thinking, is trying to be a moral practitioner. It focuses on how to act according to the direction of emotions for virtuous acts and how to develop emotions for emotions on behalf of vicious acts. We can design the possibility and direction of cultivating human emotions and emotional happiness and happy sensitivities by the principle of strengthening virtue and the principle of elimination of ill feeling.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.25-34
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• 2014

The current study investigates the impacts of empathic concern, as a personal trait, and rational/emotional appeal on responses over the campaigns to help the disabled. Empathic concern is an emotional personality known as strongly activating altruistic motivations. The experiment proceeded at two stages that in the first stage, the personal disposition was measured and in the second stage, the condition of appeal type was presented. Thus, the whole experimental design was empathic concern(2) ${\times}$ appeal type(2) on attitudes and behavioral intention. Individuals high in empathic concern showed higher ratings, compared to people low, on attitudes and behavioral intention in the condition of rational appeal. The difference between high and low empathic concern in the condition of emotional appeal was small.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.145
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• pp.325-350
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• 2018

The overemphasis of the priority of reason over will runs the risk of resulting in intellectual determinism. On the contrary, it is also unfair to underestimate the role of reason in Saint Thomas Aquinas' theory of the free will to avoid intellectual determinism. For, according to Thomas, "the will inclines to the good, insofar as it is an appetite, and it follows the judgment of the reason in the pursuit of the good, insofar as it is a 'rational' appetite." It is the objective of this article to show that, for Thomas, the idea of the free will is not contradictory to that of the will's following the judgment of reason. For this purpose, it is decisive to adequately evaluate the role of reason in Thomas's theory of the free will. This article therefore proves that in principle Thomas argues the priority of the will over reason as well as the freedom of the will, and that he nevertheless recognizes the role of reason which precedes the choice of the will by making the second-level judgment even when the will chooses not to follow the first-level judgement of reason. It is entirely up to the will to follow the judgement and order of reason or not. It explains the freedom of the will. But 'not to follow reason' is contradictory to the essential determination of the will as the 'rational' appetite. For from the will's not following reason, wrong-doing follows; the human act which does not conform to reason. This article therefore argues that for Thomas, the 'true' liberty of the will corresponding to its determination as the rational appetite consists in its following the rule and order of reason, not in acting against the judgement of reason.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.68 no.1
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• pp.95-116
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• 2016

This study was developed from the idea that giving has been interpreted exclusively as a social selection based on reasonal thinking. The purpose of the presented study was to investigate the hypothesis that giving was a habitus of citizen, based on Bourdieu theory of social setting and habitus. For that purpose, this study analyzed the secondary data from KGSS 2011 through SEM. Result revealed that the goodness of fit for the proposed structural model was high. Also, level of virtue as civizen and social participation as citizen were significantly associated with level of giving, supporting the hypothesis that giving was a hibitus of citizen.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.105
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• pp.49-74
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• 2008

Le but de notre recherche est $d^{\prime}{\acute{e}}clairer$ la nature du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi aux actes humaines dnas le Thomisme. Dans le Thomisme la nature humaine qui a la raison et la $volont{\acute{e}}$ a une $intentionnalit{\acute{e}}$ ver la fin ultime. De sorte que les actes humaines qui $corr{\grave{e}}spondent$ cette nature humaine a un $caract{\grave{e}}re$ du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi visant toujours plus que le $pr{\acute{e}}sent$. Le fondement de cet acte du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi est $l^{\prime}{\hat{a}}me$ rationelle qui est la forme substantielle de l'homme et de soi subsistante. Chez st. Thomas ce $caract{\grave{e}}re$ du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ a trois ${\acute{e}}taps$ distinctes : (1)le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ dans l'ordre du $progr{\grave{e}}s$ naturel (2)le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans l'ordre morale (3)le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans l'ordre de la religion. Le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ dans l'ordre du $progr{\grave{e}}s$ naturel apparaît d'abord au $caract{\grave{e}}re$ de $l^{\prime}{\hat{a}}me$ rationelle. St. Thomas $d{\acute{e}}finit$ les vertus rationelles comme $^{\prime}pl{\acute{e}}nitude$ dans le $f{\acute{e}}blesse$, parce qu'il $consid{\grave{e}}re$ la vertu rationelle comme $finalit{\acute{e}}$ des $facult{\acute{e}}s$ du sens $ext{\acute{e}}rieur$. L'homme par le sens $ext{\acute{e}}rieur$ reçoit des $esp{\grave{e}}ces$ sensibles(especies sensibilis), et $poss{\grave{e}}de$ les images. Puis cette images sensible devenant la $r{\acute{e}}alit{\acute{e}}$ spirituelle sous forme du $m{\acute{e}}moire$ et du souvenir, devient aussi la partie de son existence. Donc chez st. Thomas la vertue rationnelle n'est pas simplement un $facult{\acute{e}}$ $sp{\acute{e}}culative$, mais elle est dans l'ordre du devenir et du $pl{\acute{e}}nitude$. A cette raison st. Thomas compare la raison(ratio) comme $g{\acute{e}}n{\acute{e}}ration$(generatio) et l'intelleigence(intellectus) comme ${\hat{e}}tre$(esse). C'est-${\grave{a}}$-dire la raison $d{\acute{e}}passe$ le sensible et l'intelligence $d{\acute{e}}passe$ la raison. Le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans l'ordre morale $li{\acute{e}}$ au $progr{\grave{e}}s$ de la conscience. Chez st. Thomas la perception de l'objet $ext{\acute{e}}rieur$ ayant pour but d'avoir conscience de soi, se perfectionne ${\grave{a}}$ ceci. D'avoir conscience de soi signifie d'avoir $l^{\prime}identit{\acute{e}}$ de soi, et de-$l{\grave{a}}$ apparaît l'acte moral en tnat qu'acte $sp{\acute{e}}cifique$ humain. La raison pour laquelle la vie morale elle-$m{\hat{e}}me$ a un $caract{\grave{e}}$ du $d{\acute{e}}passement$, c'est que l'acte humaine qui corresfonde ${\grave{a}}$ $l^{\prime}identit{\acute{e}}$ du soi est une vie qui vise toujours plus que le $pr{\acute{e}}sent$ ou $l^{\prime}id{\acute{e}}al$. Quant au problem du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ dans l'ordre de la religion, chez st. Thomas en raison de $l^{\prime}affinit{\acute{e}}$ entre Dieu et l'homme, $o{\grave{u}}$ il y a des vertues infuses(virtutes infusas), il y a une sorte du $d{\acute{e}}passement$ religieux. Car ces vertues infuses signifie la communication entre Dieu(${\hat{E}}tre$ absolu) et l'homme(${\hat{e}}tre$ fine) et cela signifie le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de l'humain vers le divin. Cette $id{\acute{e}}e$ thomiste permet de penser que $o{\grave{u}}$ il y a un $d{\acute{e}}passement$ de soi dans la vie religuse d'une personne, il y a une intervention $r{\acute{e}}elle$ de la providence divine. Cette $pens{\acute{e}}e$ thomiste sera alors un $caract{\grave{e}}$ $r{\acute{e}}aliste$ face ${\grave{a}}$ la $pens{\acute{e}}e$ $id{\acute{e}}aliste$ qui n'admette que le $d{\acute{e}}passement$ absolu comme $d{\acute{e}}passement$ religieux.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.58 no.4
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• pp.119-139
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• 2006

The main purpose of this study is to examine the implications of Habermas's Critical Theory, which has been considered as modern descendant of enlightenment thought, on the social work profession. The focus of this paper is a critical examination on expected perceptual and practical gain provided by communicative theory for the professional relations between social workers and clients. This paper proves that Habermas's theory has failed to sufficiently grasp the scope and functions of social work practice. First, in regard to perceptual gains, Habermas's theory commits some kind of reductionism which considers communicative behaviors as only and original one. It is likely to limit the scope and extent of the function and mission of social work into a kind of communication performed by humans with communicative ability. Second, in regard of practical gains, Habermas's theory does not provide detail procedure of power-free communication nor critical criteria to evaluate the degree of ideal speech situation. Without these ones, Habermas's critical theory might play a role of liberal conservatism, which is trying to replace the substantial contents with procedural formality. In sum, to be a adequate theoretical and practical framework for social work, Habermas's theory needs to combine additional humanitarian considerations into communicative paradigm with more detail requirements and preconditions for ideal speech situations between professional and clients.

• Journal of Korean Home Economics Education Association
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.27-44
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• 2021

This study is to identify the concept of action from the critical science perspective and to explore the agency of home economics teachers for the purpose of teacher education. The context and various characteristics of home economics teacher' agency were identified in terms of philosophy and teacher education. The results of the study indicates, first, the concept of action refers to an activity of individuals involving one's own intentions, and include the ability to reveal a unique identity that aims to reach a set purpose and decision, and this can be identified by mutual meaning in the public sphere. Second, teacher agency is influenced by a teacher's professional experiences and cultural and structural aspects, and it can create an environment which can promote self-directed and cooperative relationships among individuals and communities. Therefore, home economics teachers should be able to reasonably judge, contemplate, and act through reflections on the circumstances and consequences in which their agency is exercised. Third, home economics teachers can reflect and think critically about the values, roles, and sense of purpose of home economics education based on agency. Teachers should focus on the process of achieving their agency rather than on completing it, and they can continuously develop it through a perceived shared understanding among teachers. Therefore, the conceptualization of the agency of home economics teachers is to understand the practice revealed in a teacher's actions. This requires environmental support in school settings because it acts as a mechanism for strengthening the thinking and reflection of teachers through the creation of interactive environments in which professional knowledge and experiences can be shared.